It is asserted that God, from all eternity, ordained every sin that is committed but yet is neither the author nor approver of it. How can these things be reconciled? The following remarks, it is thought, will aid us to arrive at a solution of the question.
1. A distinction is to be made, as existing in the divine mind, between the sinful act and the result to be attained by it. The one may be abhorrent to God and forbidden by Him and is sinful, because it is a violation of His law; the other may be good and infinitely worthy of accomplishment. Thus, eating the forbidden fruit was a sinful act, because forbidden by God and, as such, was infinitely abhorrent to Him; while the result attained by it was, in part, at least (and who will venture to say it was not as a whole, taking all things into consideration) a good infinitely valuable. It gave occasion for the advent of Christ; for the manifestation of the divine excellencies; and for the bestowal of that glorious grace which will constitute the theme for the praises of the redeemed, throughout eternity. Again, the outrage upon Joseph was, in the perpetrators of it, an unnatural sin and, as such, offensive in the sight of God; but the result attained by it was good and extorted the gratitude of all those affected by it. Joseph's brethren "meant" it for evil, but God "meant" it for good, to save much people alive. Finally, the crucifixion of Christ was not only a violation of the commands of God against the shedding of innocent blood, but was infinitely heinous as a manifestation of the Jews' hostility to Christ's holiness and was, therefore, an awful act of wickedness; but what Christian is unconscious of the glorious consequences of the crucifixion of Christ? What humble soul does not adopt the language of the Apostle, and say -- "God forbid that I should glory, save in the Cross of Christ, by which the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world."
2. It follows from the above that if God knows that any thing will result in infinite good (as the wicked crucifixion of Christ, for instance), it is not unworthy in Him to decree that it should occur; on the contrary, it is infinitely worthy in Him to do so. Calvinists, therefore, divide the will of God into secret and revealed -- the revealed to govern His creatures, the secret to govern Himself; and the latter will be attained, whether men regard or disregard the former. But here two other objections are started. 1st. "Does not this imply an inconsistency in God; as His secret will is sometimes one thing, and His revealed another?" and 2nd. "Is this not saying that God does evil, that good may come?"
1st. To the first, we answer that God's revealed will is always consistent with itself, and His secret will is always consistent with itself. The former is given in His precepts, and all the commands, warning, threatening, persuasions, &c, are consistent therewith. He never commands anything without sincerely requiring it; and, having commanded it. He never authorizes anything that conflicts with it. His revealed and His secret will have reference to objects that are entirely distinct, and cannot, therefore, be compared together. Thus, as we have shown, His revealed will may be entirely opposed to the violence offered to the Saviour and to the motives and feelings that influenced the Jews in that transaction; and yet His secret will, having another object in view, decreed that event in order that the glorious blessings and results that flow from the atonement of Christ might be secured.
2nd. "Is this not saying that God does evil that good may come?"
God is not the doer of evil -- the most that can be said, therefore, is that He permits evil that good may come. Substitute, therefore, for the word `does', the word `permits', and the question will stand: "Does God permit evil that good may come?" That He does permit evil is indisputable. Only three suppositions, therefore, can be made in the case: Either He permits it without any objection in view and for no reason at all; or He permits it that evil may come; or He permits it that good may come. The first, if we understand them, is the Arminian view; but which is the most honoring to God? Let the reader judge.
Finally, if there is any difficulty in this subject, it grows out of the connection that exists between the omnipotent and sovereign God and finite and responsible men. God's sovereignty and man's free agency are both revealed in the scriptures and, therefore, should be both believed. And if we cannot reconcile them, it is not because they are irreconcilable, but because the subject is above our faculties. We think it has been shown, however, that if the objection considered above can lie against the Calvinistic system, it can be alleged with as much reason against the Bible: and Calvinism is content to stand or fall with the Bible.
Objection 2. "Does not the doctrine which teaches that God foreordained all things even to the sins that wicked men commit, exonerate the sinner from all blame?" This is akin to the objection considered above, viz: that Predestination makes God the author of sin, and the answer to one is applicable to the other. The point of the objection is that, if the creature does what God in His secret counsels ordained should be done and thus becomes an instrument (though unconsciously) for the accomplishment of God's purposes, no blame can be attached to him, and God has no right to find fault. Exactly such an objection and in the same connection is considered and answered by the Apostle Paul in Romans 3:5, 6, 7, 8. "But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance?" If our wickedness tends to the glory of God and to the accomplishment of His purposes, would it not be unjust in God to punish us? Certainly not, says he, "God forbid; for then how shall God judge the world?" "But," says the objector, "if the truth of God hath more abounded through my life unto his glory, why am I also judged as a sinner?" "And not rather," answers the Apostle (as we be slanderously reported, &c), "Let us do evil that good may come." Secret things belong to God; and it is a worthy view of Him that He rules with such an omnipotent sway, then even our rebellion and wickedness cannot happen without His permission and cannot thwart His purposes. His revealed will is the rule of our action, and whenever we violate it thoughtlessly or through enmity to it, we are guilty of sin and are blameworthy, whatever may be the consequence of our act as it relates to God. As well might one say who, with malice aforethought, attempted to injure seriously another whom he hated but was thwarted by the skill or power of the latter and thus the act, that was meant for his injury, was made to subserve his interest in a high degree- as well might such an one say, that he was not blameworthy since his act (though unintentionally) wrought good and not evil. And the case supposed would be more pertinent still, and it would not in the slightest degree affect the moral character of the act, if the assailed, unknown to his adversary, became possessed of his intention before hand and determined to permit it, because he foresaw how he could turn it to a good account. Because the wrath of man is foreseen by God and is made to praise Him, that does not make it the less the wrath of man. That God does ordain particular events and all the minute circumstances connected therewith, and yet men act wickedly in bringing them to pass, is asserted by a multitude of scripture passages. Take the following: "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain" (Acts 2:23). See again, Matt. 17:12; Acts 4:27, 28, 27:23, 24, 34 and that remarkable passage John 19:11. "Jesus answered, thou couldst have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin." Our objector, however, differing from the Saviour, would say that, under the circumstances, he had no sin at all!
Objection 3. "But does not Predestination, as explained, destroy free-agency, and make men mere machines?" No, on the contrary, it establishes free-agency. Men are free-agents when they act according to their inclinations. Freedom of action is not opposed to necessity but to compulsion. A being may be necessarily holy or necessarily wicked, and yet a free-agent -- nay, a free-agent for that very reason. Thus, God is a free-agent though He cannot sin and Satan though he cannot but sin. And so it is with men. . . Predestination asserts neither that God makes men serve Him against their consent nor that they disobey Him unwillingly. His chosen people He makes willing in the day of His power and so works in them to will and to do His good pleasure, that they find it to be their meat and their drink to do His will; the rest He leaves to themselves, and, in consequence, they sin against Him freely, and, in following their own inclinations, they work out their own destruction greedily. "But you say God does not infuse into the sinner any active principle of disobedience; how then can he fulfil that which God has appointed, and yet not be a mere machine?" And yet so it is; and my Arminian objector is as much responsible for it as I am. Did not Joseph's brethren act freely in their violence to him? Yet God sent him to Egypt? Did not Pharaoh act freely in refusing to let the Israelites go? Yet God hardened his heart that he might not let them go. Was not the curse which Shimei uttered against David the offspring of the bitter feelings of his heart? Yet God told him to curse David. Did not Absalom and his advisers act in an untrammeled manner in adopting the counsel of Hushai rather than that of Ahithophel? Yet "the Lord had appointed to defeat the good counsel of Ahithophel, to the intent that the Lord might bring evil upon Absalom" (2 Sam. 17:14). Did not the Jews act freely in crucifying Christ? Yet He was delivered to them by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God.
-- Patrick Hues Mell
