Town Heretic:
I've read your most recent response twice, and I think that the best course of action simply is to note the following:
1. I think that we can simplify and avoid the conversation about licensing/taxing tobacco in the following way. If:
A. The use of tobacco, in and of itself, constitutes a moral evil and
B. The action of the State (let us call it x) constitutes formal or unjustified material cooperation in that evil (or otherwise itself constitute a moral evil)...
...Then the State has a moral obligation not to do x.
Let it be noted, however, I have serious doubts about both A and B (though, of course, this in and of itself does not constitute an argument).
In particular, your argument for A rests on a vague notion of harm which I simply can't agree with. The criterion for the moral acceptability or unacceptability of an act is not harm. The criterion is conformity with right reason, which, again, should be understood according to the analogy of the artisan. Just as a cobbler is to the shoes that he makes, so too is the moral agent to his conduct.
If your sole argument is "there are bad consequences," then I'm simply not impressed. Further contributing to my doubt is my lack of awareness of Catholic authorities who make your claim. Again, I know several (more or less serious and well educated) Catholics who have absolutely no moral qualms about an occassional cigar. It could, of course, be that they are mistaken. I don't know.
But the point remains that I am unaware of any authorities which indicate that tobacco smoking is, in and of itself, evil. Again, the fact that tobacco smoking falls under temperance seems to indicate that it's not, but then, that's not necessarily true. I don't know.
But note, of course, that this has absolutely no bearing on the previous conditional that I gave, which, again runs as follows:
If the action of the State (x) constitutes formal or unjustified material cooperation (or otherwise itself constitute a moral evil), and if tobacco smoking is per se evil, then the State has an obligation not to do x.
The truth of the antecedent is in doubt, but this puts us in no doubt about the truth of the conditional.
Even so, we may reason, likewise:
If the issuance of marriage licenses to sodomite couples constitutes formal or unjustified material cooperation in evil (or, otherwise, it itself constitutes a moral evil), then the State may not do it.
In point of fact (as, I think, you will admit), the antecedent is true. Therefore, the consequent follows: The State has a moral obligation not to do it.