Lon
Well-known member
New to us, not to God, in my own words.The creation of the world a new direction?
A new direction is change and time in God.
In your own words, you're almost there.
--Dave
New to us, not to God, in my own words.The creation of the world a new direction?
A new direction is change and time in God.
In your own words, you're almost there.
--Dave
Yes, but gravity isn't His reality. We are discussing time in the same light, that it cannot apply to Him. Keep up sir
I AM. Look it up. :AMR:
God is independent, and claims it so in his own name-- he makes himself known as absolute being, as the one who is in an absolute sense.
BTW, if your litmus test is explicit words, where in the Bible do we find the word "Trinity"? Best to stick with "by good and necessary consequence" of the whole counsel of God when determining doctrine, no?
AMR
The verses which I quoted do prove my contention and you said absolutely NOTHING that demonstrates what I said is in error:Your exegesis, including attempt to use Greek you don't understand, does not support your preconceived idea.
The salvation spoken of in the verse is not in regard to a "corporate" one at all but instead an "individual" oneCorporate vs individual election resolves your proof texting.
You find it difficult because you have no one to tell you how to answer the verses which I quoted. You are helpless if you cannot find an answer supplied by others.Why do I find it so difficult to dialogue with you?
Originally Posted by DFT_Dave
The creation is in his (God's) past.
--Dave
Prove the above to me please, and I'll become an open theist.
As I said, a nonbeginning eternality has no past or a past that is still going (both amount to the same thing logically). Yes, we have a past, God does not. We have a point to measure from, we are in time. God is not subject to His creation, but His creation subject to Him. What God does can be measured. Who God is cannot.The earth God created is the one we are on right now, how can God be still creating it?
--Dave
Can what God did before creation be measured? Are you saying that there are pockets of time within eternity?What God does can be measured. Who God is cannot.
Yup.As I said, a nonbeginning eternality has no past or a past that is still going (both amount to the same thing logically). Yes, we have a past, God does not. We have a point to measure from, we are in time. God is not subject to His creation, but His creation subject to Him. What God does can be measured. Who God is cannot.
As I said, a nonbeginning eternality has no past or a past that is still going (both amount to the same thing logically). Yes, we have a past, God does not. We have a point to measure from, we are in time. God is not subject to His creation, but His creation subject to Him. What God does can be measured. Who God is cannot.
As I said, a nonbeginning eternality has no past or a past that is still going (both amount to the same thing logically). Yes, we have a past, God does not. We have a point to measure from, we are in time. God is not subject to His creation, but His creation subject to Him. What God does can be measured. Who God is cannot.
New to us, not to God, in my own words.
Zippy2006,
The question of the difference between ought and can (with regard to man) is important, just as is the matter of relating the will of God to the manner of its expression.
There is no ought to with regard to God's behavior—whatever God wills for himself is right ethically, and aligns with God’s being and knowledge. If some evil is permitted to be done by some creature, the proper response by believers is to view it as allowed for the greater purpose of its ultimate frustration and destruction. "You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good."
God defines that which is morally proper to do, because the creature is naturally subject to his Creator.
Now here explanation is sought to account for the fact of human rebellion, man's defiance of the expressed will of God. The one explanation that aligns with Scripture’s description of divine providence is that God's imperatives do not consistently line up with God's indicatives prior to the final moment of history, when they line up perfectly.
The basic or descriptive mood of speech is the indicative. It the sort of speech one regularly encounters in narrative, whether in past, present—excluding the content of dialog. The future tense can also be in the indicative mood, where description is the purpose[/i]. Thus, the statement:"Jesus will be coming again," is indicative.
For example, "Even so, Come! Lord Jesus," is in the imperative mood. Carefully note the rather obvious contextual limits on this being a command believers issue to Christ. In Luther's words, "Nothing else is signified than that which ought to be done." Morality implies oughtness. To say that humans are responsible to God is to say that they ought to obey Him.
The statement by Luther may sound like it comes in the context of dealing with the argument that whatever Scripture commands (imperative mood) assumes the possibility of fulfillment. In other words, as you are arguing, ought implies can by logical or moral necessity. Such an argument assumes that God—either because of his knowledge or his moral character—never demands of anyone that which lies beyond their ability to perform. Your argument reads this belief into the imperatives of Scripture.
But that's not a logical implication of the imperative mood at all. There is no "moral necessity" for God to limit his commands to that which men can naturally perform.
The possibility that a creature might resent him for such a command is irrelevant; and resentment would only occur to the sinful creature anyway, while a believer would be only too willing to die in the attempt.
Your notion that commands such as, "Look unto me, all you ends of the earth, and be saved," means that dead men can look to God apart from God’s making them alive, erroneously takes the theologically descriptive indicative (bound/captive/enslaved will) and subordinates it to philosophical presuppositions that
(1) men possess the power of contrary choice; and
(2) God deals with men "fairly"—God lowers the bar for men in their fallen condition, and doesn't ask as much from them as God asked of Adam and then of Jesus Christ.
Human responsibility does not require neutrality of the will in order for the person to be morally accountable. Here is exactly where the Reformed and others differ. Others, like yourself, argue that moral responsibility necessitates that the person is at a crossroads and can equally choose either option. We Reformed disagree.
Zippy, what Scripture commands (imperative) indeed is what ought to be done. "He did/didn't," "he does/doesn't," "he will/won't," are all indicative expressions of the moving relation from "ought" to "is."
We note from Scripture that no man is neutral towards Christ, who said, He who is not with me is against me” (Matthew 12:30, and the logical converse, “He that is not against us is for us”, Mark 9:40). In turn, this means ”No man can serve two masters” (Matt. 6:24). A person cannot serve two and he cannot serve none. At any given moment, the will of man is serving God or serving sin. Therefore, moral neutrality is impossible. Like Dylan sang, You gotta serve somebody. It might be the Devil and it might be the Lord. But you gotta serve somebody.
In fact, non-neutrality is required from the very nature of moral responsibility, for to not to be for a certain moral law is to be against it.
Therefore, the pretense that one can be morally neutral is an escape and a cover up of enmity to God. All men know that God exists and by nature are opposed to Him. They are not neutral, they are guilty. Hence, moral responsibility in man is synonymous with moral culpability. We are able to be guilty, and we are guilty.
Finally it is a mistake to suppose that the will is self-determining. The will is no more independent than it is neutral. The will may in turn affect other things, but the will is not itself self-determining. God alone is self-determining—it is self-evident if we carefully look at the will. A man chooses something for a reason, namely, because that something seemed like the best thing at the time. Thus, the will is internally affected by the mind. But the mind is in turn affected by the nature. Hence, and from Scripture, we see that a good nature produces good wills; a bad nature produces bad wills (Matt. 7:17). All men are born with a nature and all men always follows their nature. If a man follows a good nature he is praiseworthy; if a man follows a bad nature, he is blameworthy. This is responsibility.
The Reformed reject the notion that the human will must be totally free from all intervention in order to be responsible.
Arminians and others argue that man must be totally free and independent.
But, the Reformed reply, “Why? Who says this? Not God in Scripture. If anything, the very notion of independent wills is a symptom of sinful wills. Furthermore, the Reformed rightly observe, using reductio ad absurdum, that when human wills are sinful, the theory of Arminians and others can be used to defend the human will from punishment. For example, John was “free” to choose A or B. So if John is truly “free” either way, how can John be punished? Rather, the Reformed say that man is not “free” like the Arminians and others claim.
No they do not.
This is nothing but your erroneous assignment of a label, libertarian freedom to their affirmation that Adam was able to sin and able not to sin before the Fall.
Adam was not unbounded by his nature, as libertarian free will ultimately entails, any more than God is unbounded by his nature. God created our first parents with the moral capacity to sin or not to sin before the Fall, and though their sin severely affected their wills it did not abolish them—unlike the regenerate, the unregenerate is not able to not sin.
Your ought implies can…
I will grant that in some contexts, this principle does apply. At work I would operate under the assumption that the responsibilities of every worker should be a fair measure of their abilities, and their abilities should be related to their responsibilities. But this principle simply does not apply all the time. For example, only the baseball player at bat has the ability to drive home runs or to strike out. If the player at bat strikes out, losing the game, the whole team loses. Which situation here fits that of Adam when he fell into sin? Was he the office worker who alone was fired for his failure? Or was he a player up to bat for the entire team who struck out? Hint: Romans 5:19.
After Adam’s fall into sin, Adam no longer had the moral ability to meet his continuing moral obligation. Adam retained the moral ought but lost the moral can. And all his progeny inherited the same situation.
That was but one dimension of the death God had warned would result from sin. However, Adam did not, through his disobedience lose any of his moral responsibility to obey God.
Just as squandering the family inheritance does not somehow automatically lessen financial obligations, so Adam's loss of original righteousness did not relieve him or his posterity of their obligation to obey God.
Scripture teaches that those who are accustomed to doing evil ought instead to do good. Scripture also teaches that those who are accustomed to doing evil can no more do good than the leopard can change his spots (Jeremiah 13:23).
Your axiom, “ought implies can” simply proves too much.
Limiting its application to Gospel obedience is quite arbitrary.
If ought implies can, then everybody has the moral ability to live a sinless life because living a sinless life is what everyone ought to do.
Zippy, the consistent application of your axiom leads to pure Pelagianism, the teaching that fallen man has the moral ability to save himself by living a morally perfect life. That just won’t do.
Zippy, I think if you read Augustine more thoroughly, you may come to different, that is, more well-thought out, conclusions than your simplistic observation. But this is a topic for other threads. For your further review, here is a good starter:
http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2009/11/augustine-on-monergism-summary.html
You are jumping from one set of proofs to the other, confusing the 2:God has a past unless you think Jesus is still on the cross (Ps. 90:2 there is a before and after creation for God; God's dealings with Moses is in the past; if you say it is Moses' reality, but not God's, you really don't have a clue).
AMR: Check out the conservative International Standard Bible Encyclopedia (1982) article on 'eternity' (Schoonhoven from Fuller actually gets it right, to my pleasant surprise, as does moderate Calvinist, Bruce Ware who accepts endless time, not timelessness).
No towel to throw in, especially when the swings are missing altogether.It is a new direction for God, not us because we don't exist before the creation of the world. It's God doing the creating not us. You're losing the argument badly.
I hope you throw in the towel before you get knocked out.
--Dave
No, to come up with that means you are missing something crucial to the proof. His duration is at the minimum two-way with a past that is going forever (no singular direction).So, God is still creating the world d[e]spite the absolute reality that it is finished and in past for the history of the earth.
--Dave
Both the heavens and the earth shall pass away but His Word will stand (no motion) forever. I would speculate that you are correct but haven't thought a great deal about it. I simply know that having no beginning means it is not possible for God to be involved in time as we are.Can what God did before creation be measured? Are you saying that there are pockets of time within eternity?
Thus we see that libertarian free will, the liberty of indifference, does not preserve moral responsibility, it would actually destroy it! For we would have persons intending to do X and yet they would end up doing not-X instead.
AMR
Furthermore, many Calvinists I've met affirm such a "libertarian freedom" before the Fall. Which is to say they affirm human freedom before the Fall, rather than a strawman idea of random choice. The Church has always held that man retains free will, and the position was solidified with Augustine.
:e4e:
Zippy2006,
No they do not. This is nothing but your erroneous assignment of a label, libertarian freedom to their affirmation that Adam was able to sin and able not to sin before the Fall. Adam was not unbounded by his nature, as libertarian free will ultimately entails, any more than God is unbounded by his nature. God created our first parents with the moral capacity to sin or not to sin before the Fall, and though their sin severely affected their wills it did not abolish them—unlike the regenerate, the unregenerate is not able to not sin.
AMR
The question addressed then, is whether Adam had libertarian freewill.Sure they do. Go ask Lon. Or AA.
-zip :e4e:
And when asked, explained more:In my estimation, man was created with a free will, he was free to be what God intended. I would suggest he actually lost free-will.
I believe I wrapped it up with this:Okay. Here is my definition of free-will, and I would note that is opposed to what most mean. They generally mean: Able to do otherwise. What I mean is "Able to be what one is created for." In my estimation, having a will that 'can' choose sin would be a creation problem, like programming a computer to purposefully be able to break down. In this sense, those opposed to Calvinism are back on the same page (guilty of what we are accused of).
When I read the Genesis account, I specifically see the circumstances of the temptation as progressing toward the Fall rather than anything in man being faulty. I cannot fathom God could/would make man with a faulty wire, which 'an ability to do otherwise' is, to my assessment.
This is nothing but your erroneous assignment of a label, libertarian freedom to their affirmation that Adam was able to sin and able not to sin before the Fall.That's precisely what everyone else says before you constantly introduce the strawman term of "libertarian free will" with your signature "all-or-nothing" Calvinistic bent.
Zippy and AMR,Lon:
Your own explanations seem to me to conflate the morally neutral definition of freedom, which is colloquial, with the moral definition of freedom. When I am critiquing Calvinism I am rarely if ever speaking of the moral notion of freedom.
-zip :e4e:
You are jumping from one set of proofs to the other, confusing the 2:
<------------------------------------------------->
no beginning, no end
<--------------------Christ----------------------->
His work on the cross, in our creation, has a beginning and end.