ARGH!!! Calvinism makes me furious!!!

[Hilston]

Originally posted by 1Way

Hilston

By your argumentation against mine, the murderer:

Did not first resolve to murder, then

Did not acquire the gun and ammo, then

Did not load the gun with ammo, then

Did not aim the gun at the victim, then

Did not pull the trigger

Did not murder anyone, he is innocent, but the bullet is guilty!

What does "resolve" mean to you, 1Way? And what role would you guess it might play according to my view?

Originally posted by 1Way
Even though all those steps certainly did take place. The fact that they all took place is part of the righteous evidence that is used to convict criminals. It is the separation of this chain of cause and effect that is ludicrous.

You're apparently having an argument with yourself, 1Way. No one is separating cause and effect. Try to keep up.

Originally posted by 1Way
Can you imagine the murderer saying, but your honor, I did not kill that man, all I did was pull the trigger, the cause of the killing was the bullet itself, not my use of my gun!

Are you even trying? Where are the terms of this discussion in your argument?

Didn't you say this?:

So I believe you unrealistically claim that your genetics did not cause you to eat beans, it was your will and not your genetics. Your will was caused to prefer beans over peas by your genetics, so that is the foundational cause for this preference, then when you acted out that preference, you did so first by your will, which had already been caused to prefer beans over peas by your genetics. So yes, there is an in between step between the initial or primary cause and the effect, but this cause and effect chain is not broken, it is fully established by your example. The most foundational cause was the genetics not the will.

So which is it? The gun manufacturer? Or the bullet? I say it's the will.

Originally posted by 1Way
Come on, someone go over and wake up Hilston, he's in la la land again.

The funny thing is this: 1Way's condescending little dramas, as amusing as they are, usually emerge when he is clearly more desperate, indicating by scattered stammerings that he tries to pass as arguments. I'm not the only one who sees this, and I get the feeling that the one who ought to be seeing this pattern and most alarmed by it is the most blind to it.

 

[Hilston]

Originally posted by Clete Pfeiffer

Jim,

I understand your peas analogy perfectly.

But do you agree with it? Is there any part we need to work on before we move forward?

Originally posted by Clete Pfeiffer
When I said, "According to your view, God's decree does not cause the action, our wills do. So without our wills, God's decree is impotent and unable to make anything happen."

You said that it was backward. But when I repeated the same thing in different words...

"Perhaps it would be accurate to characterize your view this way …

That's just it. It was not the same thing in different words, unless you've assigned non-normative meanings to the words that I did not detect.

Originally posted by Clete
God does not decree for me to actually do anything God simply decrees that I want to do something. And since my will cannot go against that which I want, then the action that God has decreed that I will want to do is destined to happen."

...you said that you basically agreed.

Which is to say that you could not do something without first wanting to do it, and you could not want to do it without it first being decreed.

Originally posted by Clete They’re the same thing Jim. It's precisely the same statement with more detail for clarity. How can you think one is backward and the other not? I don't get it.

Explain to me how they are the same. In the one statement, you said without our wills God's decrees were impotent. I said you had that backward. In your other statement, you said our wills are determined by God's decrees, with which I agreed. How are those the same?

Originally posted by Clete
I then said it a third time...
"It is our wills that God commands not our actions."
I should have been more consistent and used the word "decrees" rather than "commands" because I know that you draw a distinction which you find important, but the rest of the post should have made my meaning clear anyway.

You know as well as I do that we can't make assumptions about word meanings in this forum. I told you that I have no problem with that characterization as it stands. I would prefer more detail and clarity, but for the sake of discussion, I can live with it.

Originally posted by Clete
At any rate, the point I tried to make about your view rendering our wills meaningless is being made far better by 1Way. He's really been on a roll lately, ...

Ooooooo kaaaaay. :freak:

Originally posted by Clete
And by the way, the twin studies you like to reference prove nothing in relation to the will except that there is an influence that genetics has on our will. Genetics cannot be said to control us or else the twins in these studies would be precisely the same and there would never be a set of twins that didn't exhibit the same types of similarities.

I'm being careful not to overstate the effect of genetics on our choices. I merely want to point out that genetics can be (not always) a very powerful influence (among myriad other influences, of course). Do you not agree that it is compelling evidence for the power of genetics when two individuals make exactly the same choices in certain areas of their lives (not all areas, granted), having never before met, and therefore not having any influence each others choices? If you consider the similarities, they are staggering: Same hairstyles, same music preferences, same shampoo brand, same make/model/color of car, same pet name, same spouse name, same second spouse name (in the same order), same vacation destination (only a mile apart in proximity), same beverage preference, same occupation, etc. etc. etc.

Yet, if you were to ask these individuals, "When you chose to buy a navy blue Ford LTD, did you feel compelled or forced to make that choice, or did you freely choose that vehicle?" On this any one of the above choices, I think it's a fair bet that they would say, "Yes, I freely made that choice." Are some of them non-genetic coincidences? I'm sure, just as the differences between them (different preference in lawn mower brand, for example) may be a genetic influence that was derailed by some external influence (there was a sale at Sears). The point is to show that predetermined (genetically driven) choices are no less free even though they are predetermined.

Originally posted by Clete
These studies definite prove influence. But influence is not control.

I agree.

Originally posted by Clete
These studies don't even speak to whether or not the genetic influence can be overcome if one were to try as it wouldn't occur to someone who didn't know that they were a twin to attempt such a thing.

I agree completely. That's why experiment are difficult, because if the person has an additional motivation (such as not wanting to make the same choice as the twin), then the experiment is tainted. That's why being separated from birth provides such a compelling control component (in the scientific method sense of the word "control").

Originally posted by Clete
I frankly don't see how it is even relevant to the discussion. Perhaps you can connect the dots for me.

If we can agree that genetics (predetermination) can (not always) play a powerfully influencing role in our choices, and if we can agree that those choices, though genetically predetermined, are no less free, then we have an example (one example -- not a blanket statement or universal claim) of choice co-existing with predetermination.

And finally, I'm looking forward to getting your thoughts on the peas/beans discussion. I wrote: Please reconsider my questions in post #1169 in light of my post #1164, your response post #1165, and my rejoinder post #1166.

 

[Clete]

Originally posted by Hilston

But do you agree with it? Is there any part we need to work on before we move forward?

Good grief man, yes, I think that I agree with it.
I, however, reserve the right to change my mind at will on the matter. Especially if it turns out that I do not understand it as well as I think I do now.

Explain to me how they are the same. In the one statement, you said without our wills God's decrees were impotent. I said you had that backward. In your other statement, you said our wills are determined by God's decrees, with which I agreed. How are those the same?

They are the same. If you don't see it I can't help you.
I wrote it, I know what I was saying and I'm telling you, they are the same.

You know as well as I do that we can't make assumptions about word meanings in this forum. I told you that I have no problem with that characterization as it stands. I would prefer more detail and clarity, but for the sake of discussion, I can live with it.

It would not have been an unreasonable assumption to make. We are not robots and we must all make an effort to stay on the same page as the one who wrote the post, wouldn't you agree?

Ooooooo kaaaaay. :freak:

1Way is cleaning your clock Jim and you don't even see it, or claim not to. I don't see how you can't see it. It's so clearly obvious that he has destroyed your position beyond repair and yet you claim that he is arguing with himself! It sort of funny really. Let me try to explain it to you.

You say that we are culpable for our actions because we choose by our own free will to do that which we do. You also say that our will is the way it is because God degreed it to be that way. Thus God causes our will and our will causes our actions. But since our will is what causes our actions it is we who are responsible for those actions.

This is exactly the same as saying that a murder victim is killed by a bullet. The bullet was aimed and fired by a murder but because it is the bullet itself that does the killing that it is the bullet that is responsible for the death. The parallel is perfect and the logic inescapable. If you blame the murderer for the killing rather than the bullet then by the same line of reasoning you must blame God for our actions if He is the one who decrees our will. You are stuck Jim, admit it.\

The point is to show that predetermined (genetically driven) choices are no less free even though they are predetermined.

If we can agree that genetics (predetermination) can (not always) play a powerfully influencing role in our choices, and if we can agree that those choices, though genetically predetermined, are no less free, then we have an example (one example -- not a blanket statement or universal claim) of choice co-existing with predetermination.

Genetically predetermined? No! If they were predetermined then all separated twins would always choose the same things, which they do not. Genetically predisposed would be a far better term. However, such a term would destroy these twin studies as a means to bolster your position.

And finally, I'm looking forward to getting your thoughts on the peas/beans discussion. I wrote: Please reconsider my questions in post #1169 in light of my post #1164, your response post #1165, and my rejoinder post #1166.

From post 1169...
"Excellent question. To better answer your question, it would help me to know if you agree thus far with what we've established? You don't have to prematurely agree at this point with any conclusions, nor am I asking you to do that. But are the terms acceptable thus far? If not, let's work on this part. It could end up that we don't agree at a very basic level, which is ok. But at least then we'd both know and save ourselves from going over stuff that could have been settled at this stage."

As far as I can tell the terms of the discussion are clear enough and are acceptable.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[Big Finn]

These studies definite prove influence. But influence is not control. These studies don't even speak to whether or not the genetic influence can be overcome if one were to try as it wouldn't occur to someone who didn't know that they were a twin to attempt such a thing.
I frankly don't see how it is even relevant to the discussion. Perhaps you can connect the dots for me.

Excellent point, Clete. There are twins who consciously avoid dressing alike so that they will be seen as distinct individuals rather than as two peas in a pod. Besides, I've read a few studies such as Hilston is referencing as I did a few thousand word college paper in a developmental psychology class on the role of genetics in determing behavior, and there is no study that shows a 100% link between genetics and behavior.

While there are occasionally twins who exhibit the behavior Hilston references they are the exception, not the rule. I can't recall the exact percentages in which this happens between identical twins that are separated at birth, but it seems to me that it is less than 20% of identical twins that do this, so it doesn't prove Hilston's point at all. In fact it shows the opposite, because in the majority of cases it doesn't happen. All these studies show are genetic influences, not the absolute control of genetics over behavior.

 

[Clete]

Originally posted by Big Finn

Excellent point, Clete. There are twins who consciously avoid dressing alike so that they will be seen as distinct individuals rather than as two peas in a pod. Besides, I've read a few studies such as Hilston is referencing as I did a few thousand word college paper in a developmental psychology class on the role of genetics in determing behavior, and there is no study that shows a 100% link between genetics and behavior.

While there are occasionally twins who exhibit the behavior Hilston references they are the exception, not the rule. I can't recall the exact percentages in which this happens between identical twins that are separated at birth, but it seems to me that it is less than 20% of identical twins that do this, so it doesn't prove Hilston's point at all. In fact it shows the opposite, because in the majority of cases it doesn't happen. All these studies show are genetic influences, not the absolute control of genetics over behavior.

Yes, Jim's idea of "genetic predeterminism" over steps the evidence by a mile.

 

[Hilston]

Clete writes:
Good grief man, yes, I think that I agree with it. I, however, reserve the right to change my mind at will on the matter. Especially if it turns out that I do not understand it as well as I think I do now.

That's fine. Nobody is asking you to sign in blood. Thanks for the straight answer.

hilston wrote: Explain to me how they are the same. In the one statement, you said without our wills God's decrees were impotent. I said you had that backward. In your other statement, you said our wills are determined by God's decrees, with which I agreed. How are those the same?

Clete writes:
They are the same. If you don't see it I can't help you. I wrote it, I know what I was saying and I'm telling you, they are the same.

Perhaps I'm missing something. From what I gather, you equate "impotent decree" with "wills being determined by decree." Is that correct?

hilston wrote: You know as well as I do that we can't make assumptions about word meanings in this forum. I told you that I have no problem with that characterization as it stands. I would prefer more detail and clarity, but for the sake of discussion, I can live with it.

Clete writes:
It would not have been an unreasonable assumption to make. We are not robots and we must all make an effort to stay on the same page as the one who wrote the post, wouldn't you agree?

I've been burned too many times by equivocation. Whether you like it or not, I prefer to get clarity than to make assumptions about important and distinctive words.

Clete writes:
1Way is cleaning your clock Jim and you don't even see it, or claim not to. I don't see how you can't see it. It's so clearly obvious that he has destroyed your position beyond repair and yet you claim that he is arguing with himself! It sort of funny really.

It's not only funny. It's baffling. I lay out the contradictions, I even give syllogisms for those who like that sort of thing, but they are either (a) blithley ignored, or (b) baldly asserted as proving exactly the opposite. The OV cataract is remarkably powerful.

Clete writes:
Let me try to explain it to you.

You say that we are culpable for our actions because we choose by our own free will to do that which we do. You also say that our will is the way it is because God degreed it to be that way. Thus God causes our will and our will causes our actions. But since our will is what causes our actions it is we who are responsible for those actions.

See? You can't even get these basic components of the discussion straight. You are so wrong, Clete. Your attempt to "explain" only shows that you don't get it. Decree is not cause, Clete. I don't know how else to say it. You call this a cleaned clock. You don't even recognize the terms of the discussion.

Clete writes:
This is exactly the same as saying that a murder victim is killed by a bullet. The bullet was aimed and fired by a murder but because it is the bullet itself that does the killing that it is the bullet that is responsible for the death. The parallel is perfect and the logic inescapable. If you blame the murderer for the killing rather than the bullet then by the same line of reasoning you must blame God for our actions if He is the one who decrees our will. You are stuck Jim, admit it.

Are you guys so deluded that you can't see the obvious disconnect in your so-called "perfect parallel"? Here's how you can prove it is "exactly the same" and "a perfect parallel" and compel me to concede the point: Prove that the bullet has volition.

Hilston wrote: The point is to show that predetermined (genetically driven) choices are no less free even though they are predetermined.

If we can agree that genetics (predetermination) can (not always) play a powerfully influencing role in our choices, and if we can agree that those choices, though genetically predetermined, are no less free, then we have an example (one example -- not a blanket statement or universal claim) of choice co-existing with predetermination.

Clete writes:
Genetically predetermined? No! If they were predetermined then all separated twins would always choose the same things, which they do not. Genetically predisposed would be a far better term. However, such a term would destroy these twin studies as a means to bolster your position.

I have no problem with "genetically predisposed." Predisposition suggests an influence that can be overidden by other influences, and I can appreciate that distinction. If we stipulate for the sake of discussion that a genetic predisposition was solely at work in the twins' choice of shampoo, perhaps we can make progress. For the sake of discussion, will you allow for the twins' genetics to be the sole determining factor in that one choice of shampoo?

Related to the twins studies, what, in your view, accounts for the remarkable similarities in some of their choices?

Clete writes:
As far as I can tell the terms of the discussion are clear enough and are acceptable.

Then you do agree that there is a difference between one's power to choose in terms of will, and one's power to choose in terms of capability? Choose one:

__ Good grief man, yes.
__ No, I now invoke my right to change my mind to say ___________.

 

[Big Finn]

Hilston,

If decree is not cause, then God's decrees mean nothing in the salvation of man. However, I think you are going outside the meaning of the words again in your theology.

Main Entry: 1de·cree
Pronunciation: di-'krE
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French decré, from Latin decretum, from neuter of decretus, past participle of decernere to decide, from de- + cernere to sift, decide -- more at CERTAIN
1 : an order usually having the force of law
2 a : a religious ordinance enacted by council or titular head b : a foreordaining will
3 a : a judicial decision of the Roman emperor b : a judicial decision especially in an equity or probate court

I'd say this is a very good description of what everyone here, except maybe you, sees when the word decree is used in respect to God decreeing something.

However, you say a decree is non-causative. This violates the meaning of the word in the context that you are using it, for you are using in the context that I bolded.

A foreordaining will foreordains by definition. Here is the dictionary definition of foreordain:

Main Entry: fore·or·dain
Pronunciation: "fOr-or-'dAn, "for-
Function: transitive verb
: to dispose or appoint in advance : PREDESTINE

Now to appoint in advance, in the way you use the word, says God appoints things in advance so that no one can do other than He decrees. He then must by definition predestine.

Main Entry: pre·des·tine
Pronunciation: (")prE-'des-t&n
Function: transitive verb
Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French or Latin; Middle French predestiner, from Latin praedestinare, from prae- + destinare to determine -- more at DESTINE
: to destine, decree, determine, appoint, or settle beforehand; especially : PREDESTINATE 1

Now, to predestine is to settle beforehand. If something is already settled is there any choice in the matter? No. No there is no ability to do otherwise.

I also think your false distinction between will and choice is just that, a false distinction. The will is the power of choice. That's why I posted the dictionary definition of will. It clearly shows that will and power of choice are so close in meaning as to be inseperable. I'll post the definition here again so that this is clear.

Main Entry: 1will
Pronunciation: w&l, (&)l, &l, 'wil
Function: verb
Inflected Form(s): past would /w&d, (&)d, 'wud/; present singular & plural will
Etymology: Middle English (1st & 3d sing. present indic.), from Old English wille (infinitive wyllan); akin to Old High German wili (3d singular present indicative) wills, Latin velle to wish, will
transitive senses : DESIRE, WISH <call it what you will>
verbal auxiliary
1 -- [/b]used to express desire, choice, willingness, consent, or in negative constructions refusal[/b] <no one would take the job> <if we will all do our best> <will you please stop that racket>
2 -- [/b]used to express frequent, customary, or habitual action or natural tendency or disposition[/b] <will get angry over nothing> <will work one day and loaf the next>
3 -- used to express futurity <tomorrow morning I will wake up in this first-class hotel suite -- Tennessee Williams>
4 -- used to express capability or sufficiency <the back seat will hold three passengers>
5 -- used to express probability and often equivalent to the simple verb <that will be the milkman>
6 a -- used to express determination, insistence, persistence, or willfulness <I have made up my mind to go and go I will> b -- used to express inevitability <accidents will happen>
7 -- used to express a command, exhortation, or injunction <you will do as I say, at once>
intransitive senses : to have a wish or desire <whether we will or no>

This is why your objections to the analogy of the shooter and the bullet have no force. If someone's will is settled in advance, then they have no volition of their own. Their volition, just as the bullet's is, is preset. The bullets volition is to go where it is aimed. Thus the person who's will is settled in advance by God also has no other volition than to go where it is aimed by God. There is no power to do otherwise. Both are predetermined. Neither have a choice.




.

 

[Hilston]

Big Finn writes:
If decree is not cause, then God's decrees mean nothing in the salvation of man.

God's decrees mean everything. If it isn't decreed, it doesn't happen. Man's salvation is according to God's decrees.

Big Finn writes:However, I think you are going outside the meaning of the words again in your theology.

quote: Main Entry: 1de·cree Pronunciation: di-'krE Function: noun Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French decré, from Latin decretum, from neuter of decretus, past participle of decernere to decide, from de- + cernere to sift, decide -- more at CERTAIN 1 : an order usually having the force of law 2 a : a religious ordinance enacted by council or titular head b : a foreordaining will 3 a : a judicial decision of the Roman emperor b : a judicial decision especially in an equity or probate court.

The definition you cite is just fine. What part of my usage goes outside of the definition?

Big Finn writes:
I'd say this is a very good description of what everyone here, except maybe you, sees when the word decree is used in respect to God decreeing something.

It is an excellent description. What have I said that makes you think I don't see it?

Big Finn writes:
However, you say a decree is non-causative. This violates the meaning of the word in the context that you are using it, for you are using in the context that I bolded.

I was the one who originally defined decree as foreordaining will. Go back to the first post in the Prescriptive/Decretive Will thread. Your problem seems to be the inability (or unwillingness) to see the difference between planning (decreeing) something and causing it (doing the action).

Big Finn writes:
A foreordaining will foreordains by definition. Here is the dictionary definition of foreordain:

quote: Main Entry: fore·or·dain Pronunciation: "fOr-or-'dAn, "for- Function: transitive verb : to dispose or appoint in advance : PREDESTINE

Now to appoint in advance, in the way you use the word, says God appoints things in advance so that no one can do other than He decrees. He then must by definition predestine.

Very good.

Big Finn writes:
quote: Main Entry: pre·des·tine Pronunciation: (")prE-'des-t&n Function: transitive verb Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French or Latin; Middle French predestiner, from Latin praedestinare, from prae- + destinare to determine -- more at DESTINE : to destine, decree, determine, appoint, or settle beforehand; especially : PREDESTINATE 1

Now, to predestine is to settle beforehand. If something is already settled is there any choice in the matter? No. No there is no ability to do otherwise.

Exactly. I happy to see that you comprehend these concepts. I have not gone against any of these definitions, and I've heartily affirmed them in all I've written.

Big Finn writes:
I also think your false distinction between will and choice is just that, a false distinction. The will is the power of choice. That's why I posted the dictionary definition of will. It clearly shows that will and power of choice are so close in meaning as to be inseperable.

I agree completely. Is will the same as choice? No, but it is the same as the power of choice. Where is the difficulty here?

Big Finn writes:
I'll post the definition here again so that this is clear.
quote: Main Entry: 1will Pronunciation: w&l, (&l, &l, 'wil Function: verb Inflected Form(s): past would /w&d, (&d, 'wud/; present singular & plural will Etymology: Middle English (1st & 3d sing. present indic.), from Old English wille (infinitive wyllan); akin to Old High German wili (3d singular present indicative) wills, Latin velle to wish, will transitive senses : DESIRE, WISH <call it what you will> verbal auxiliary 1 -- [/b]used to express desire, choice, willingness, consent, or in negative constructions refusal[/b] <no one would take the job> <if we will all do our best> <will you please stop that racket> 2 -- [/b]used to express frequent, customary, or habitual action or natural tendency or disposition[/b] <will get angry over nothing> <will work one day and loaf the next> 3 -- used to express futurity <tomorrow morning I will wake up in this first-class hotel suite -- Tennessee Williams> 4 -- used to express capability or sufficiency <the back seat will hold three passengers> 5 -- used to express probability and often equivalent to the simple verb <that will be the milkman> 6 a -- used to express determination, insistence, persistence, or willfulness <I have made up my mind to go and go I will> b -- used to express inevitability <accidents will happen> 7 -- used to express a command, exhortation, or injunction <you will do as I say, at once> intransitive senses : to have a wish or desire <whether we will or no>

Another excellent definition. This is truly one of your best posts to date. You've contributed a lot to this discussion by offering these definitions, and I sincerely thank you.

Big Finn writes:
This is why your objections to the analogy of the shooter and the bullet have no force. If someone's will is settled in advance, then they have no volition of their own.

That is incorrect. God decrees the wills of men, and creates them in such a way that their wills truly exist and function according to His decrees. They choose of their own free will, which was predetermined, foreordained, predestinated according to God's decrees.

Big Finn writes:
Their volition, just as the bullet's is, is preset. The bullets volition is to go where it is aimed.

Are you speaking figuratively?

Big Finn writes:
Thus the person who's will is settled in advance by God also has no other volition than to go where it is aimed by God. There is no power to do otherwise. Both are predetermined. Neither have a choice.

For humans, the power is there. The desire is not. Recall the peas and beans analogy. As for the bullet -- well, maybe you should just look up "volition."

Excellent post, Big Finn.

 

[Big Finn]

That is incorrect. God decrees the wills of men, and creates them in such a way that their wills truly exist and function according to His decrees. They choose of their own free will, which was predetermined, foreordained, predestinated according to God's decrees.

quote:
Big Finn writes:
quote: Main Entry: pre·des·tine Pronunciation: (")prE-'des-t&n Function: transitive verb Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French or Latin; Middle French predestiner, from Latin praedestinare, from prae- + destinare to determine -- more at DESTINE : to destine, decree, determine, appoint, or settle beforehand; especially : PREDESTINATE 1

Now, to predestine is to settle beforehand. If something is already settled is there any choice in the matter? No. No there is no ability to do otherwise.

Exactly. I happy to see that you comprehend these concepts. I have not gone against any of these definitions, and I've heartily affirmed them in all I've written.

God's decrees are causative according to your own words right here. If a person's will functions according the designs of some other being it is not capable of functioning freely. It might have the illusion of it, but in reality there is no choice.

You cannot choose freely that which has been already settled. It's back to the fork in the road analogy. Once something is settled there are not two or more paths from which to choose. There is only one, and that, by definition, is not a fork in the road of life. So, there is no choice to make.

Now, to volition and will.

The next quote is from the definition of "will". Notice that determination, insistence, or willfulness all are the power of choice. Determination is simply choosing to say I will keep going no matter what happens. Insistence is saying I will choose no other option. Willfulness is the same thing. It's saying, I will choose no other way than my own. All of these are simply expressions of the power of choice and how it used. The will and the power of choice are simply two different ways of expressing the same concept. That's why the dictionary uses one to describe the other.

6 a -- used to express determination, insistence, persistence, or willfulness <I have made up my mind to go and go I will>

Volition is only another way of expressing will. They are synonyms.

Main Entry: vo·li·tion
Pronunciation: vO-'li-sh&n, v&-
Function: noun
Etymology: French, from Medieval Latin volition-, volitio, from Latin vol- (stem of velle to will, wish) + -ition-, -itio (as in Latin position-, positio position) -- more at WILL
1 : an act of making a choice or decision; also : a choice or decision made
2 : the power of choosing or determining : WILL

So, if one's power of choice in respect to whether one will partake of an action or not is already decreed one has no choice. Thus one would have no individual volition. It's the same thing as being pointed in a certain direction and being fired out of gun. Once the will of a person, or volition if you will, has been settled, or determined, beforehand they have no personal choice left. Their power of choice has then been co-opted by another will and it is no longer their own.

 

[Big Finn]

A long time ago I used the analogy of hypnotism. A hypnotist co-opts the will of another person. The victim of a hypnotist has th illusion that he is freely choosing to do what he does, but in reality has no choice in the matter. His will has been over-ridden by the hypnotist.

Please explain how this differs from how you see that God can decree that a person will do something, and that person has no choice but to perform that action, yet you say they freely choose it at the same time.

 

[Yorzhik]

It does seem odd. It seemed odd to me when you first proposed it, but I answered anyway, and I've been consistent in my answers. Sometimes people design things strangely for strange reasons. The reason didn't seem relevant, so I didn't bother asking why the architect would design it that way, assuming he had a reason for the building to fall after the first rain.

It doesn't matter why the architect did it. He'll be held responsible for any damage/death. Buildings aren't supposed to fall in the first rain.

In the case of God, something went wrong. How do we know?
God says He hates sin -> That something He hates is going on -> Something is wrong.

I don't disagree. The question is whether or not God decreed it.

If he decreed that we would want to sin, then He is decreeing sin. In fact, the sin that we do doesn't matter as much to God as our desire to please God / our desire to sin. Equally, although more awkwardly, we could say, "the sin that we do doesn't matter as much to God as our want to please God / our want to sin."

You're right. There are causative effects to a decree. That is not the same as being the cause.

If there are causative effects to a decree from God… what exactly is caused by God's decrees?

[/quote]And when we're talking about culpability, we have to narrow it down to who is criminally responsible. As infinite, God cannot be held culpable for anything by anything or anyone. As the Decreer, one can claim that God's decrees had a causative effect, but God is not the cause in terms of culpability.[/quote]
Of course, no one would be big enough to punish God if He sins. But then again, the superpower of the world wasn't able to punish OJ, either. So was OJ responsible for the sin of murder?

I tried that once. I thought, "Well if it was God's will to design everything in such a way that these problems and evil would exist, and if I happen to sin, how could He blame me for sinning (Why doth He yet find fault)? After all, He is God, and who hath resisted his will?" I don't think that anymore.

Can you finish your thought here? "I don't think that anymore" because…

The answer is no. God never says that He doesn't hate sin.

God takes pleasure in doing His will. According to you, the Israelites sinned according to God's will. Therefore, according to you, God does take pleasure in sin. I'd say taking pleasure in something indicates they like it. I'm not trying to be provocative. I get this from your quote: "God put it in their hearts" and from the bible:

Eph 1:9 Having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself:

Phl 2:13 For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of [his] good pleasure.

Rev 4:11 Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.

Okay, here is an analogy: A city sees a large enemy army coming its way. They have to destroy the bridge in order to be saved. But the army is coming too fast. The king calls for a mighty warrior to stand in the gap on the enemy side of the bridge. A mighty warrior comes forward, and stands at the choke point and holds off each enemy soldier, one by one, buying enough time for the bridge to be destroyed, and having great evil done to him until he dies. Was the warrior evil? How about the king?

Neither. What is the purpose of the analogy?

The Father is the king, Jesus is the mighty warrior, and standing in the gap is the Passion.

Let's say the people later found out that king could have stopped the large army from ever approaching the city. But because the king wanted to make a great example of the mighty warrior, he decided to let the enemy come and to do this evil against his champion. In your view, does that change anything?

Yes, then the king is evil (at this point in the development of the analogy).

Hilston and 1Way

1Way writes:
I suggest that "solving chess"

is in essence "mastering the game"

Hilston writes:
I can't believe this. In your effort to explain your view, you use a phrase I've never used, "solved the game of chess," and one I do not understand. I ask you a question about the phrase and what you mean by it, and you send me off to do research. Do you really want to communicate with me and explain your view, or is this a game to you? What if I were to ask you whether or not you distinguish between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata, but I refused to define the terms for you, and then insisted that you look them up yourself to prove that you're "really trying"? Is it the aim to make things as difficult as possible for each other?

Hilston, thou protest too much. An example: If you had said the reason God cannot be accused of any wrongdoing was the 'Skippy' principle, then I probably would have said "What? God cannot be accused of wrongdoing because of peanut butter?" If the 'Skippy' principle, as meant in the context of our conversation, had a number of explanatory hits on the first page of Google, and it was a common term among theologians, then I would not be upset if you told me to look it up myself. Especially if, after my first response, I answered again "What does peanut butter have to do with justice?" So don't be upset, I wasn't asking too much. It is germane to the discussion. You could have said 'I don't know' in the first place and I would have explained.

After looking up potentia absoluta and potentia ordinate, I wouldn't be upset if you didn't give me the definition, especially if I had assumed a definition that was wrong. I'm not playing a game; I just don't think some explanations are as effective unless they are "hashed out".

Now, this doesn't mean that giving definitions of simple concepts is wrong, I'm just saying you shouldn't be so sensitive about it.

BTW... why did you go to the first page in that book and type a whole bunch of time away when you could have typed one phrase, looked up the definition and cut and pasted it in with much less time and effort? Are you trying to make this hard?

I was surprised when 1Way didn't get it quite right either. To "solve chess" or "solve the game of chess" means that all possible moves and responses have been thought of. Or, one could say, that if someone solves a game, no matter what move the opponent makes, the person that has solved the game can always respond with a move that will result in victory eventually, and without fail. I don't mean solve a problem within the game. I mean "solve the game" itself. This is a clunky definition. There are better ones on the web. But is this not clear enough though?

 

[Hilston]

Yorzhik,

Although I still owe Big Finn a response to his posts, yours can be dispatched more quickly, so I offer it first.

Yorzhik writes:
It doesn't matter why the architect did it. He'll be held responsible for any damage/death. Buildings aren't supposed to fall in the first rain.

This is the first time you've said anything about it being a building for people. Since you never mentioned the deaths of occupants in this scenario until now, I assumed it was a non-occupied building that fell after the first rain. Now that you've further clarified this, yes, the designer is culpable to the authorities and should be executed.

Hilston wrote: I don't disagree. The question is whether or not God decreed it.

Yorzhik writes:
If he decreed that we would want to sin, then He is decreeing sin.

Exactly.

Yorzhik writes:
In fact, the sin that we do doesn't matter as much to God as our desire to please God / our desire to sin. Equally, although more awkwardly, we could say, "the sin that we do doesn't matter as much to God as our want to please God / our want to sin."

I do not understand what you mean.

Hilston wrote: You're right. There are causative effects to a decree. That is not the same as being the cause.

Yorzhik writes:
If there are causative effects to a decree from God … what exactly is caused by God's decrees?

The causative effects of God's decrees is the entirety of history and everything in creation. This is what foreordained, predestinated and predetermined mean and refer to. But the decree is not the cause. Just as the causative effect of the architect's plans (decrees) was the construction of the building, but the decrees did not cause the construction of the building.

Hilston wrote: And when we're talking about culpability, we have to narrow it down to who is criminally responsible. As infinite, God cannot be held culpable for anything by anything or anyone. As the Decreer, one can claim that God's decrees had a causative effect, but God is not the cause in terms of culpability.

Yorzhik writes:
Of course, no one would be big enough to punish God if He sins. But then again, the superpower of the world wasn't able to punish OJ, either. So was OJ responsible for the sin of murder?

You miss the point. It's not a question of whether or not someone is duly punished, but whether or not an authority legislates over them. There is no higher authority than God. God is absolute and no law legislates over Him. He is subordinated to nothing, no one, and no law, and therefore, not culpable.

Hilston wrote: I tried that once. I thought, "Well if it was God's will to design everything in such a way that these problems and evil would exist, and if I happen to sin, how could He blame me for sinning (Why doth He yet find fault)? After all, He is God, and who hath resisted his will?" I don't think that anymore.

Yorzhik writes:
Can you finish your thought here? "I don't think that anymore" because …

I don't think that anymore because of the response I got from God. He basically put me in my place and said, "O man, who are you to reply against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, 'Why have you made me this way?'?"

Hilston wrote: The answer is no. God never says that He doesn't hate sin.

Yorzhik writes:
God takes pleasure in doing His will. According to you, the Israelites sinned according to God's will. Therefore, according to you, God does take pleasure in sin. I'd say taking pleasure in something indicates they like it. I'm not trying to be provocative. I get this from your quote: "God put it in their hearts" and from the bible:

Eph 1:9 Having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself:

Phl 2:13 For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of [his] good pleasure.

Rev 4:11 Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.

I can't argue with that. Well done.

Yorzhik previously wrote: Okay, here is an analogy: A city sees a large enemy army coming its way. They have to destroy the bridge in order to be saved. But the army is coming too fast. The king calls for a mighty warrior to stand in the gap on the enemy side of the bridge. A mighty warrior comes forward, and stands at the choke point and holds off each enemy soldier, one by one, buying enough time for the bridge to be destroyed, and having great evil done to him until he dies. Was the warrior evil? How about the king?

Hilston replied: Neither. What is the purpose of the analogy?

Yorzhik writes:
The Father is the king, Jesus is the mighty warrior, and standing in the gap is the Passion.

Hilston wrote: Let's say the people later found out that king could have stopped the large army from ever approaching the city. But because the king wanted to make a great example of the mighty warrior, he decided to let the enemy come and to do this evil against his champion. In your view, does that change anything?

Yorzhik writes:
Yes, then the king is evil (at this point in the development of the analogy).

But isn't this the case with God? Didn't we (the people) later find out that the "king" (God) could have stopped the evil done by the large army (the Passion) to the "warrior" (Jesus). But the king (God) wanted to make a great example of the mighty warrior (Jesus), so he decided to let the enemy come and to do this evil (the Passion) against his champion (Jesus). Is this the logical conclusion of Open Theism: God is evil?

Yorzhik writes:
Hilston and 1Way

1Way wrote: I suggest that "solving chess" is in essence "mastering the game"

Hilston wrote: I can't believe this. In your effort to explain your view, you use a phrase I've never used, "solved the game of chess," and one I do not understand. I ask you a question about the phrase and what you mean by it, and you send me off to do research. Do you really want to communicate with me and explain your view, or is this a game to you? What if I were to ask you whether or not you distinguish between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata, but I refused to define the terms for you, and then insisted that you look them up yourself to prove that you're "really trying"? Is it the aim to make things as difficult as possible for each other?[/qupte]

Yorzhik writes:
... You could have said 'I don't know' in the first place and I would have explained.

I DID!!!!!!! HERE IS EXACTLY WHAT I SAID:

Yorzhik,

Re: "Solving the game of chess." I don't understand what you mean by it.

Do you remember that? Do you remember your condescending and catechizing response? Here it is:

Why don't you ask somebody who is a chess enthusiast? Or Google it? I'd tell you, but it's so easy to come up with the correct answer that at this point if you don't find out for yourself you aren't even trying.

It makes me sick to even read it again.

Yorzhik writes:
I'm not playing a game; I just don't think some explanations are as effective unless they are "hashed out". Now, this doesn't mean that giving definitions of simple concepts is wrong, I'm just saying you shouldn't be so sensitive about it.

Whatever.

Yorzhik writes:
BTW... why did you go to the first page in that book and type a whole bunch of time away when you could have typed one phrase, looked up the definition and cut and pasted it in with much less time and effort? Are you trying to make this hard?

I Googled it in full compliance with your demands. I then cut and pasted it from a weblink provided by Google.

Yorzhik writes:
I was surprised when 1Way didn't get it quite right either.

Maybe 1Way is trying to make this hard, too.

Yorzhik writes:
To "solve chess" or "solve the game of chess" means that all possible moves and responses have been thought of. Or, one could say, that if someone solves a game, no matter what move the opponent makes, the person that has solved the game can always respond with a move that will result in victory eventually, and without fail. I don't mean solve a problem within the game. I mean "solve the game" itself. This is a clunky definition. There are better ones on the web. But is this not clear enough though?

It's not. I asked a chess enthusiast. She says the phrase doesn't make sense. Maybe you should find one of the "better ones on the web" and enlighten us.

 

[Yorzhik]

Yorzhik writes:
In fact, the sin that we do doesn't matter as much to God as our desire to please God / our desire to sin. Equally, although more awkwardly, we could say, "the sin that we do doesn't matter as much to God as our want to please God / our want to sin."

I do not understand what you mean.

What is more important to God? Our desire to sin, -or- the act of a sin we do?

Yorzhik writes:
If there are causative effects to a decree from God … what exactly is caused by God's decrees?

The causative effects of God's decrees is the entirety of history and everything in creation. This is what foreordained, predestinated and predetermined mean and refer to. But the decree is not the cause. Just as the causative effect of the architect's plans (decrees) was the construction of the building, but the decrees did not cause the construction of the building.

Well that's fine… until someone sins.

You miss the point. It's not a question of whether or not someone is duly punished, but whether or not an authority legislates over them. There is no higher authority than God. God is absolute and no law legislates over Him. He is subordinated to nothing, no one, and no law, and therefore, not culpable.

That wasn't my point. The point is that OJ was guilty, regardless what anyone said, even if there was no higher authority than OJ, he would still be guilty. Still, the best understanding of this situation is that the different parts of the Godhead testified to the justice of the other parts. And the bible says in Gen 18:25 That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee: Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?

It's a rhetorical question. It's a forgone conclusion that God will do right. AND He specifies what is wrong – slaying the righteous and the wicked as if they were the same.

Hilston wrote: I tried that once. I thought, "Well if it was God's will to design everything in such a way that these problems and evil would exist, and if I happen to sin, how could He blame me for sinning (Why doth He yet find fault)? After all, He is God, and who hath resisted his will?" I don't think that anymore.

Yorzhik writes:
Can you finish your thought here? "I don't think that anymore" because …

Hilston wrote: I don't think that anymore because of the response I got from God. He basically put me in my place and said, "O man, who are you to reply against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, 'Why have you made me this way?'?"

Was it an audible voice? A message to you from the Bible? Was the knowledge input directly into your memory? Again, I'm not trying to be provocative, but you said, "He basically put me in my place and said…".

But isn't this the case with God? Didn't we (the people) later find out that the "king" (God) could have stopped the evil done by the large army (the Passion) to the "warrior" (Jesus). But the king (God) wanted to make a great example of the mighty warrior (Jesus), so he decided to let the enemy come and to do this evil (the Passion) against his champion (Jesus). Is this the logical conclusion of Open Theism: God is evil?

No, God could not have stopped the evil done by the large army before it was done and remain just.



First,

Yorzhik wrote: if you don't find out for yourself you aren't even trying.

I apologize. This condescending remark went too far. I should have said something like, " if you don't find out for yourself, I don't think the point will properly be made."

Yorzhik writes:
... You could have said 'I don't know' in the first place and I would have explained.

Hilston wrote:
I DID!!!!!!! HERE IS EXACTLY WHAT I SAID: Re: "Solving the game of chess." I don't understand what you mean by it.

No, you did not say that in the first place. This is what you said in the first place:

Hilston wrote:It means nothing if He can be surprised by something that never entered His mind.

Hilston wrote:I Googled it in full compliance with your demands.

It wasn't a demand. It was a suggestion.

Hilston wrote:Maybe 1Way is trying to make this hard, too.

No. I was surprised about 1Way's take on it because it is often used as an analogy for the OV. So I thought he would have been through it before since he is frequently deep in a number of discussions about the OV.

Hilston wrote:It's not. I asked a chess enthusiast. She says the phrase doesn't make sense. Maybe you should find one of the "better ones on the web" and enlighten us.

Yes, Chess, if played the "perfect game" can be determined. We are currently unaware if one side will definitively win, lose or draw, but we are, however, certain that it can be determined, given enough computing time and power to decide so.

So, God would be playing white and has solved the game. Humanity is playing black, and has not solved the game. God made the first move. NOW, it doesn't matter what move humanity responds with, the ultimate end is known because God's next move will always go down a known string of moves that will end at a known state. But the game, before the end comes, can still be played in more ways than there are atoms in the universe. Even a surprising move can be made. That cannot change the final result.

Is that clear enough?

 

[1Way]

Right, I was speaking presumptuously about what "solving chess" meant. But I think I got the main idea basically correct, but not the specific description. I'm happy to learn what it particularly means. I think it is an interesting and profitably analogy.

I think I said that I heard that this analogy was used in OV circles before, but that I did not know how it was specifically used. I think this sounds like something that G. Boyed would say (not sure though), and I think I disagree with him as to his view on foreknowledge (again, not sure though).

 

[1Way]

Hilston

1
Decretive and Prescriptive wills
"Cause and effect", "either or", "both and"
I hear you say that God has a decretive and prescriptive will. The decretive will is what must happen, and the prescriptive will is what should happen, but often does not happen. So between the two different wills, it is God's "decretive will" that is the more causative one, the prescriptive will may or may not influence obedience, but everything that happens without exception, happens because it was decreed by God to happen.

Yet you say that God's decretive will is not causative, and so your view is a self-refuting contradiction.


2
Harmonizing contradiction
and showing distinction
You demonstrated the differences between decretive and prescriptive wills, but the entire reason for this thread was not to show how they are different, but to show how two contrary wills can exist in one steadfastly faithful and true and righteous God.

You plainly exchanged the issue from resolving contradictory conflict between the two wills, to just showing how the two different wills, were different.


3
In Conclusion
I think you have beguiled yourself into an impossible position of effective infallibility. You do not stand corrected on basic issues that concern the law of non-contradiction. That sort of logical and intellectual dishonesty, is on the order of saying that 1 plus 1 equals 3 and not 2. If you can not stand corrected to the idea that God's decretive will MUST be in some way causative for it to make any effective difference at all, then you will not stand corrected over any less foundational precept nor subsequent issues.

You presume that something that causes nothing to happen, causes (at least) something (if not everything) to happen.

And you presume that showing distinction between two contrary wills is somehow resolving contradiction instead. The question of asking you to resolve the contradiction between two contrary wills, presupposes the distinction between the two "different" wills of God. It was this contradictory differentiation that we expected you to "resolve", not "differentiate".


4
A heartfelt plea
Come back to the light Hilston, that's right, follow the light, you are needed back on planet earth (<--levity) where people have a right to question even your own presumptions as to, what is, and what is not true. You should try to make meaningful sense out of this open contradiction, or you will remain lost where you are, speaking contrary nonsense. If you need a get out of
"the quagmire of confusion from contradictory nonsense"
free card, I hear they are readily available upon request, however logical consistency is required.

 

[Yorzhik]

I think this sounds like something that G. Boyed would say (not sure though), and I think I disagree with him as to his view on foreknowledge (again, not sure though).

I disagree with Dr. Boyd about his view on forknowledge as well. But, yes, this comes straight from his camp (although I don't know if this analogy originates with him).

 

[John Reformed]

Re: ARGH!!! Calvinism makes me furious!!!

Originally posted by Knight

OK? I gotta vent.

I try to be calm and I try to be patient with those that credit bad things to God via Calvinistic theology. But there are some times I simply can?t be patient or cordial because this twisted sick, perverted theology is sometimes too much to handle.

Today I was listening to a Christian station on the radio. And there was a public service spot which featured a woman explaining a heart wrenching story. She explained that she was diagnosed with Leukemia on her child?s first birthday. She explained that she was treated with intense chemotherapy. She went on to say that she was comforted by God (which of course is fantastic). But then she said that God have given her the cancer so God would also give her the strength to get through it.

AHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!! :shocked:

Can you imagine that?

Can you imagine a women actual thinking that God had given her cancer???

That is just plain sick!

What ever happened to understanding that it was man?s sin (our rebellion) that brought sickness and death into the world? What ever happened to placing the responsibility for bad things with mankind? So now God is a disease dispenser?

People are just plain stupid.

:dunce:

John 2 "Now as Jesus passed by, He saw a man who was blind from birth. 2 And His disciples asked Him, saying, "Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?"
3 Jesus answered, "Neither this man nor his parents sinned, but that the works of God should be revealed in him.

Could not the same thing be said of the lady on the radio? It seems to me that her cancer provided her with an opportunity to praise God rather than to blame Him.

The fact that man brought death and disease upon himself and his posterity, in no way mitigates God's perogative to use it for His own puropse; His Glory!

Revisit Job. You may be surprised at what it says.

John

 

[1Way]

John

I think you are somewhat blurring the issue. It's not if God has the ability (in some unspecified way) to be glorified through evil or tragedy. Knight refined the point beyond that by presenting the idea that "God gave her the cancer". Should she praise God for giving her the cancer, or not? Should she instead praise God because she can? Blaspheme is fundamentally attributing to God something that is not godly and or true. So the issue is what exactly is God in the business of doing, and do we risk actually blaspheming God when we mean to praise Him?

I think that it is fundamentally sick to consider that God causes a destructive tragedy "simply" so that He may be glorified. Most of the time, people genuinely are more thankful towards me if I do something good for them. Interestingly enough, the opposite is true if I do something harmful or destructive or tragic. Maybe you find this response to be accurate in your life too? We are created in His image. It is good to be good and righteous and promote life and edification. It is bad to be bad, and unrighteous and promote death and destruction.

We are to glorify God in all things. He is ultimately the source of all good things (Ja 1:17). We can glorify God even in a tragedy, but we should not attribute to God what He is not doing.

Job did not undergo anything that he could not bare, and I think God knew that, it is implicate in his statements that Job is good example of an upright man. And God restored Job for this unusual testing he was allowed to experience. Job said he needed a "mediator", and he ended up getting one. And his mediation happened upon him too, restoring him and exonerating him before his so called friends.

As to John, I think you miss the point. It's not very conceivable that they thought that "sin" itself is what makes people get tragically sick or diseased or debilitated. People sin all the time and remain in good health and live prosperous lives. Entire countries that hated God and Israel prospered were typically filled with "healthy" people, sometimes exceptionally healthy.

Instead, it is reasonable that they thought that God is the causes sickness or illness, typically because of sin, as in, it was punishment of some sort. Or conversely, they might believe that God might heal them on account of their faith. And in times past, it is true that sometimes those exact things did happen in the bible. So, Jesus' answer was effectively that God did not cause the blindness on behalf of sin. And it does not necessarily imply that God made him blind so that He could later heal him.

How would you like it if someone said, here, let me do something terrible to you (__fill in the blank__) so that afterwards I can fix it for you? That does not sound like a genuine blessing. Instead we hear things like that God is the giver of life and that we should have it more abundantly! That is what God delights in, life and goodness and things that promote such things.

Adam was not created blind and his wife was not leprous and Able did not have cancer. And when we get our new glorified bodies, they are said to be "incorruptible", not prone to disease! So the ideal from God is clearly to be physically and spiritually and emotionally and intellectually whole and healthy (or healed). I hope this helps clarify things.

 

[Hilston]

To Big Finn,

Another groovy post, Big Finn. I'm beginning to think that I misjudged you.

Reply to Big Finn's post #1189

Hi Big Finn,

Please forgive the delayed reply. You write:

God's decrees are causative according to your own words right here.

They can be viewed as causative in the same way that an architect's drawings are causative. The drawings do not cause the construction of the building, but they play a causative role.

Big Finn writes:
If a person's will functions according the designs of some other being it is not capable of functioning freely. It might have the illusion of it, but in reality there is no choice.

Sure there is. There is a choice. A fork in the road. But the person chooses in full accordance with their desire and volition, which is foreordained.

Big Finn writes:
You cannot choose freely that which has been already settled. It's back to the fork in the road analogy. Once something is settled there are not two or more paths from which to choose. There is only one, and that, by definition, is not a fork in the road of life. So, there is no choice to make.

Peas and beans, Big Finn. I'm presented with a choice. A fork in the salad -- er, road. Do I want beans or peas? Without hesitations, I'm taking the beans. The choice is there to take the peas, but the will is not. It's fork/choice whether you like it or not, even though there is no will to choose peas.

Big Finn writes:
Now, to volition and will.

The next quote is from the definition of "will". Notice that determination, insistence, or willfulness all are the power of choice. Determination is simply choosing to say I will keep going no matter what happens. Insistence is saying I will choose no other option. Willfulness is the same thing. It's saying, I will choose no other way than my own. All of these are simply expressions of the power of choice and how it used. The will and the power of choice are simply two different ways of expressing the same concept. That's why the dictionary uses one to describe the other.

I have no problem with that. We have the power to choose. We do not have the power to go against our volition.

Big Finn writes:
quote:
6 a -- used to express determination, insistence, persistence, or willfulness <I have made up my mind to go and go I will>

Volition is only another way of expressing will. They are synonyms.

I fully agree.

Big Finn writes:
quote:
Main Entry: vo·li·tion
Pronunciation: vO-'li-sh&n, v&-
Function: noun
Etymology: French, from Medieval Latin volition-, volitio, from Latin vol- (stem of velle to will, wish) + -ition-, -itio (as in Latin position-, positio position) -- more at WILL
1 : an act of making a choice or decision; also : a choice or decision made
2 : the power of choosing or determining : WILL

So, if one's power of choice in respect to whether one will partake of an action or not is already decreed one has no choice.

Peas and beans, Big Finn. I have the power to choose one or the other. I do NOT have the power to choose against my own volition.

Big Finn writes:
Thus one would have no individual volition. It's the same thing as being pointed in a certain direction and being fired out of gun. Once the will of a person, or volition if you will, has been settled, or determined, beforehand they have no personal choice left. Their power of choice has then been co-opted by another will and it is no longer their own.

Let's suppose for the sake of argument that a geneticist tampered with my DNA at my conception. He genetically predetermined that I would only choose beans, and never peas. Faced with the choice of beans or peas, my genetic makeup affects my will and I choose beans every single time without fail. It is exactly what I want because my genetic makeup predetermined it. Do I still have a choice between peas or beans? Of course. Do I have the power to override my predetermined volition? Not at all. This is compatibilism, Big Finn.

Reply to Big Finn's post #1190

Big Finn writes:
A long time ago I used the analogy of hypnotism. A hypnotist co-opts the will of another person. The victim of a hypnotist has the illusion that he is freely choosing to do what he does, but in reality has no choice in the matter. His will has been over-ridden by the hypnotist.

Please explain how this differs from how you see that God can decree that a person will do something, and that person has no choice but to perform that action, yet you say they freely choose it at the same time.

First of all, hypnotism is nothing like the popular notion or how it is portrayed in movies. It is indeed a highly controversial subject, even among reputable hypnotists/psychotherapists. I know one personally who uses the Ericksonian method of hypnotherapy. There are other schools as well, such as the sociocognitive approach [E.g., Nicholas Spanos]. It should be pointed out that the hypnotist does not override the will of a person. He manipulates, suggests, and encourages certain behavior. The person, in a hyper-suggestive trance-state, is less inhibited to do certain things, but he will not act against his will or belief system. Here are some excerpts from a book called Hypnosis: A History, by Derek Forrest, which I highly recommend if you are interested in this subject.

Despite more than a century of empirical research, there is no convincing evidence to support the contention that hypnotic subjects enact behavior, process information, or develop experiences in ways different from those of nonhypnotic control subjects. [Nicholas Spanos, quoted in the aforementioned title, p. 268]

From the same book:

Hypersuggestibility seemed to Hull to be the sole characteristic of hypnosis and the only justification for calling it a 'state.' Any difference between the hypnotic state and the normal waking state was a quantitative and not a qualitative one:

• Despite the widespread and long-standing belief to the contrary, the author is convinced that no phenomenon whatever can be produced in hypnosis that cannot be produced to lesser degrees by suggestions given in the normal waking condition. [Ibid. p. 264]

The following comes from the ukhypnosis.com website.

Of all the definitions offered here, in my view, this one is the best, the most practical, and the most accurate. Gil [Boyne] is a renowned hypnotherapist, trainer of hypnotherapists, and founder of the American Council of Hypnotist Examiners. He is well liked and respected by other hypnotherapists.

Hypnosis is a natural state of mind with special identifying characteristics:

1. An extraordinary quality of relaxation.
2. An emotionalized desire to satisfy the suggested behaviour: The person feels like doing what the hypnotist suggests, provided that what is suggested does not generate conflict with his belief system.
3. The organism becomes self-regulating and produces normalization of the central nervous system.
4. Heightened and selective sensitivity to stimuli perceived by the five senses and four basic perceptions.
5. Immediate softening of psychic defenses. [Gil Boyne, Transforming Therapy, 1985: 380-381][Emphases added]

So, once we have been disabused of the common misconceptions about hypnosis, we see that the subject is not at all useful in the discussion of this topic of culpability, volition vs. the power of choice, etc.

 

[1Way]

Hilston's line (or circle?) of reasoning.

:beanboy:

• Everything without exception happens, because it is according to God's decretive will that it happens.
  
• But God's decretive will is not causative especially concerning man's actions.
  
• Man only acts according to his own free will. It can be no other way.
  
• God's decretive will, which causes nothing to actually happen, causes man's will to actually do God's decretive will, which in term is that man acts according to his own free will.
  
• Somehow, God's decretive will is both causative and it is not causative.
  
• Devise obfuscating analogies, and pretend like there is no contradiction at all.
  
• Go back to the top and start over.

:beanboy:

Oh boy, I just created an infinite loop.