ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 2

[themuzicman]

But the scenarios all work on paper and logistically. Until it can be seen as plausible, your presupposition disqualifies scriptural enquiry. You won't be able to reasonably assess scriptural truths if there is no plausibility. I believe scripture definitely points this direction but it is mute until you can concede it isn't illogical.

Except that it is illogical. The fact that we can explain EDF and free will within the confines of Modal logic is fairly meaningless, and fails to address the logical contradiction that has existed for centuries, because it fails to address the real problems of the compatibility between free will and EDF.

In fact, it seeks to circumvent them by making the gaining of knowledge and the execution of a decision timeless entities, and they are not.

Again, I believe all three do an excellent job of proving that it is indeed within the limits of logic and do understand you disagree. I'll continue to try to express that there is only apparent contradiction in ensuing posts.

They only demonstrate that they can be conformed to modal logic. Modal logic, in and of itself, is insufficient to demonstrate truth or compatibility. It only addresses what is timelessly necessary and what is timelessly contingent. It fails to address reality.

ETA: I found the modal logic I was looking for:

If [](p->q) Then ([]p -> [] q)

It is necessary that if God foreknows X, then X will happen.

Thus,

If God necessarily foreknows X, then X will necessarily happen.


So the question is: Is God's knowledge necessary? If not, what is it contingent upon?


Muz

 

[godrulz]

Modal logic deals with necessities, contingencies, possibilities, certainties, etc. It is a friend of Open Theism.

 

[Eli_Cash]

You'll have to demonstrate that the Jews understood God to be "eternally now", because that's a very Greek concept, one worthy of Plato and Aristotle, and definitely not Jewish.

Not for my central argument. My interpretation of Jesus' argument was more of an inessential diversion.

In fact, God is repeatedly represented as temporal throughout the Old Testament.

The temporal and atemporal views of God are not mutually exclusive. God is, in Himselves, atemporal. But He is revealed to us temporally.

Except that your interpretation of "I am" as "eternally now" has no basis in the text or in the context.

Yes it does. "I am" is present tense, but it occurs in a past context.

Sounds like a Christological problem for you.

Muz

There is no Christological problem with the idea that Jesus has different attributes in the incarnation than He does in Himself. In fact I'm pretty sure that this is the very definition of the doctrine of the incarnation.

 

[godrulz]

Everlasting time, not timelessness. God cannot be atemporal and temporal at the same time. He is uncreated Creator, but that does not mean He is timeless (incoherent for a personal being).

 

[Eli_Cash]

Everlasting time, not timelessness. God cannot be atemporal and temporal at the same time.

Atemporal and temporal at the same time?!

What does that even mean?

He is uncreated Creator, but that does not mean He is timeless (incoherent for a personal being).

I have yet to see you explain why you believe that timelessness is incoherent for a personal being.

 

[Lon]

Everlasting time, not timelessness. God cannot be atemporal and temporal at the same time. He is uncreated Creator, but that does not mean He is timeless (incoherent for a personal being).

A post from infidels

theological fatalism
If God knows that x will happen, then x will happen. God knows x will happen. Therefore, x will happen necessarily. That's a common—and fallacious—argument for fatalism. Something about that fallacious argument, for whatever reason, has the ring of truth to a lot of people, but it's entirely false. All that follows from "If God knows that x will happen, then x will happen" and "God knows x will happen" is that x will happen; it doesn't follow that x will happen necessarily. X may well happen contingently. And if x involves a free person, then that free person could have chosen otherwise. And if he would have chosen otherwise, God would have known that as well. So God's knowledge reflects the event, the event does not reflect God's knowledge.

And if God has middle knowledge, then He knows not only what we will do but what we would do.

I believe he shows your 'incoherent' problem as false.

 

[Lon]

Except that it is illogical. The fact that we can explain EDF and free will within the confines of Modal logic is fairly meaningless, and fails to address the logical contradiction that has existed for centuries, because it fails to address the real problems of the compatibility between free will and EDF.

In fact, it seeks to circumvent them by making the gaining of knowledge and the execution of a decision timeless entities, and they are not.

I don't believe it does. It may not prove the concept, but it does prove that it cannot be logical to reject it upon the grounds given in modal logic.

They only demonstrate that they can be conformed to modal logic. Modal logic, in and of itself, is insufficient to demonstrate truth or compatibility. It only addresses what is timelessly necessary and what is timelessly contingent. It fails to address reality.

ETA: I found the modal logic I was looking for:

If [](p->q) Then ([]p -> [] q)

It is necessary that if God foreknows X, then X will happen.

Thus,

If God necessarily foreknows X, then X will necessarily happen.


So the question is: Is God's knowledge necessary? If not, what is it contingent upon?


Muz

Any character trait of God, is by definition necessary. Foreknowledge (actually 'knowing' beforehand) necessitates it is so.

As with the quote I gave Godrulz, (a brief to the point treatise) I believe it is certainly reveals that the logic isn't incoherent but premised upon faulty supposition.

God's knowledge reflects the event, the event does not reflect God's knowledge.

This isn't every Calvinist's position, but it reveals that the faulty premise is flipping the antecedant around.

Here is a Stanford article that presents this again, a bit differently.

 

[godrulz]

Atemporal and temporal at the same time?!

What does that even mean?



I have yet to see you explain why you believe that timelessness is incoherent for a personal being.

J.R. Lucas "A treatise on time and space" does this. I have quoted him before, but too tired at the moment. I believe he is correct and establishes that thinking, acting, feeling (attributes of personality) require duration and change...i.e. time. Even the eternal triune relations of God presuppose duration, not timelessness. Communication, love, fellowship, thinking, acting, feeling are reciprocal and durative, not one eternal now simultaneity (an orchestra would be cacophonic without time).

 

[godrulz]

A post from infidels


I believe he shows your 'incoherent' problem as false.

Is this William Lane Craig? Middle knowledge is still problematic and just another form of a settled vs contingent future.

 

[Edmond_Dantes]

Except that it is illogical. The fact that we can explain EDF and free will within the confines of Modal logic is fairly meaningless, and fails to address the logical contradiction that has existed for centuries, because it fails to address the real problems of the compatibility between free will and EDF.

I started reading the Bible when I was in the 1st grade, so around 6 or 7 years old. I had just picked up the knack of reading and read everything I came across. Now no one pointed out the Bible to me or that it was any different to any other book, we just had one on the shelf. It was really big, had pictures in it, and no chapter or verse annotation. A few of the impressions it made on me.

1. The God character could see the future.

2. The other characters had 'free will', though I wouldn't have called it that then. In fact they very often exercised their free will contrary to the mandate of the God character, which seemed to really fire Him up.

I never had a problem with these two points coexisting, given the extraordinary ability of the God character it seemed quite trivial.

Now given my exposure to ov vs sv, I suppose His ability to know the future could be attributed to a super 'Sherlock Holmes' analytical capability. However, in unbiased defense of the sv, I believe the raw narrative of the Bible supports God seeing the future. That is when one takes, for example the classic debate battlefield of Christ telling Peter of his immanent denial, the sv'er can rest on the explicit text the ov'er must append implications to explain his view.

Just an observation, I still think it's irrelevant.

 

[themuzicman]

I don't believe it does. It may not prove the concept, but it does prove that it cannot be logical to reject it upon the grounds given in modal logic.

Any character trait of God, is by definition necessary. Foreknowledge (actually 'knowing' beforehand) necessitates it is so.

OK, then given the principles of modal logic:

Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will occur. (definition of foreknowledge)
Thus, if God necessarily knows X, then X will necessarily occur. (distributive principle)
God's foreknowledge is necessary.
Therefore, X is necessary.

As with the quote I gave Godrulz, (a brief to the point treatise) I believe it is certainly reveals that the logic isn't incoherent but premised upon faulty supposition.

I think the discussion of free will gives us cause to discuss whether propositions about the future are true or false, as well.

This isn't every Calvinist's position, but it reveals that the faulty premise is flipping the antecedant around.

The problem that foreknowledge has, at its core, is the chicken and the egg... which came first? The decision or the foreknowledge of it?

Here is a Stanford article that presents this again, a bit differently.

I've been through that article. None of the possible "work arounds" really work.

Muz

 

[Lon]

OK, then given the principles of modal logic:

Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will occur. (definition of foreknowledge)
Thus, if God necessarily knows X, then X will necessarily occur. (distributive principle)
God's foreknowledge is necessary.
Therefore, X is necessary.

I agree, but the necessity of x is contingent upon itself. That is, y doesn't determine the outcome of x, x does.

I think the discussion of free will gives us cause to discuss whether propositions about the future are true or false, as well.



The problem that foreknowledge has, at its core, is the chicken and the egg... which came first? The decision or the foreknowledge of it?



I've been through that article. None of the possible "work arounds" really work.

Muz

I do think they work. If it must be proved that foreknowledge and freewill are congruent, I understand the argument, but it sets the premise back into discussion by showing the logical fallacy against foreknowledge and freewill capatiblity isn't rightly premised, is false. This eliminates the logical objection.

The premise would have to allow the impossible for man to be able to discuss this intelligently because we don't have foreknowledge.

For the impossible, I suggest two scenarios:

1) I happen upon an almanac published one year from now (it's not possible, but for example will, I believe, illustrate that freewill and foreknowledge are not incompatible). As I read through the Almanac, I'm privy to every major event for the year before it happens. I don't make anything happen. The weather is out of my control. I don't even watch the Kentucky Derby etc. All proceeds through the year according to the Almanac. The fact that it is written doesn't necessitate the outcome, it simply records it. It is in fact a time conundrum for logical analysis. The men and women who took office that year made the choice. The only thing the Alamanac people did was record what already happened. The problem in logic isn't about the historical record, it is about how it came to exist in their past/my present where the events haven't happened yet. The events occured according to choices made so the almanac is not foreknowledge, but history recorded. The problem is how it gets back into my hands a year before it is written. This is the only problem to solve, as the Almanac simply recorded the events after they occured. I have foreknowledge of the year's events but do nothing to make them occur, they occur without my intervention. The certainly occur, but because the events are contingent upon themselves, not my foreknowledge whatsoever.

The director and movie editor

The director makes his movie by taking footage. He knows everything that is in his movie because he directed the whole thing. He does not, however know how it is finally going to look when the film is cut and edited for presentation. Despite the fact that he knows every piece of footage shot, his foreknowledge does not affect what the editor chooses to do with his film. The editor does not lose his freedom to edit how he sees fit despite what the director foreknows about what is contained in his footage. Furthermore, he is pleased and enjoys watching the final cut even though he has seen all the footage already. The director knows all the possibilities, but the editor is not constrained by that knowledge and is free to edit as he pleases.

 

[themuzicman]

I agree, but the necessity of x is contingent upon itself. That is, y doesn't determine the outcome of x, x does.

There is no "Y" in my proof. What this demonstrates is that eternal foreknowledge of all things requires the necessity of all things. There can be no contingency in the presence of exhaustive, eternal and definite foreknowledge.

I do think they work. If it must be proved that foreknowledge and freewill are congruent, I understand the argument, but it sets the premise back into discussion by showing the logical fallacy against foreknowledge and freewill capatiblity isn't rightly premised, is false. This eliminates the logical objection.

The premise would have to allow the impossible for man to be able to discuss this intelligently because we don't have foreknowledge.

Gee, we've never been to the center of a star, and yet we can discuss what is there. Sure, some of the foreknowledge discussion is based upon our understanding of it, but there is no other way for us to reach a conclusion about it.

For the impossible, I suggest two scenarios:

1) I happen upon an almanac published one year from now (it's not possible, but for example will, I believe, illustrate that freewill and foreknowledge are not incompatible). As I read through the Almanac, I'm privy to every major event for the year before it happens. I don't make anything happen. The weather is out of my control. I don't even watch the Kentucky Derby etc. All proceeds through the year according to the Almanac. The fact that it is written doesn't necessitate the outcome, it simply records it. It is in fact a time conundrum for logical analysis. The men and women who took office that year made the choice. The only thing the Alamanac people did was record what already happened. The problem in logic isn't about the historical record, it is about how it came to exist in their past/my present where the events haven't happened yet. The events occured according to choices made so the almanac is not foreknowledge, but history recorded. The problem is how it gets back into my hands a year before it is written. This is the only problem to solve, as the Almanac simply recorded the events after they occured. I have foreknowledge of the year's events but do nothing to make them occur, they occur without my intervention. The certainly occur, but because the events are contingent upon themselves, not my foreknowledge whatsoever.

One minor issue. If you send an almanac back a year in time, and free will exists, it will almost certain be wrong in some respect. Free will dictates that one is able to choose X and able to choose ~X in a given circumstance. What an agent chooses the first time around may not be choosen the second time around. That's the problem with time travel. Even if you do nothing to influence events around you, an individual is not required to choose in the same manner, even if he encounters the same circumstance. If this is the case, then there is no free will.

And we all know how small decisions made differently can make a big difference.

The director and movie editor

The director makes his movie by taking footage. He knows everything that is in his movie because he directed the whole thing. He does not, however know how it is finally going to look when the film is cut and edited for presentation. Despite the fact that he knows every piece of footage shot, his foreknowledge does not affect what the editor chooses to do with his film. The editor does not lose his freedom to edit how he sees fit despite what the director foreknows about what is contained in his footage. Furthermore, he is pleased and enjoys watching the final cut even though he has seen all the footage already. The director knows all the possibilities, but the editor is not constrained by that knowledge and is free to edit as he pleases.

I'm not sure how this applies to anything we've said. The director's work itself is past knowledge. He has no foreknowledge of what is to come, only present knowledge of what he gave to the editor.

Muz

 

[Eli_Cash]

J.R. Lucas "A treatise on time and space" does this. I have quoted him before, but too tired at the moment. I believe he is correct and establishes that thinking, acting, feeling (attributes of personality) require duration and change...i.e. time. Even the eternal triune relations of God presuppose duration, not timelessness. Communication, love, fellowship, thinking, acting, feeling are reciprocal and durative, not one eternal now simultaneity (an orchestra would be cacophonic without time).

If the persons of the Trinity were not one in being then I could see this as true, but since they are a unity I don't see any problem with timeless relations. I don't think they know one another discursively, but intuitively. Nor do I see any reason to believe that God comes to any knowledge discursively. Perhaps you could sum up Lucas' arguments, because i really don't have any idea where he's coming from.

 

[Lon]

There is no "Y" in my proof. What this demonstrates is that eternal foreknowledge of all things requires the necessity of all things. There can be no contingency in the presence of exhaustive, eternal and definite foreknowledge.

Incorrect, x is contingent and determined by x alone. y (foreknowledge) is no way connects to x necessarily at all.

Gee, we've never been to the center of a star, and yet we can discuss what is there. Sure, some of the foreknowledge discussion is based upon our understanding of it, but there is no other way for us to reach a conclusion about it.

If it remains unvarified, it is theory. So is the argument against/for foreknowledge/freewill. And again, I believe the authors prove that the logic against does not hold.

One minor issue. If you send an almanac back a year in time, and free will exists, it will almost certain be wrong in some respect. Free will dictates that one is able to choose X and able to choose ~X in a given circumstance. What an agent chooses the first time around may not be choosen the second time around. That's the problem with time travel. Even if you do nothing to influence events around you, an individual is not required to choose in the same manner, even if he encounters the same circumstance. If this is the case, then there is no free will.

And we all know how small decisions made differently can make a big difference.

But x determines x. Remember an Almanac records as it was. X will remain X 'because' of choice. It will unfold exactly as recorded (barring an Almanac info mistake) yet has no determinitive influence at all upon those outcomes. It 'can' if I apply my knowledge, like making a bet and becoming a millionaire. God can and does interact with us and this certainly directs what happens next, but it does not eliminate freedom, it may redirect it. I don't have a problem with that idea. Foreknowledge is not only about what we do, but about what He does. In the grand scheme of things, this is God's Universe and what we freely choose is not significant in comparison to what He chooses to do with 'His' universe.

I'm not sure how this applies to anything we've said. The director's work itself is past knowledge. He has no foreknowledge of what is to come, only present knowledge of what he gave to the editor.

Muz

But he knows 'before' the editor what is contained in the footage.

Suppose the editor says
"You know, I think that you need to shoot some more footage because there is something missing from A to C so that it doesn't logically flow with the story."

The director comes back and says
"Here you go, I'd already seen that and shot it."

He knows before the editor about the problem and has already addressed it. This actually creates more freedom and satisfaction for the editor to do what he wanted to do in the first place and it makes no difference 'when' the director knew the same thing.

There are always restraints upon our freedoms. Baskin Robbins only has 31 flavors. If you wanted pickle-onion ice cream you'd have to make it yourself.
Foreknowledge does necessitate that you make a certain decision as it is priorily known, but it does not necessitate that you lost choice in doing so. You cannot choose otherwise because your own choice necessitates itself.

If given the choice of vanilla or chocolate, I'm always going to choose vanilla. In a sense, you can assume I'll never choose chocolate and it does not impinge my freewill decision to comply. I am a created being with a predisposition toward vanilla and I'm not bothered by the fact that you know beforehand that I'm always going to choose vanilla. I'm locked to it, in your mind, but I freely and always choose vanilla. The other choices are open but I will never choose to exercise my ability to do otherwise. Choosing chocolate over mint is a different scenario altogether. I may even choose chocolate/banana over vanilla in deference to banana depending how much chocolate to banana in the scoop. Just because God knows all the determinitive factors prior to my choosing and in prescience knows the flavor chosen does not remove my volition, it just actualizes it.

 

[themuzicman]

Incorrect, x is contingent and determined by x alone. y (foreknowledge) is no way connects to x necessarily at all.

Umm.. we were talking about the nature of God and His knowledge. The logical proof is there. X is anything that may happen. There is no 'Y'. Look again:

OK, then given the principles of modal logic:

Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will occur. (definition of foreknowledge)
Thus, if God necessarily knows X, then X will necessarily occur. (distributive principle)
God's foreknowledge is necessary.
Therefore, X is necessary.​

None of the facts or definitions are incorrect. The logical proof stands as it is. There is no 'Y'. There is no contingent. If you want to argue this proof, then do so on the merits of the proof itself. Don't go inserting other elements into it that aren't there.

You can't just claim that X is contingent without giving a basis for doing so. The proof stands as it is.

If it remains unvarified, it is theory. So is the argument against/for foreknowledge/freewill. And again, I believe the authors prove that the logic against does not hold.

My little proof above exposes the problems in the author's arguments.

But x determines x. Remember an Almanac records as it was.

Except that your Almanac made a trip to the past, which means it is attempting to record what will happen.

X will remain X 'because' of choice.

This is logically contradictory. Free will (choice) states that agent A in circumstance C must be able to choose 'X' and must be able to choose '~X', but not both.

What you're saying is that agent A may not choose ~X because the last time agent A was in circumstance C, he chose X.

You've just violated the definition of free will.

It will unfold exactly as recorded (barring an Almanac info mistake) yet has no determinitive influence at all upon those outcomes.

As I've shown above, if free will (choice) is truly involved, it may not.

It 'can' if I apply my knowledge, like making a bet and becoming a millionaire. God can and does interact with us and this certainly directs what happens next, but it does not eliminate freedom, it may redirect it. I don't have a problem with that idea. Foreknowledge is not only about what we do, but about what He does. In the grand scheme of things, this is God's Universe and what we freely choose is not significant in comparison to what He chooses to do with 'His' universe.

I don't have a problem with this, per se, except that you must arrive at the point where God's "redirection" eliminates free will in every possible decision, because there is only one thing an individual may do in a given situation, and that's what God has "redirected" them to do.

But he knows 'before' the editor what is contained in the footage.

Because the actions of the individuals in the movie occurred as the director was shooting the footage. The footage itself has no free will.

Suppose the editor says
"You know, I think that you need to shoot some more footage because there is something missing from A to C so that it doesn't logically flow with the story."

The director comes back and says
"Here you go, I'd already seen that and shot it."

He knows before the editor about the problem and has already addressed it. This actually creates more freedom and satisfaction for the editor to do what he wanted to do in the first place and it makes no difference 'when' the director knew the same thing.

OK, you've lost me. I don't know who is what in this analogy, anymore.

There are always restraints upon our freedoms. Baskin Robbins only has 31 flavors. If you wanted pickle-onion ice cream you'd have to make it yourself.

You're confusing unlimited ability with the ability to choose. The fact that I can't flap my arms and fly to the moon doesn't infringe the fact that I may choose any one of those 31 flavors, and that choice isn't knowable until I make it.

Foreknowledge does necessitate that you make a certain decision as it is priorily known, but it does not necessitate that you lost choice in doing so. You cannot choose otherwise because your own choice necessitates itself.

And we come across the chicken and egg problem. As you pointed out "FORE" means BEFORE. However, my loss of choice due to having made the choice comes AFTER I choose. The past is now necessary, because there are no contingents about the past.

However, BEFORE I choose, this is not an issue. The future is contingent because I may choose X or ~X.

If given the choice of vanilla or chocolate, I'm always going to choose vanilla. In a sense, you can assume I'll never choose chocolate and it does not impinge my freewill decision to comply. I am a created being with a predisposition toward vanilla and I'm not bothered by the fact that you know beforehand that I'm always going to choose vanilla. I'm locked to it, in your mind, but I freely and always choose vanilla.

LOL... You keep contradicting yourself. You are "predisposed" to always choose vanilla. That is an external force that prevents you from being able to choose to not have vanilla (~X.) Remember that our definition says that you must be able to choose X and must be able to choose ~X, but not both. But what you've just told me is that your predisposition means you are not able to choose ~X. Thus, you don't have free will.

The other choices are open but I will never choose to exercise my ability to do otherwise. Choosing chocolate over mint is a different scenario altogether. I may even choose chocolate/banana over vanilla in deference to banana depending how much chocolate to banana in the scoop. Just because God knows all the determinitive factors prior to my choosing and in prescience knows the flavor chosen does not remove my volition, it just actualizes it.

And there you finally use it: Determinitive. You finally admit that you believe that factors other than your will determine your choice. Thus, you are not able to choose ~X, and you've lost free will.

You keep contradicting yourself with your own language, Lon. Until you grasp the idea that the will and the will alone chooses, without the "determinitive" factors, you'll never be able to engage this debate.

Muz

 

[Lon]

Umm.. we were talking about the nature of God and His knowledge. The logical proof is there. X is anything that may happen. There is no 'Y'. Look again:

OK, then given the principles of modal logic:

Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will occur. (definition of foreknowledge)
Thus, if God necessarily knows X, then X will necessarily occur. (distributive principle)
God's foreknowledge is necessary.
Therefore, X is necessary.​

None of the facts or definitions are incorrect. The logical proof stands as it is. There is no 'Y'. There is no contingent. If you want to argue this proof, then do so on the merits of the proof itself. Don't go inserting other elements into it that aren't there.

You can't just claim that X is contingent without giving a basis for doing so. The proof stands as it is.



My little proof above exposes the problems in the author's arguments.



Except that your Almanac made a trip to the past, which means it is attempting to record what will happen.



This is logically contradictory. Free will (choice) states that agent A in circumstance C must be able to choose 'X' and must be able to choose '~X', but not both.

What you're saying is that agent A may not choose ~X because the last time agent A was in circumstance C, he chose X.

You've just violated the definition of free will.



As I've shown above, if free will (choice) is truly involved, it may not.



I don't have a problem with this, per se, except that you must arrive at the point where God's "redirection" eliminates free will in every possible decision, because there is only one thing an individual may do in a given situation, and that's what God has "redirected" them to do.



Because the actions of the individuals in the movie occurred as the director was shooting the footage. The footage itself has no free will.



OK, you've lost me. I don't know who is what in this analogy, anymore.



You're confusing unlimited ability with the ability to choose. The fact that I can't flap my arms and fly to the moon doesn't infringe the fact that I may choose any one of those 31 flavors, and that choice isn't knowable until I make it.



And we come across the chicken and egg problem. As you pointed out "FORE" means BEFORE. However, my loss of choice due to having made the choice comes AFTER I choose. The past is now necessary, because there are no contingents about the past.

However, BEFORE I choose, this is not an issue. The future is contingent because I may choose X or ~X.



LOL... You keep contradicting yourself. You are "predisposed" to always choose vanilla. That is an external force that prevents you from being able to choose to not have vanilla (~X.) Remember that our definition says that you must be able to choose X and must be able to choose ~X, but not both. But what you've just told me is that your predisposition means you are not able to choose ~X. Thus, you don't have free will.



And there you finally use it: Determinitive. You finally admit that you believe that factors other than your will determine your choice. Thus, you are not able to choose ~X, and you've lost free will.

You keep contradicting yourself with your own language, Lon. Until you grasp the idea that the will and the will alone chooses, without the "determinitive" factors, you'll never be able to engage this debate.

Muz

I disagree with much here and believe you are asserting rather than proving anything. I acquiesce I may have lost you on a few of the scenarios as I'm not foreknowing and have only seen or realized examples that are unfitting for expressing something we don't possess so couldn't explain adequately.

As I said previously, it remains difficult both to prove or disprove a thing that is outside of our rationality. This doesn't mean the thing is irration, just beyond us.
OV objections will fall into two categories: 1) that is faulty in premise precisely because of the finite limitation and/or 2) that is faulty because it doesn't understand the supposition.

Clete is correct on the point that some things that are traditionally believe are unclarifiable so are also undeniable but this is a truth of all God's transcendant qualities such as a past that has no beginning and stretches to infinity. OV accept the premise with the rest of us, but it is wholly unqualifiable and logically unattainable.

You are asserting about time properties here that we could not possibly debate with our limitations.

What I do know is that foreknowledge (a scripturally given) does not remove culpability of our choices (also a scripturally given). Foreknowledge of any kind does not eliminate free choice, it actualizes it.

 

[themuzicman]

I disagree with much here and believe you are asserting rather than proving anything. I acquiesce I may have lost you on a few of the scenarios as I'm not foreknowing and have only seen or realized examples that are unfitting for expressing something we don't possess so couldn't explain adequately.

Umm.. I presented a logical proof about necessity and eternal definite foreknowledge. It stands unopposed to this point. Yes, you tried to introduce 'Y' without defining 'Y' or demonstrating that it should be there. That should be our main focus, as themoment.

As I said previously, it remains difficult both to prove or disprove a thing that is outside of our rationality. This doesn't mean the thing is irration, just beyond us.

However, if that thing involves elements of this universe, such as our free will decisions, then we can at least speak of whether it is logical. There is a difference between something that is not logically explainable and something that is logically contradictory.

OV objections will fall into two categories: 1) that is faulty in premise precisely because of the finite limitation and/or 2) that is faulty because it doesn't understand the supposition.

Or a third category: That it is correct on both counts.

You see, this is why it is impossible to have a discussion with you. You've already assumed that you are right and I am wrong. I presented a proof that demonstrate the opposite, and you are unable to interact with it.

Clete is correct on the point that some things that are traditionally believe are unclarifiable so are also undeniable but this is a truth of all God's transcendant qualities such as a past that has no beginning and stretches to infinity. OV accept the premise with the rest of us, but it is wholly unqualifiable and logically unattainable.

And I already said that I agree with this. However, we're talking about foreknowledge of what happens in the imminent world, and the free will of created creatures living in this imminent world. These should be logically consistent from an imminent standpoint. They are not.

Also, those things which are transcendent aren't logically contradictory. They're simply beyond our comprehension. There is a difference.

You are asserting about time properties here that we could not possibly debate with our limitations.

Why is it you can make assertions about time (I have an almanac that is from a year from now), but when it comes to understanding free will during that year, suddenly, we can't understand time?

What I do know is that foreknowledge (a scripturally given) does not remove culpability of our choices (also a scripturally given). Foreknowledge of any kind does not eliminate free choice, it actualizes it.

Actualizing a choice = Eliminating free will.

I know Molininsts just love to use that word to say that God just "actualized" a given set of "free will choices" to create one of the possible worlds.

The problem is that the contingent regarding what "choices" I make lie with God's decision to actualize a given possible world, and not what I've freely chosen.

Muz

 

[godrulz]

Molinism is confusing and incoherent. It still tries to support EDF, but logically at the expense of genuine free will. William Lane Craig is a great philosopher, but barking up the wrong tree on this one.

 

[Lon]

Umm.. I presented a logical proof about necessity and eternal definite foreknowledge. It stands unopposed to this point. Yes, you tried to introduce 'Y' without defining 'Y' or demonstrating that it should be there. That should be our main focus, as themoment.

I opposed it. Articles opposed it.

However, if that thing involves elements of this universe, such as our free will decisions, then we can at least speak of whether it is logical. There is a difference between something that is not logically explainable and something that is logically contradictory.

There is no element in our experience that explains an eternal nonbeginning well.

Or a third category: That it is correct on both counts.

You see, this is why it is impossible to have a discussion with you. You've already assumed that you are right and I am wrong. I presented a proof that demonstrate the opposite, and you are unable to interact with it.

I'm totally able and 'did' interact with it. It is a repeat and just repeating it is asserting. I'm not into readdressing a mistaken concept more than twice.

I introduced 'y' and you actually proved my point by saying 'y' has nothing to do with 'x.' That was the proof of the whole thing and a sizable concession.
Of course I believe I'm right and you are wrong. The scriptures point to this truth and yet, because you cannot grasp it logically are dismissing it out of hand with a commitment to OV.

And I already said that I agree with this. However, we're talking about foreknowledge of what happens in the imminent world, and the free will of created creatures living in this imminent world. These should be logically consistent from an imminent standpoint. They are not.

Despite what a Stanford paper and two other collegiate works would say.

Also, those things which are transcendent aren't logically contradictory. They're simply beyond our comprehension. There is a difference.

Explain the difference, please. I'm not tracking with you here.

Why is it you can make assertions about time (I have an almanac that is from a year from now), but when it comes to understanding free will during that year, suddenly, we can't understand time?

Because I see your logical objection and object to it.

Actualizing a choice = Eliminating free will.

Are you eliminating freewill every time you actualize a decision then?
Further, does this mean you never had freewill?
Your logical conclusions are confusing to me and I expect it is because they are committing logical fallacies.

I know Molininsts just love to use that word to say that God just "actualized" a given set of "free will choices" to create one of the possible worlds.

The problem is that the contingent regarding what "choices" I make lie with God's decision to actualize a given possible world, and not what I've freely chosen.

Muz

OV is caught in this trap because it seeks to grasp an atemporal anomaly with temporally constrained parameters of logic.

Let me ask, according to the Almanac presentation, is freewill lost?
In my estimation, the answer is 'no.' That is, we are talking about something we can't intellectualize well because it goes beyond our reason. The qualifier that disables our ability to assess is the fact that somehow the Almanac came back a year earlier before it was written. This doesn't gel with temporal logic because we are trying to take something that escapes our temporal parameters and trying to understand it temporally. OV assumptions are the problem here, not the logistics of the problem. When John meets and speaks with an elder in heaven, you assume the elder is a fabrication. I assume that God is able to transcend temporal restraints. I believe my position takes the scripture at face value and interprets it correctly.