ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 2

[Lon]

None of the examples you gave directly stated that an OV'er said someone was not saved because they were an SV'er (and only a couple could indirectly be considered saying someone would go to hell at all). You've overstated your case. Are you a good enough person to admit you've overstated your case?

PK's was a direct issue of this very thing.

The correction regarding Clete also dealt with this very thing. Did you even read his reply to you?

Let's keep adding to it

Aimiel

Wizard of Oz has made the exact same observation that I have when GR corrected Maximee

GR even acknowledges the comment

Once again correcting Mystery

Lighthouse (just a few days ago)and here

Door

Nick M

How many of these are going to be necessary before you recant?

I can readily keep going, there are many more GR never saw or responded to, he is just keen on this as am I.

 

[Lon]

The difference is that EDF and our free will are characteristics of the imminent world. Yes, God has the knowledge of EDF, but the knowledge is about this world. Likewise, the free wills in question are those that are part of this imminent world. Thus, the content of God's knowledge and the nature of our free will is going to conform to the logical existence of this world.

Muz

I may need you to explain the immanent a bit here to me. Both an eternal past and foreknowledge (future, as I understand it) are problematic for immanent discussion and apprehension to me.
Example again: When we discuss a nonbeginning 'past' escapes our reasoning ability because as far back as we consciously can comprehend-God extends beyond those parameters of apprehension. We cannot meaningfully discuss exactly what this means but it is revealed truth "from eternity to eternity You are God." So we accept the premise without being able to grasp it fully logically. It isn't that it isn't logical, I agree with Clete here, it is. The problem isn't logic, it is the restraints upon our finite ability to grasp what is beyond us. I didn't go for math after calculus. I probably could have, but pursued a different course of study to work with people (human sciences). Even not having taken higher math past calculus, I know it is logical and explainable but 'I' can't do it. I believe the consideration of future and freewill to be beyond the ken of all men. Graspable, like simple math and higher maths, but exponentially difficult when our limitation hits ceiling and God's continues far beyond toward infinity.

 

[themuzicman]

While there are students I have that will not attain, the majority can and so there is expectations that come with the teacher's contract. In some schools and areas, this is more difficult because of language barriers etc.

Those who are not yet adults are also more willing to learn.

I somewhat disagree. "No" has the more meaning but it isn't a good answer either imo. You are answering a question that isn't properly understood by the querrier so the answer cannot be properly understood either until the question is corrected. The assumption is that "omnipotence" means "anything" including a querried contradiction. This assumption must be corrected first.

But that assumption hasn't been expressed. There is nothing in the question that necessarily implies omnipotence. I might say that the answer requires some discussion before giving it, but, in the end, "no" is still the correct answer.

Yes, I've seen Lamerson and Enyart's battle royale but I'm not sure why Bob put this particular omni on the list. I really don't know what OV objects to on this particular Omni. I cannot fathom or guess what the hang up on this particular one is when we understand that being able 'not' to do something is also the mark of omnipotence (not sinning for example-that's 'why' He's omnipotent). I agree with OV that He doesn't do the logically absurd but we disagree somewhat on what is absurd such as foreknowing (also a Biblical concept). It isn't enough of a disagreement for the term to be rejected however. I believe you are correct and Enyart incorrect on this particular: it shouldn't be listed as one of the omni's in that list.

There's a difference between "foreknowing" things and having exhaustive, definite foreknowledge of every individual decision. Humans in groups are often very predictable (even to the point of certainty, given the right conditions) without knowing what each person will choose along the way.

I answer the question by correcting it. It isn't a good logical question to ask. That is my answer.

Why is it not logical? It's actually a good question, as it allows the questioner and answerer to engage in a discussion about the answer.

Rather I correct the question so that it has proper meaning: "What does omnipotence mean and not mean?"
When the question is corrected, the answer is obvious and the querrier will correct his misconception. That's where real learning takes place. Now we don't have to waste pages with him trying to explain why we'd say 'no.'

I think we probably arrive at the same place in the discussion. The difference is That I've answered the question properly.

Here I disagree because 'foreknowledge' literally means 'knows+future (prognosei).

I should probably use the term "EDF", rather than foreknowledge, as it is possible for God to foreknow some things.

I understand, but it seems a bit backwards to me and the long way around. I appreciate that because I'm a global thinker and actually think like that but most people are linear thinkers where the correction to the question comes first.

I don't think either approach is wrong, but one is more expedient and move the conversation along more swiftly with the querrier satisfied with a direct answer (the question is corrected).

I guess I'd rather have the question be answered, to relieve the tension of "why can't he just answer my question" out of the way, and then we can have a discussion about why that is correct. It may be less efficient, but I think it is more complete.

I do understand and appreciate that. But the scripture term foreknowledge and instances that support the idea are also biblical. I too reject any thought of unqualified immutability. I believe it was Clete and I who went around on this particular a bit using a digital clock analogy. In one sense, the clock doesn't change. It is moving, but it will never display anything other than the sequence it is programmed to create over and over again. But as Clete rightly said, the succession of numbers is change. I believe OV and traditional theology agree on these points of immutability but we apply this differently to be sure because foreknowledge acquiesced or denied colors our understandings respectively.

Hopefully we can agree to speak of EDF, and not just any kind of foreknowledge.

And I agree here as well, but again our suppositions (from scripture) have us disagreeing what that entails. We believe that God has transcendant qualities as God. Because OV does accept some of these, it isn't as difficult to understand the dilemma of foreknowledge and logical constraints (one example where we digress).

I don't know of any attributes of God that are logically contradictory as EDF and free will.

This was said very well but we disagree on the interpretations. Foreknowledge, again is a biblical term and must be wrestled with. I gave Godrulz this scripture that distinguishes and clarifies that the OV definition needs reworking

I don't think he actually took the time to think through the scriptual definitions but dismisses them quickly from OV presupposition. This will never do when the OV goal is to enlighten and/or convert those of opposing position. It is a real hurdle that needs proper attention or we both go away completely convinced the other is wrong, as GR has done (I'll address him on this and let ya know if it continues to be dropped or properly engaged).

Certainly we can discuss what "foreknowledge" really means from a Scriptural perspective. I think that's something that OV should do. However, OV spends much of its time dealing with EDF, so moving on to this area is sometimes difficult.

I agree, but the last question is really where we begin to discuss the issue. The others are all steering questions that lead us to the meaningful. The last question is the better question because it leads directly to the area of learning. All these extemporaneous questions aren't beneficial and tend to have us spinning off on rabbit trails without ever engaging the most pertinent questions when they 'should' be bringing us to the pertinent ones.
We need to ask good questions between OV and traditional theology.

Agreed.

Okay, let's start with that verse from acts. Have you and I discussed the term 'foreknowledge' before (I don't want to retread old ground uneccesarily)?

I don't think we've discussed it before.

Muz

 

[Lon]

double post, I'm having trouble with connection on TOL lately.

 

[Lon]

Those who are not yet adults are also more willing to learn.

I can't help but see the frustration in your continuance but again remind that if there is a disagreement that it is usually the fault of the instructor. On most of these particulars, it is bit complicated because we are not talking about instruction but reconstruction and this carries an aweful lot of weight for the instructor. He has to prove the priori knowledge is incorrect in addition to his explitive.

There's a difference between "foreknowing" things and having exhaustive, definite foreknowledge of every individual decision. Humans in groups are often very predictable (even to the point of certainty, given the right conditions) without knowing what each person will choose along the way.

I should probably use the term "EDF", rather than foreknowledge, as it is possible for God to foreknow some things.

Hopefully we can agree to speak of EDF, and not just any kind of foreknowledge.

Certainly we can discuss what "foreknowledge" really means from a Scriptural perspective. I think that's something that OV should do. However, OV spends much of its time dealing with EDF, so moving on to this area is sometimes difficult.

Muz

The difference between EDF and simple foreknowledge

I'm sure we are going to disagree over definitions here. This isn't a concern of mine but that we are able to understand at least where one or the other is coming from. I may be pleasantly surprised if we do agree on some things here.

Knowledge

Foreknowledge means "knowing" before hand. More explicitly, it means to actually know (not guess or predicte)something is going to happen before it actually happens. To my knowledge, OV rejects the definition of 'knowledge' that the rest of us understand.

In order to arrive at this, I believe the medical profession sheds some light.
"Prognosis," is the Greek term used by doctors to give a patient information about a malady. The doctor may 'predict' very accurately that the malady is life-threatening and the patient will not survive. He 'knows' the patient has cancer, alz, or some other condition and because of the extent of invasion is able to 'predict' the outcome: "You have x months to live." Even though the doctor is most likely correct, it isn't knowledge but a rather trustworthy prediction. Sometimes the doctor 'predicts' incorrectly but upon reliable observation is fairly assured. He doesn't really 'know' but is fairly confident in his observation.

In my estimation, 'prognosis' in this case is a misnomer. Unless a thing is unwaivering in correct cognition, it cannot be said to be 'known.' Knowledge and actual fact are congruent terms of equivocation.

"Fore" knowledge means actual knowledge before an event occurs. I do not believe OV believes in actual foreknowledge but defines it according to the misnomer. "God really can't know anything future about man's actions, but predicts and/or determines an outcome."

OV redefines the term (prognosis).

Definite

Definite means actual but it is a bit redundant.
Example: Positively the truth
If it is truth, positive is assumed or it wouldn't be truth. Definite foreknowledge is only necessary when one disagrees with the definition of foreknowledge in the first place (i.e. it isn't really necessary).

Exhaustive

I don't get too worked up over the difference because if (definite) foreknowledge is possible, it is not too hard to extrapolate and prove that it can be exhaustive. This is only a disagreement on the extensiveness of the term.

The real deliberation doesn't come here. The question to be answered is "Can God really know anything before it happens?" This is where the OV/traditional debate takes place. "How much" is only meaningful after concession or divergence is acknowledged and understood.

 

[themuzicman]

I can't help but see the frustration in your continuance but again remind that if there is a disagreement that it is usually the fault of the instructor. On most of these particulars, it is bit complicated because we are not talking about instruction but reconstruction and this carries an aweful lot of weight for the instructor. He has to prove the priori knowledge is incorrect in addition to his explitive.

I've often taught by the idea that you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink.

The difference between EDF and simple foreknowledge

I'm sure we are going to disagree over definitions here. This isn't a concern of mine but that we are able to understand at least where one or the other is coming from. I may be pleasantly surprised if we do agree on some things here.

Knowledge

Foreknowledge means "knowing" before hand. More explicitly, it means to actually know (not guess or predicte)something is going to happen before it actually happens. To my knowledge, OV rejects the definition of 'knowledge' that the rest of us understand.

In order to arrive at this, I believe the medical profession sheds some light.
"Prognosis," is the Greek term used by doctors to give a patient information about a malady. The doctor may 'predict' very accurately that the malady is life-threatening and the patient will not survive. He 'knows' the patient has cancer, alz, or some other condition and because of the extent of invasion is able to 'predict' the outcome: "You have x months to live." Even though the doctor is most likely correct, it isn't knowledge but a rather trustworthy prediction. Sometimes the doctor 'predicts' incorrectly but upon reliable observation is fairly assured. He doesn't really 'know' but is fairly confident in his observation.

I don't really have a problem with this. I think God is able to know some things with certainty simply though the vast knowledge He has of the present, the possible courses of the future, and how His actions will affect both. I think the key, here, is the knowledge of all the possible courses of the future.

In my estimation, 'prognosis' in this case is a misnomer. Unless a thing is unwaivering in correct cognition, it cannot be said to be 'known.' Knowledge and actual fact are congruent terms of equivocation.

I guess it depends on what you mean by fact. It is a fact that when you introduce flame to gasoline vapors mixed with oxygen that the gasoline will burn quickly. Now, I don't know as a fact that the next instance of this will occur, but I can know, based upon previous experience, that it will, even though the fact of its happening isn't reality, yet.

"Fore" knowledge means actual knowledge before an event occurs. I do not believe OV believes in actual foreknowledge but defines it according to the misnomer. "God really can't know anything future about man's actions, but predicts and/or determines an outcome."

I'd like to refine this a bit more, since it isn't quite accurate:

Because future free will decisions are unknowable, God can't know what future free will decisions men will make, He doesn't know the exact course of the future. There are things God can know about the future, including things that happen solely by the laws of nature, and any actions God does that are independent of man's actions.

So, there are elements to God's foreknowledge. But it isn't exhaustive, since man's decisions aren't knowable. It's also not definite, since some may be contingent upon what men decide.

OV redefines the term (prognosis).

I think you can see that this isn't the case, based upon what I said.

Definite

Definite means actual but it is a bit redundant.
Example: Positively the truth
If it is truth, positive is assumed or it wouldn't be truth. Definite foreknowledge is only necessary when one disagrees with the definition of foreknowledge in the first place (i.e. it isn't really necessary).

Exhaustive

I don't get too worked up over the difference because if (definite) foreknowledge is possible, it is not too hard to extrapolate and prove that it can be exhaustive. This is only a disagreement on the extensiveness of the term.

More accurately, the granularity.

And I think the problem isn't definite or exhaustive independently, but rather when they are put together. EDF means that every action, every decision, the precise course of the future is exhaustively known by God and is definitely fixed, without any possibility of alteration.

The real deliberation doesn't come here. The question to be answered is "Can God really know anything before it happens?" This is where the OV/traditional debate takes place. "How much" is only meaningful after concession or divergence is acknowledged and understood.

And I think OVT would say that God can know some things before they happen. However, those things that God knows are based upon something other than the free will decisions of individuals.

Muz

 

[Lon]

I've often taught by the idea that you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink.

I'd love to have a parent like you in my corner

I don't really have a problem with this. I think God is able to know some things with certainty simply though the vast knowledge He has of the present, the possible courses of the future, and how His actions will affect both. I think the key, here, is the knowledge of all the possible courses of the future.

I'm not sure we are agreeing on the same thing. I'll try to point out where I see discrepancy on a few of the comments below.

I guess it depends on what you mean by fact. It is a fact that when you introduce flame to gasoline vapors mixed with oxygen that the gasoline will burn quickly. Now, I don't know as a fact that the next instance of this will occur, but I can know, based upon previous experience, that it will, even though the fact of its happening isn't reality, yet.

This is a bit different than foreknowledge however. As far as I've read, no man is ever mentioned as having it and that's significant. It means that we might expect this to be one of His transcendant qualities. I believe this is actually the case.

Jas 4:13 Come now, you who say, "Today or tomorrow we will go into this or that town and spend a year there and do business and make a profit."
Jas 4:14 You do not know about tomorrow. What is your life like? For you are a puff of smoke that appears for a short time and then vanishes.
Jas 4:15 You ought to say instead, "If the Lord is willing, then we will live and do this or that."
Jas 4:16 But as it is, you boast in your arrogance. All such boasting is evil.

Especially honing into Jas 4:14 "You do not know about tomorrow." I believe you are correct we can make really solid predictions about outcomes like the gasoline lit. This however, I wouldn't define as foreknowledge like scripture does.

I'd like to refine this a bit more, since it isn't quite accurate:

Because future free will decisions are unknowable, God can't know what future free will decisions men will make, He doesn't know the exact course of the future. There are things God can know about the future, including things that happen solely by the laws of nature, and any actions God does that are independent of man's actions.

So, there are elements to God's foreknowledge. But it isn't exhaustive, since man's decisions aren't knowable. It's also not definite, since some may be contingent upon what men decide.

Then we don't even agree on the term foreknowledge and perhaps in some cases just knowledge. If you say the gasoline will light and then the only match goes out, you and I can be wrong and it is varified that we hadn't actually known. As to 'if' it were lit, I think we are on the same page. We can expect that natural laws God has set in motion will remain consistent, but I'm talking about specifically God foreknowing men's actions which I believe scripture expresses such as in Psalm 139 and 1 Peter 1:2.

OV redefines the term (prognosis).

I think you can see that this isn't the case, based upon what I said.

I believe to 'know' something means it cannot be different because it is real/actual.
Because I believe it an attribute of God's alone, I believe we definitely disagree on the term.

More accurately, the granularity.

And I think the problem isn't definite or exhaustive independently, but rather when they are put together. EDF means that every action, every decision, the precise course of the future is exhaustively known by God and is definitely fixed, without any possibility of alteration.

I acquiesce, but I don't believe it removes freewill culpability to know something before I do it. The hypothetical clouds logical findings on this particular. The hypothetical goes: If God knows before I make a choice, what choice I was going to make, I didn't have a choice.

The problem with this logic is similar to the rock analogy. The question needs correction because it is assuming that free choice is lost by foreknowledge.

Rom 9:17 For the scripture says to Pharaoh: "For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I may demonstrate my power in you, and that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth."

The traditional view has God knowing and Pharoah still choosing his responses.
I don't believe actual (definite) foreknowledge equates loss of choice.

And I think OVT would say that God can know some things before they happen. However, those things that God knows are based upon something other than the free will decisions of individuals.

Muz

I believe you succinctly state the discrepancy well here. We define foreknowledge differently having also differing presuppositions that define the term. We aren't talking about the same thing.

 

[Clete]

This post is in response to Lon's post #8041 where he linked to the following post while trying to make a case that there are those here who have said that people who hold to the settled view are not saved. If there are such individuals who hold to such a position, I am not one of them. I have never said such a thing and anyone who thinks otherwise needs to take a class on reading comprehension.

Where did Clete say he was an enemy of the gospel? I do not think Clete considers AMR a godless unbeliever. If he did, Clete would be wrong and deserves rebuke. Issues of foreknowledge are not salvific like the Deity/resurrection of Christ and justification by faith (which both affirm).

I do not believe that neither AMR, Nang nor Hilston are believers in Biblical Christianity. But I do not hold that position because they believe in exhaustive foreknowledge or even predestination. Thousands upon thousands of people who believe in these doctrines are very much saved and love the real God in spite of the fact that these doctrine are in contradiction to a truly Biblical Theology Proper (i.e. theology of who God is). It isn't predestination or foreknowledge or any such ancillary doctrine that leads to me conclude that AMR or anyone else is an unbeliever. Rather it is what they believe about who God is.

You don't get to just make up any old god you want to believe in, call it Jesus and add a few (or a lot of) details that parallel the Biblical story and then still get to rightly call yourself a Christian. The Christian faith is about having a relationship with the God who actually did create the universe, not some nonsensical made up god that has more in common with Greek mythology than it does with the God spoken of in the Bible. These people ignore the principles of justice, righteousness and love in order to maintain all of their ancillary doctrines that are all rendered moot by having done so. In other words, if you are worshiping the wrong god, it doesn't matter whether you get all the other details right or wrong. If a person believes that their pagan god became a human being named Jesus and died for their sins and rose from the grave three days later that person is worshiping the wrong Jesus and is still in their sins because the pagan god they worship does not exist. This is where I believe AMR, Nang and Hilston are. They worship a false god whom they happen call 'Jesus' and they ignore the most important principles of what the Bible teaches (i.e. love, justice, righteousness, etc) in order to maintain their worship of this false god who does not possess within its character any of the principles which are at the very core of the true Christian faith.

Of course they use the terms, 'love', 'righteousness', 'justice' and 'relationship' as well as every other term common to the Christian faith in relation to their pagan god but the definitions of those terms don't have anything to do with what the Bible says about those principles. Its as if the only thing they get right is the terms themselves as though there is more than one English language. Their religious paradigm is completely different and thus so is their religion itself. This is what leads Hilston to conclude that I and other Open Theists have a mental disorder. He actually believes that for his god, justice is completely arbitrary and just doesn't get it when someone wants to suggest that to believe such a thing is completely contrary to what the Bible says about who the real God is. They simply do not know who God is. How can you trust in a God that you do not believe in? And make no mistake about it, they do not believe in the God of Scripture; the God who really does love them; the God who really did die for them; the God who's heart really does ache for them to repent and to love Him in return and Who is completely powerless to force them to do so. Indeed, they believe that those who do not love God, are being made not to love God by God Himself. That isn't Christianity and, regardless of what they call themselves, anyone who believes such a thing is not a believer in the Christian faith.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[LightSon]

Because future free will decisions are unknowable, God can't know what future free will decisions men will make, He doesn't know the exact course of the future.

Muz,
Were you taught this (i.e. OV) since the beginning of your Christian experience? Or is this something to which you changed along the way?

 

[Lon]

Lon, Just for the record, I am not OV. Nor do I identify with Calvinism. If forced to choose, I lean towards Calvinism, but am a long ways from embracing it. OVers make a number of fair points. Frankly I do not know what I am, and just want to keep my ears and mind open for now. I enjoy getting both sides to discuss the matter.

What I do know is that a spirit led person is slow to anger and demonstrates a Christlike humility. How we control our tongue is a key indicator. It is the spiritual man whose arguments I am most keen to hear. Doctrine is important, Christlike character is paramount.

Regards.

Forgive me, please.

1) for missing this
2) for assumption based upon "Lon may be wrong on many points"
I mistook it for having many points wrong when it was merely a proposition.
3) If I haven't always been gracious. My intentions are good but sometimes I don't come across as tactfully in written expression but I pray and endeavor to do so, for His glory.

Blessings, thank you for the correction and graciousness.

In Him

Lon

 

[LightSon]

for assumption based upon "Lon may be wrong on many points"
I mistook it for having many points wrong when it was merely a proposition.

Yes. I had no doctrine of yours in mind. It was a very general proposition, that I could have made about any person, myself included. I could have been more clear however.

Forgive me, please.

All's forgiven....

 

[Eli_Cash]

Congratulations, you've just assumed the conclusion! Welcome to logical incoherentness!

Your argument now consists of:

1) God is "eternally now"
2) Jesus is God.
3) Jesus said, "I am"
4) Therefore God is "eternally now."

It's silly.

I think you are confusing what I'm saying about Jesus' argument in the passage with what I'm arguing about the passage.

This is how I interpret Jesus.

1) God is eternally now. (Assumed by Jesus and the Jews)
2) Jesus claims to be eternally now.
3) Therefore Jesus is God.

On the other hand my argument about this passage is as follows.

1) Jesus says "I am" with reference to the past, which is the eternal now position.
2) Jesus is God, and "I am" is the divine title.
3) Therefore God is "eternally now".

I don't think that Jesus was trying to tell the Jews about God's temporal character, but about his own.

However,

1) your interpretation completely ignores the context of the conversation and the text around "I am."

No it doesn't. As I've pointed out already, my argument is based on the context, namely the immediate question that he was answering. Since is was a question about his temporal nature, I believe that his use of tense is quite relevant.

2) your interpretation assumes that God is eternally now in order to arrive at the conclusion that Jesus is "eternally now.'

As I explained above, it does not.

And, if you think about it for just a moment, Jesus was a human being, which means that He is temporal, as humans tend to be. For Jesus to be claiming to be "eternally now", when He was presently and demonstrably temporal, would be a LIE.

I don't think Jesus does that.

Muz

Jesus is temporal in the incarnation, but atemporal in his divine essence.

 

[themuzicman]

Muz,
Were you taught this (i.e. OV) since the beginning of your Christian experience? Or is this something to which you changed along the way?

I was raised in a reformed setting, so I suppose I absorbed some of this from that upbringing, although I was never really exposed to theology before I was an adult.

When I became interested in theology, and I started studying sin and the fall, and wanted to reconcile these things with what people were saying about God, the logical contradiction was evident, and given what I had studied to that point, I rejected EDF fairly easily.

Muz

 

[themuzicman]

This is a bit different than foreknowledge however. As far as I've read, no man is ever mentioned as having it and that's significant. It means that we might expect this to be one of His transcendant qualities. I believe this is actually the case.

That would be an argument from silence, although I might not necessarily disagree. I think my original point isn't about God's knowledge, but what the contents of God's foreknowledge regarding creation are, that being knowledge of the imminent world, and, as such, there are some logical ties.

Especially honing into Jas 4:14 "You do not know about tomorrow." I believe you are correct we can make really solid predictions about outcomes like the gasoline lit. This however, I wouldn't define as foreknowledge like scripture does.

I don't know that Scripture every does define "foreknowledge" directly, nor does it speak of the source of God's foreknowledge. We only know that He foreknows some things.

Then we don't even agree on the term foreknowledge and perhaps in some cases just knowledge. If you say the gasoline will light and then the only match goes out, you and I can be wrong and it is varified that we hadn't actually known.

I don't think I mentioned a match. I said that when flame was exposed to gasoline and oxygen that burning would result.

As to 'if' it were lit, I think we are on the same page. We can expect that natural laws God has set in motion will remain consistent, but I'm talking about specifically God foreknowing men's actions which I believe scripture expresses such as in Psalm 139 and 1 Peter 1:2.

We'd have to exegete these more closely to see.

I believe to 'know' something means it cannot be different because it is real/actual.
Because I believe it an attribute of God's alone, I believe we definitely disagree on the term.

I don't have a problem saying it cannot be different. I guess it's an assumption to say that all future events are already actual.

I acquiesce, but I don't believe it removes freewill culpability to know something before I do it. The hypothetical clouds logical findings on this particular. The hypothetical goes: If God knows before I make a choice, what choice I was going to make, I didn't have a choice.

As does the logical proof.

The problem with this logic is similar to the rock analogy. The question needs correction because it is assuming that free choice is lost by foreknowledge.

But it's not an assumption. It's logically demonstrable.

The traditional view has God knowing and Pharoah still choosing his responses.
I don't believe actual (definite) foreknowledge equates loss of choice.

Then you'll have to explain the logical contradiction.

I believe you succinctly state the discrepancy well here. We define foreknowledge differently having also differing presuppositions that define the term. We aren't talking about the same thing.

Then let's get on the same page.

Muz

 

[themuzicman]

I think you are confusing what I'm saying about Jesus' argument in the passage with what I'm arguing about the passage.

This is how I interpret Jesus.

1) God is eternally now. (Assumed by Jesus and the Jews)
2) Jesus claims to be eternally now.
3) Therefore Jesus is God.

On the other hand my argument about this passage is as follows.

1) Jesus says "I am" with reference to the past, which is the eternal now position.
2) Jesus is God, and "I am" is the divine title.
3) Therefore God is "eternally now".

I don't think that Jesus was trying to tell the Jews about God's temporal character, but about his own.

You'll have to demonstrate that the Jews understood God to be "eternally now", because that's a very Greek concept, one worthy of Plato and Aristotle, and definitely not Jewish.

In fact, God is repeatedly represented as temporal throughout the Old Testament.

No it doesn't. As I've pointed out already, my argument is based on the context, namely the immediate question that he was answering. Since is was a question about his temporal nature, I believe that his use of tense is quite relevant.

Except that your interpretation of "I am" as "eternally now" has no basis in the text or in the context.

Jesus is temporal in the incarnation, but atemporal in his divine essence.

Sounds like a Christological problem for you.

Muz

 

[Lon]

That would be an argument from silence, although I might not necessarily disagree. I think my original point isn't about God's knowledge, but what the contents of God's foreknowledge regarding creation are, that being knowledge of the imminent world, and, as such, there are some logical ties.

I totally agree with that assessment and I believe you did hone in that it was what might be expected.

As I understand,

James 4:14 "You do not know about tomorrow."

it supports the idea. I'm glad you are open to this point.

I don't know that Scripture every does define "foreknowledge" directly, nor does it speak of the source of God's foreknowledge. We only know that He foreknows some things.

But it seems the term is adequate enough. That foreknowledge means 'knowing' before. In my estimation, it is the 'knowing' part that we understand differently.

I don't think I mentioned a match. I said that when flame was exposed to gasoline and oxygen that burning would result.

And I agree, it is knowledge, but it isn't foreknowledge. I was trying to keep the ideas separate, again because I don't believe we possess foreknowledge.
I may need to explain this a bit further, but you seem to be tracking. Let me know if I need to continue on this vein.

We'd have to exegete these more closely to see.

I want to do this shortly as well but believe it will take space so will defer until we are both on the same page with our agreements and divergences on terms and concepts.

I don't have a problem saying it cannot be different. I guess it's an assumption to say that all future events are already actual.
As does the logical proof.
But it's not an assumption. It's logically demonstrable.
...you'll have to explain the logical contradiction.
...let's get on the same page.

Muz

Here is an interesting video that demonstrates that foreknowledge doesn't interfere with freewill.
He uses Abert Einstein's theories but even if some of it isn't acquiesced, it still provides sound logical reasoning that it is possible and it is largely simple to understand (short also, which is why I place it first).

This one is much more heady but I believe he proves that freewill and foreknowlege are very much compatible (longest, high academics, and my preferred recommend).

Here is one that isn't as heady and comes to the conclusion using words more than symbols if prefered, but I prefer the second.

 

[themuzicman]

Yes, I have heard and read about the Modal argument. It has at least two issues:

1) It assumes a timeless perspective. The statement that "Gold was first found in California in 1990" is possible, but only from a timeless perspective. Once gold was found in 1848 (or whatever year it was), that statement became "not possible", and the statement that "Gold was first found in California in 1848" became necessary, because it is now (at the present moment) no longer possible that "Gold was first found in California in 1990." This principle is called "The necessity of the past."

Further, to say (on this day) that "it is possible that gold was first found in California in 1990" falls into the same "irrelevant" category as most tautologies. It is certainly not a basis for any rational argument.

The author's response to "changing the past" is also invalid. He immediately says that, since God exhaustively knows the future, God knew about the prayer request and acted beforehand to fulfill the request, such that the past isn't really changed, even though it may have appeared to.

Thus, this doesn't address God changing the past. The past is clearly necessary, and God is unable to change the past. That statement did not change.

And, it assumed that God has exhaustive and definite foreknowledge, something that has not been demonstrated.

Finally, the article rejects (very early on) what is clearly true (from a secular perspective): Propositions about the future are either a) neither true nor false, or b) their truth or falsity is logically unknowable. Yet, the only significant argument against considering this is "bad consequences" (we'd have to rethink logic.) So, the author tacitly assumes determinism from the beginning, even as he tries to prove determinism.

And, that doesn't address humans. This is somewhat related to #1, in that we are temporal beings. God may have been able to act in advance to change what seems to be the past, but really isn't, but we are not. To us, past decisions are not contingent.


2) This argument weakens free will considerably. This, again, is due to timelessness. Ultimately, the author will have to make the argument that God's knowledge of a free will decision is logically after its execution, even though it is temporally before. However, because of the "timeless" view of modal logic, this is "acceptable", even though the contradiction is evident (and has been demonstrated at least since Aristotle.)

And, ultimately, the argument fails because the author as assumed an atemporal perspective to evaluate things that are necessarily temporal. If you can insert the perspective of time into this argument, I'd love to hear it, but this old argument fails the smell test up front, and ultimately fails in the area of logical consistency inside a temporal world.

Muz

 

[Lon]

Yes, I have heard and read about the Modal argument. It has at least two issues:

1) It assumes a timeless perspective. The statement that "Gold was first found in California in 1990" is possible, but only from a timeless perspective. Once gold was found in 1848 (or whatever year it was), that statement became "not possible", and the statement that "Gold was first found in California in 1848" became necessary, because it is now (at the present moment) no longer possible that "Gold was first found in California in 1990." This principle is called "The necessity of the past."

Further, to say (on this day) that "it is possible that gold was first found in California in 1990" falls into the same "irrelevant" category as most tautologies. It is certainly not a basis for any rational argument.

The author's response to "changing the past" is also invalid. He immediately says that, since God exhaustively knows the future, God knew about the prayer request and acted beforehand to fulfill the request, such that the past isn't really changed, even though it may have appeared to.

Thus, this doesn't address God changing the past. The past is clearly necessary, and God is unable to change the past. That statement did not change.

And, it assumed that God has exhaustive and definite foreknowledge, something that has not been demonstrated.

Finally, the article rejects (very early on) what is clearly true (from a secular perspective): Propositions about the future are either a) neither true nor false, or b) their truth or falsity is logically unknowable. Yet, the only significant argument against considering this is "bad consequences" (we'd have to rethink logic.) So, the author tacitly assumes determinism from the beginning, even as he tries to prove determinism.

And, that doesn't address humans. This is somewhat related to #1, in that we are temporal beings. God may have been able to act in advance to change what seems to be the past, but really isn't, but we are not. To us, past decisions are not contingent.


2) This argument weakens free will considerably. This, again, is due to timelessness. Ultimately, the author will have to make the argument that God's knowledge of a free will decision is logically after its execution, even though it is temporally before. However, because of the "timeless" view of modal logic, this is "acceptable", even though the contradiction is evident (and has been demonstrated at least since Aristotle.)

And, ultimately, the argument fails because the author as assumed an atemporal perspective to evaluate things that are necessarily temporal. If you can insert the perspective of time into this argument, I'd love to hear it, but this old argument fails the smell test up front, and ultimately fails in the area of logical consistency inside a temporal world.

Muz

I don't believe he has to prove the assumption, just that it isn't contradictory, which I believe he accomplished (he has proven that it 'isn't' logically contradictory even if he hasn't proven that it is true). In other words, he's shown that it 'isn't' logically contradictory. As did, I believe, the first and third presentation as well.

The necessity of the past is merely anecdotal and is just a way to help explain.

He reveals convincingly that foreknowledge does not eliminate freewill as do the 1st and 3rd. You can object, but not upon the grounds of logic. I believe they prove 1) logical plausibility 2) that the premise of objection isn't without logic problems of it's own (much like the rock analogy).

 

[themuzicman]

I don't believe he has to prove the assumption, just that it isn't contradictory, which I believe he accomplished (he has proven that it 'isn't' logically contradictory even if he hasn't proven that it is true). In other words, he's shown that it 'isn't' logically contradictory. As did, I believe, the first and third presentation as well.

Again, I disagree entirely. All he's done is taken time out of our existence, which only means he's dealing with some other world than the one that exists. I suppose in this other existence that he creates, this might be possible, but not in this one.

The necessity of the past is merely anecdotal and is just a way to help explain.

Anecdotal? The necessity of the past must exist for modal to even have a possibility of finding reality.

He reveals convincingly that foreknowledge does not eliminate freewill as do the 1st and 3rd. You can object, but not upon the grounds of logic. I believe they prove 1) logical plausibility 2) that the premise of objection isn't without logic problems of it's own (much like the rock analogy).

It proves that free will and EDF are modally consistent. Which doesn't say that they are logically consistent.

To be honest, I think the author does violence to the meaning of "free will."

Muz

 

[Lon]

Again, I disagree entirely. All he's done is taken time out of our existence, which only means he's dealing with some other world than the one that exists. I suppose in this other existence that he creates, this might be possible, but not in this one.



Anecdotal? The necessity of the past must exist for modal to even have a possibility of finding reality.



It proves that free will and EDF are modally consistent. Which doesn't say that they are logically consistent.

To be honest, I think the author does violence to the meaning of "free will."

Muz

But the scenarios all work on paper and logistically. Until it can be seen as plausible, your presupposition disqualifies scriptural enquiry. You won't be able to reasonably assess scriptural truths if there is no plausibility. I believe scripture definitely points this direction but it is mute until you can concede it isn't illogical.

Again, I believe all three do an excellent job of proving that it is indeed within the limits of logic and do understand you disagree. I'll continue to try to express that there is only apparent contradiction in ensuing posts.

Why does the author threaten freewill?