ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 2

[themuzicman]

Oh, the equivocations and spin...

Vaquero45,

If by "control" you mean that God does violence to the will of the person, then, no, God does not "control every choice". God does and will use the person's context (environment, proclivities, etc.) to place before the person a set of circumstances within which the person will not act contrary to the way God has chosen a course of action.

Translation: I don't want to use the word "control", so I'll say "God has chosen a course of action" and say that the person "will" choose it.

Can God create genuinely free creatures yet render certain all things that are to come to pass, including the free decisions and actions of those creatures? To unlock the problem we must distinguish between rendering something certain and rendering something necessary.

1. Rendering something certain is a matter of God’s decision that something will occur.
xxxxx1A. God’s creature will not (i.e., a creature could, but won’t) act in a way contrary to the course of action God has chosen.

2. Rendering something necessary is a matter of God’s decreeing that it must occur.

This is incorrect. Rendering something necessary means that it must be true in all possible worlds relative to the individual. For God, He is necessary, as is His nature, and those things that are universally true. Most people consider 2+2=4 to be necessary. However, the created universe is contingent from God's perspective, because it could have not existed at all. God decreed the universe into existence, but that doesn't make it necessary.

xxxxx2A. God’s creature cannot act in a way contrary to what God has chosen.

Thus, all choices are God's choices. The only contingency on what happens in this world is based upon what God chose to happen. And that's the problem.

This view is known as compatibilistic freedom: the view that free will and determinism coexist. They are compatible because free will is the ability to choose differently if one were differently disposed according to the physical factors of determinism. In other words, I am free in performing an action if I could have done otherwise, but this latter proposition is to be understood as I would have done otherwise if I had chosen. So I could have done otherwise even if determinism is true.

The only thing you've demonstrated is that when God chooses to make something happen, He can foreknow that it will happen. Notice that humans aren't involved in the choosing.

To the compatibilist, free choice is defined as the ability to choose according to our greatest inclinations at the moment of our so choosing as long as we are consciously unconstrained by external forces at the moment of that said choice. It should also be noted that compatibilists do not claim that all human actions are genuinely free in this sense. For example, if someone is forced at gun point to steal a car, that action is not free.”

That's a very interesting statement. You've been saying all along that God chooses what we will do, and then you say that we are free to choose what we will do, and provide no mechanism by which this is possible. And this is theology?

However, the gun example does point to a potential semantic issue. You see, when most people say "free will" they mean that people are able to choose any possible option from those before them. However, the Calvinist throws in this little twist that it's not the ability to choose, but the moral culpability that is at stake. The fact that an individual's choices are certain don't matter, because what they do is wrong, they "freely" chose it.

But, they make this exception that when they are under sufficient duress, that moral culpability goes away.

This is ultimately where the conversation breaks down, as the Calvinist has redefined free will not to be the ability to choose, but the transferrance of moral culpability from God to man, because man is the one doing the act God chose for him to do.

Compatibilists choose according to what most appeals to them when they choose. But they are not fully in control of the appeal of each choice before them. Decisions are in large measure influenced by personal characteristics, likes, dislikes, parents, environment, etc. In other words there are limitations on who a person is and what the person desires and wills. Thus, the person’s freedom is exercised within these limitations. Here the question arises, “Who set up these factors?”. The proper answer is “God did.”

Thus, God gives a person their nature, which defined their desires, and then creates the circumstances in which they exist, which ultimately determines their decisions.

And they call it "free."

Thus, as a compatibilist, I am free to choose among various options. But my choice will be influenced by who I am. My freedom must be understood as my ability to choose among options in light of who I am. And who I am is a result of God’s decision and activity. God is in control of all the circumstances (likes, dislikes, parents, environment, etc.) that bear on my situation in life. God may bring to bear (or permit to be brought to bear) factors that will make a particular option appealing, even powerfully appealing, to me.

In fact, in order to have EDF, they determine what option you will choose. If they do not, then EDF is lost.

According to the compatibilist perspective, God’s creatures can do what they want, but what they want is determined by God in advance because God is working within the person to direct choices according to His eternal plan. A person who enjoys compatibilistic freedom does not suffer divine compulsion to act in a manner contrary to his desires. This is the compatibilist or soft-determinist view, which argues that genuine human freedom and moral responsibility are in fact compatible with divine determinism.

And we have a very neat equivocation on "want", although AMR does flesh it out. When we say "Do what you want", we usually mean "it's your choice, make a decision." But that's not what AMR means, here. Here, AMR means that "we do what we desire" and then goes on to explain that our desires were given to us by God, and that we will do what God has chosen for us to do.

Per this understanding, human actions are free if a person is acting voluntarily, according to his or her desires. God can sovereignly determine these free decisions so long as the causal forces He utilizes are non-constraining and do not force the person to choose or act against his or her will. In other words, God actively, decisively, and non-coercively shapes human desires, and then the individual freely chooses to act according to those desires.

And, thus, the question comes down to this:

Is what a person does "voluntary", if they have been infused by God with a nature whose actions are determined by the desires given to it by God in responding to circumstances created, again, by God?

The compatiblist calls this freedom.

The incompatiblist calls this determinism.

Muz

 

[Philetus]

Dang it! (a little ala mode with my humble pie please)






But He is also God. I'm not sure why this is always the objection. God doesn't sin and is fully relational to us. The Godhead doesn't need sin for contrast for love to be meaningful. Wasn't that the argument? What aren't you agreeing with?


There's the ala mode. Perhaps I could have said it better as the point obviously escaped. I have no problem with your and Val's correction and it was most likely called for as a poorly framed counter to his post. I will endeaver to step up to the plate myself.

I disagree with your point that it was impossible for Jesus to sin – do otherwise than his father’s will. Also is the qualifier in your statement above. In the incarnation Jesus is fully God AND fully man. I understand that in your view it is not possible for God even in the flesh to ‘risk’ actual temptation or risk anything for that matter. I simply think that your position leads to all kinds of distortions not the least of which is a Christology that either exaggerates or diminishes the divinity or humanity of Jesus. Will you also be telling us that Jesus didn’t ‘really’ suffer temptation in the garden or actual death on the cross? I can not dismiss the temptation for Jesus to shrink back from the ‘cup’ offered at the Father’s will as anything less than the real possibility that Jesus could have denied himself and turned away; done otherwise. God could ‘die’ to the world (wash his hands of it and walk away and let it self destruct in sin) or die for the world (give himself for it). It is the very real possibility of the former that gives credibility to the latter. In dying for the world God revealed his character and it is for that reason we can have absolute confidence that God will always be faithful. It is the ultimate witness to God’s willingness to risk rejection for the sake of redemption and relationship.

 

[Lon]

I disagree with your point that it was impossible for Jesus to sin – do otherwise than his father’s will. Also is the qualifier in your statement above. In the incarnation Jesus is fully God AND fully man. I understand that in your view it is not possible for God even in the flesh to ‘risk’ actual temptation or risk anything for that matter. I simply think that your position leads to all kinds of distortions not the least of which is a Christology that either exaggerates or diminishes the divinity or humanity of Jesus. Will you also be telling us that Jesus didn’t ‘really’ suffer temptation in the garden or actual death on the cross? I can not dismiss the temptation for Jesus to shrink back from the ‘cup’ offered at the Father’s will as anything less than the real possibility that Jesus could have denied himself and turned away; done otherwise. God could ‘die’ to the world (wash his hands of it and walk away and let it self destruct in sin) or die for the world (give himself for it). It is the very real possibility of the former that gives credibility to the latter. In dying for the world God revealed his character and it is for that reason we can have absolute confidence that God will always be faithful. It is the ultimate witness to God’s willingness to risk rejection for the sake of redemption and relationship.

Depending on which you are emphasizing, you will always come to that same wall.

The Berlin wall kept people out as well as within.

For the most part, I, at least, concede those walls, OV continues to walk all the flppn way around the whole thing and STILL says "What wall?"

"Mr Gorbachev, Tear down this wall!"

"What wall?"

 

[Lon]

Thus, all choices are God's choices. The only contingency on what happens in this world is based upon what God chose to happen. And that's the problem.

You are either thinking shallowly here or have some OV answer I'm not seeing plainly. God is the first-cause of everything. This doesn't take away man's fall accountability. God can build a perfect road, know all routes, and pass out maps to everyone. He gave no authority for anyone to come behind him and build a dirt road connecting two, nor is at fault for the gravel being dragged onto His road.
In actuality, He forbade sin in the garden. This didn't seem to stop us. I tend to look at us being created naively. In a lot of ways, the knowledge of good and evil has elevated our intellectual desire. Things we would have taken for granted are now subject to the fall and therefore we want to rationalize the existence of everything effected by sin. I do not believe Satan was lying about us becoming 'like God' in a way that isn't there without sin. Sin already existed in God's universe or there wouldn't be a Satan. We have no idea how long he existed before creation. We do know man didn't intellectualize over sin for he had no knowledge of that realm until the serpent entered the garden. He created a world with sin present (satan). Back to my analogy, where ever a road wasn't placed, meant that a road isn't meant to go between them. God isn't the author of sin any more than if someone comes behind with a dirt road. Of course He knew and planned for sin or He would not have forbidden it. Since Christ was the plan before creation, He also knew what He was going to do at the fall.
If it is a problem as you say, I'm not seeing how foreknowledge is anything other than a sidebar issue for all the rest concerns OV, and everyone else.

The only thing you've demonstrated is that when God chooses to make something happen, He can foreknow that it will happen. Notice that humans aren't involved in the choosing.



That's a very interesting statement. You've been saying all along that God chooses what we will do, and then you say that we are free to choose what we will do, and provide no mechanism by which this is possible. And this is theology?

"Greatest inclination." I see this as true, and that we, individually and corporately, are very predictable amongst ourselves even. I do not believe EDF clouds the waters as much as you believe. Even 90% accuracy in prediction for God, with all the vast knowledge He possess, is far far beyond our understanding of prediction (again, why I believe even OV has to believe in an exponential ability that draws close to EDF). "Very Smart" not withstanding.

However, the gun example does point to a potential semantic issue. You see, when most people say "free will" they mean that people are able to choose any possible option from those before them. However, the Calvinist throws in this little twist that it's not the ability to choose, but the moral culpability that is at stake. The fact that an individual's choices are certain don't matter, because what they do is wrong, they "freely" chose it.

"Conscience" is part of this discussion. We are only as free as it allows. We say we 'sear' conscience by repeated infraction, etc. Again, there are all kinds of considerations in this discussion, and I don't believe it as simple as just saying "LFW." I'm not sure any one term can accurately describe what we experience as 'freedom.' It is a complicated idea.

But, they make this exception that when they are under sufficient duress, that moral culpability goes away.

Even under compulsion, the conscience is working. We still know right from wrong which, I believe, is the actual cause of that duress.

This is ultimately where the conversation breaks down, as the Calvinist has redefined free will not to be the ability to choose, but the transferrance of moral culpability from God to man, because man is the one doing the act God chose for him to do.

If anybody influences our will, are we no longer culpable? We see God as sovereign and 'God,' and this tends to cloud some of the conversation.
We are still morally culpable. As I contemplate this: Your parents raised you to make wise moral choices. Poor acquaintances influence the other. When people get into trouble, it is interesting that it follows the Genesis 3 example of 'passing the buck.' We never want to be implicated. "It is the government's fault." "She hit me first." "He was bugging me." None of this is a recognition of our individual choice. We want LFW until we are actually held accountable, then we want to deny we have it. "It was this woman you gave me." -Genesis 3:12

Thus, God gives a person their nature, which defined their desires, and then creates the circumstances in which they exist, which ultimately determines their decisions.

And they call it "free."

I believe there is a discrepancy in what you 'want' for "free" and we actually have.

In fact, in order to have EDF, they determine what option you will choose. If they do not, then EDF is lost.
And we have a very neat equivocation on "want", although AMR does flesh it out. When we say "Do what you want", we usually mean "it's your choice, make a decision." But that's not what AMR means, here. Here, AMR means that "we do what we desire" and then goes on to explain that our desires were given to us by God, and that we will do what God has chosen for us to do.

Let's look at an example, your kids or mine.

With mine, one has a propensity to want to lie to get out of trouble. Another has the fright/flight response. And the other has an emergency shutdown button.

They are all coping mechanisms for being in trouble (facing consequences).

I know, because they are predictable, what they each will do in a situation. I know when I tell my oldest "Time for bed" I'll be ignored. I know when I ask my fibber about why she did something, I have to help her work through the fear portion of being caught in order to get her to realize she doesn't have to fib.

How each of them respond is not my doing. They develop their own way of coping. I specifically cater my parenting to their individual responses. I don't find determinism unloving or impersonal, but quite the opposite. It is catering to individual response that I am effective and meeting their individual needs. Just because God knows us better than we know ourselves, even to the point of EDF, is no indication that my children do not respond as they choose, even if more than predictable. All I believe EDF does, is states that God perfectly knows us where as, I can make a parenting mistake.

And, thus, the question comes down to this:

Is what a person does "voluntary", if they have been infused by God with a nature whose actions are determined by the desires given to it by God in responding to circumstances created, again, by God?

The compatiblist calls this freedom.

The incompatiblist calls this determinism.

Muz

This statement seems to be saying you are a compatiblist?

Is what a person does "voluntary", if they have been infused by God with a nature whose actions are determined by the desires given to it by God in responding to circumstances created, again, by God?

How do you answer this question differently? Don't you believe God created us? Where does our desire come from? I don't believe I'm as autonomous as you seem to think I am.

In this part of the conversation, I cannot help but feel that OV describes God as apart (nonrelational) to His creation, like He set it all in motion and is no longer engaged. This is opposite of what OV is shooting for with a relational God. I believe relationship to be invasive. Relationship involves giving up freedom. Hey, I'm married. I've always realized this. I believe relationship to be the opposite of LFW in many of these considerations. It is in binding myself to my wife that I've truly become free. I define freedom as being what I was created to be. In this case, a father and husband. I lost individual freedoms when I married. Again, I believe 'free' to be a complicated subject to try and describe with one term. LFW doesn't fit my parameter or understanding of what 'free' means.

 

[themuzicman]

You are either thinking shallowly here or have some OV answer I'm not seeing plainly. God is the first-cause of everything. This doesn't take away man's fall accountability. God can build a perfect road, know all routes, and pass out maps to everyone. He gave no authority for anyone to come behind him and build a dirt road connecting two, nor is at fault for the gravel being dragged onto His road.

But that's not even close to the problem. From AMR's own words, everything that happens was chosen by God to happen. God created man's nature, gives him all his desires, and makes him choose according to what God wants him to do.

Yes, God calls it sin. The question is who's decision is the sin.

In actuality, He forbade sin in the garden. This didn't seem to stop us. I tend to look at us being created naively. In a lot of ways, the knowledge of good and evil has elevated our intellectual desire. Things we would have taken for granted are now subject to the fall and therefore we want to rationalize the existence of everything effected by sin. I do not believe Satan was lying about us becoming 'like God' in a way that isn't there without sin. Sin already existed in God's universe or there wouldn't be a Satan. We have no idea how long he existed before creation. We do know man didn't intellectualize over sin for he had no knowledge of that realm until the serpent entered the garden. He created a world with sin present (satan). Back to my analogy, where ever a road wasn't placed, meant that a road isn't meant to go between them. God isn't the author of sin any more than if someone comes behind with a dirt road. Of course He knew and planned for sin or He would not have forbidden it. Since Christ was the plan before creation, He also knew what He was going to do at the fall.

You know, it's odd how the Calvinist can say, on the one hand, that God chooses the nature of man, his desires, and the circumstances, all of which determine man's decisions, and then say something like this, as though they're claiming that God had nothing to do with Adam's decision.

And, to your analogy, no one could come behind with a dirt road without God already having chosen that they would do just that.

If it is a problem as you say, I'm not seeing how foreknowledge is anything other than a sidebar issue for all the rest concerns OV, and everyone else.

In OVT, God isn't determining what will choose. The free will that chooses sin is mankind, not God.

"Greatest inclination." I see this as true, and that we, individually and corporately, are very predictable amongst ourselves even. I do not believe EDF clouds the waters as much as you believe. Even 90% accuracy in prediction for God, with all the vast knowledge He possess, is far far beyond our understanding of prediction (again, why I believe even OV has to believe in an exponential ability that draws close to EDF). "Very Smart" not withstanding.

EDF is the end product, and really not the problem with AMR's post. But what AMR required to get EDF is a problem. There's plenty of other problems in what AMR said.

"Conscience" is part of this discussion. We are only as free as it allows. We say we 'sear' conscience by repeated infraction, etc. Again, there are all kinds of considerations in this discussion, and I don't believe it as simple as just saying "LFW." I'm not sure any one term can accurately describe what we experience as 'freedom.' It is a complicated idea.

But what AMR described is not freedom for man.

Even under compulsion, the conscience is working. We still know right from wrong which, I believe, is the actual cause of that duress.

But AMR's point is that when someone is under duress, they aren't free.

If anybody influences our will, are we no longer culpable? We see God as sovereign and 'God,' and this tends to cloud some of the conversation.

This is the biggest equivocation of all. There's a difference between "influence" and "determine." AMR is describing determination when he uses "influence." Influence only means that someone or something wishes to have input into your decision.

We are still morally culpable. As I contemplate this: Your parents raised you to make wise moral choices. Poor acquaintances influence the other. When people get into trouble, it is interesting that it follows the Genesis 3 example of 'passing the buck.' We never want to be implicated. "It is the government's fault." "She hit me first." "He was bugging me." None of this is a recognition of our individual choice. We want LFW until we are actually held accountable, then we want to deny we have it. "It was this woman you gave me." -Genesis 3:12

You'll have to be more clear how, when God gives us a nature, defines our desires, and creates the circumstances, all of which determine our decisions, that you can claim moral culpability.

I believe there is a discrepancy in what you 'want' for "free" and we actually have.

Care to describe it?

Let's look at an example, your kids or mine.

With mine, one has a propensity to want to lie to get out of trouble. Another has the fright/flight response. And the other has an emergency shutdown button.

They are all coping mechanisms for being in trouble (facing consequences).

I know, because they are predictable, what they each will do in a situation. I know when I tell my oldest "Time for bed" I'll be ignored. I know when I ask my fibber about why she did something, I have to help her work through the fear portion of being caught in order to get her to realize she doesn't have to fib.

How each of them respond is not my doing. They develop their own way of coping. I specifically cater my parenting to their individual responses. I don't find determinism unloving or impersonal, but quite the opposite. It is catering to individual response that I am effective and meeting their individual needs. Just because God knows us better than we know ourselves, even to the point of EDF, is no indication that my children do not respond as they choose, even if more than predictable. All I believe EDF does, is states that God perfectly knows us where as, I can make a parenting mistake.

I continually find it amazing how you can segregate yourself from previous statements. AMR clearly states that God was the cause of each nature, and each desire, and each circumstance. Now, in your analogy, you say how they respond is not of your doing. Your analogy is invalid because you contradict what you assume.

This statement seems to be saying you are a compatiblist?

No, I don't live in obvious logical contradiction. AMR's description of reality is determinism.

How do you answer this question differently? Don't you believe God created us? Where does our desire come from? I don't believe I'm as autonomous as you seem to think I am.

I believe God created us with a nature that freely chooses apart from His determination. I say that we are "uncaused causers." This isn't to say that our existence is uncaused, but that we cause decisions without anything else causing us.

Our desires come from a variety of sources: Our genetic makeup, our environment, our personal history. The key isn't whether we have desires, but whether they determine our decision based upon our circumstances. If you believe they do, then you deny free will. I do not.

In this part of the conversation, I cannot help but feel that OV describes God as apart (nonrelational) to His creation, like He set it all in motion and is no longer engaged.

In a theology where God must either determine or be absent, that might be the case, but that's your presupposition, not mine.

This is opposite of what OV is shooting for with a relational God. I believe relationship to be invasive. Relationship involves giving up freedom. Hey, I'm married. I've always realized this. I believe relationship to be the opposite of LFW in many of these considerations. It is in binding myself to my wife that I've truly become free. I define freedom as being what I was created to be. In this case, a father and husband. I lost individual freedoms when I married. Again, I believe 'free' to be a complicated subject to try and describe with one term. LFW doesn't fit my parameter or understanding of what 'free' means.

They don't understand what LFW means. Getting married didn't take away your choices. It meant that you made a commitment to make choices in particular manner. The fact that you wish to be a man of your word means that you choose in accordance with your commitments. You are certainly able to walk away from all of your commitments, but you choose to remain. You freely choose to remain.

That's love.

To be honest, if you say that you give up LFW because you get married, I would question whether you are capable of the love you proclaim for your wife. Without LFW, love is impossible.

Muz

 

[Clete]

ThomasJ,

Did you see my post #6676?

 

[godrulz]

Muz has insightful analysis. If one is essentially defending determinism, they should not be talking about free will being compatible with it. They are polar opposites, mutually exclusive. I follow muz, but I cannot follow the Calvinists (does not compute, like it or not).

Observation: My assertions are not necessarily wrong because they are brief; AMR and Lon's verbosity is not necessarily correct because it is long and convoluted.

God and incompatibilism rules. Open Theism is the coherent way to reconcile sovereignty and free will.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

Observation: My assertions are not necessarily wrong because they are brief; AMR and Lon's verbosity is not necessarily correct because it is long and convoluted.

This is about as substantive as you can get. :dizzy:

If you ever muster the ability to rise above the level of "Yeah! What he said!" please let me know. When adults are talking children should remain content to observe, listening, and learning.

 

[Vaquero45]

Vaquero45,

If by "control" you mean that God does violence to the will of the person, then, no, God does not "control every choice". God does and will use the person's context (environment, proclivities, etc.) to place before the person a set of circumstances within which the person will not act contrary to the way God has chosen a course of action.

Can God create genuinely free creatures yet render certain all things that are to come to pass, including the free decisions and actions of those creatures? To unlock the problem we must distinguish between rendering something certain and rendering something necessary.

1. Rendering something certain is a matter of God’s decision that something will occur.
xxxxx1A. God’s creature will not (i.e., a creature could, but won’t) act in a way contrary to the course of action God has chosen.

2. Rendering something necessary is a matter of God’s decreeing that it must occur.
xxxxx2A. God’s creature cannot act in a way contrary to what God has chosen.

This view is known as compatibilistic freedom: the view that free will and determinism coexist. They are compatible because free will is the ability to choose differently if one were differently disposed according to the physical factors of determinism. In other words, I am free in performing an action if I could have done otherwise, but this latter proposition is to be understood as I would have done otherwise if I had chosen. So I could have done otherwise even if determinism is true.

To the compatibilist, free choice is defined as the ability to choose according to our greatest inclinations at the moment of our so choosing as long as we are consciously unconstrained by external forces at the moment of that said choice. It should also be noted that compatibilists do not claim that all human actions are genuinely free in this sense. For example, if someone is forced at gun point to steal a car, that action is not free.”

Compatibilists choose according to what most appeals to them when they choose. But they are not fully in control of the appeal of each choice before them. Decisions are in large measure influenced by personal characteristics, likes, dislikes, parents, environment, etc. In other words there are limitations on who a person is and what the person desires and wills. Thus, the person’s freedom is exercised within these limitations. Here the question arises, “Who set up these factors?”. The proper answer is “God did.”

Thus, as a compatibilist, I am free to choose among various options. But my choice will be influenced by who I am. My freedom must be understood as my ability to choose among options in light of who I am. And who I am is a result of God’s decision and activity. God is in control of all the circumstances (likes, dislikes, parents, environment, etc.) that bear on my situation in life. God may bring to bear (or permit to be brought to bear) factors that will make a particular option appealing, even powerfully appealing, to me.

According to the compatibilist perspective, God’s creatures can do what they want, but what they want is determined by God in advance because God is working within the person to direct choices according to His eternal plan. A person who enjoys compatibilistic freedom does not suffer divine compulsion to act in a manner contrary to his desires. This is the compatibilist or soft-determinist view, which argues that genuine human freedom and moral responsibility are in fact compatible with divine determinism.

Per this understanding, human actions are free if a person is acting voluntarily, according to his or her desires. God can sovereignly determine these free decisions so long as the causal forces He utilizes are non-constraining and do not force the person to choose or act against his or her will. In other words, God actively, decisively, and non-coercively shapes human desires, and then the individual freely chooses to act according to those desires.

That's the best attempt at explaining compatabilism I've seen so far. Thanks for your work on it, it gives me better insight into that view. I dont mean at all to "poo-poo" it with this reply, short in comparison.

In your view though we still end up with God choosing everything that will take place with us having no real chance to do otherwise. You can say the physical ability remains, but in your own words "a creature could, but won’t) act in a way contrary to the course of action God has chosen". Thus if God is planning everything God chose every sin we commit.


I dont believe God plans everything though. There are simple examples in the Bible. God had Adam name the animals to see what he would name them. God did not command, nor did it entered God's mind that Israel would burn their own children. God changed His mind about destroying Nineveh when they heeded the warning of the prophet. Many others. I dont believe I'll ever buy the "anthro-figures" explanation of those, but I'll read if you have a better explanation of that than I have seen before. I might be jumping ahead in assuming that is where this will go of course.

I also like Themuzicman's breakdown of your answer to me and agree with his conclusions. I try to keep these as friendly as I can myself and wouldn't have posted the first line that he did yet, (you'll get what you give with me) but I'd like to see him answered as I basically agree with his post, he went to more work and I might as well not repeat it.

 

[godrulz]

AMR, buddy, old pal.

When I read about Molinism, I sense it is a convoluted attempt to explain something, but it ends up being confusing and contrived because it is not true.

When I read about compatibilism, it is strained and convoluted, an attempt to prop up a deductive conclusion about free will and sovereignty as defined by Calvinism.

You are making a simple concept complicated in an attempt to water down self-evident free will. A simple understanding and face value reading of Scripture and daily reality does not fit your philosophical props and musings.

If you would recognize free will for what it is and not have a wrong view of sovereignty, you could jettison your long, philosphical meanderings and accept straightforward revelation.

You deride Sanders and Boyd, yet their ideas are clear as a bell and biblical compared to your pontifications. You misrepresent OT and cling to Calvinism with a dogmatism that is not warranted.

I normally do not like those who are simplistic or anti-intellectual, but sometimes the other ivory tower extreme is just as blind to the obvious. I believe OT can have rigorous detailed proofs as you claim for your view. Since I do not have the time or expertise do reinvent what is already in much credible literature, I will continue to assert what seems obvious to me from life and Scripture: free will is not illusory or compatibilisitic, determinism is not compatible with free will and responsibility, sovereignty does not have to mean meticulous control; by creating free agents, God voluntarily limited the nature of His omniscience to include some unsettled issues, etc. etc.

Like it or lump it.:baby: :bang:

 

[RobE]

There's a failure here, on the part of the openists, to explain how anything occurs outside of God's will. Either..........

1. God willingly enacts an event by His allowance or
2. God willingly enacts the event through His own power.
(Notice that both of these options are the same in that in both cases it is God who enacts the events. Providence.)​

For open theism to claim that something adverse to(or outside of) God's will occurs they MUST prove that God did not 'allow' an event; but that in fact God was somehow overwhelmed by an outside force.

The openist might claim that God preferred A to occur rather than B(which would be the agreeable, i.e. desires ALL to be saved); but would further have to support this idea by proving God was UNABLE to achieve A over B due to a more powerful outside force.

To the openists: HOW does anything occur outside of God's will?

 

[Clete]

There's a failure here, on the part of the openists, to explain how anything occurs outside of God's will. Either..........

1. God willingly enacts an event by His allowance or
2. God willingly enacts the event through His own power.
(Notice that both of these options are the same in that in both cases it is God who enacts the events. Providence.)​

For open theism to claim that something adverse to(or outside of) God's will occurs they MUST prove that God did not 'allow' an event; but that in fact God was somehow overwhelmed by an outside force.

The openist might claim that God preferred A to occur rather than B(which would be the agreeable, i.e. desires ALL to be saved); but would further have to support this idea by proving God was UNABLE to achieve A over B due to a more powerful outside force.

To the openists: HOW does anything occur outside of God's will?

:rotfl:

Why don't you ask Jeremiah or Jesus!

What a dolt!

:rotfl:

 

[Philetus]

Depending on which you are emphasizing, you will always come to that same wall.

The Berlin wall kept people out as well as within.

For the most part, I, at least, concede those walls, OV continues to walk all the flppn way around the whole thing and STILL says "What wall?"

"Mr Gorbachev, Tear down this wall!"

"What wall?"

That that has to be close to the dumbest thing you have said in months. Your ducking the issue. You are the one building a wall around your view that insulates it from very real questions.

How human was Jesus? Your comment about temptation smacks of docetism.

Emphasize neither. Diminish neither. Jesus was both fully human and fully God. While in the flesh (incarnation ring a bell?) God risked exposure to temptation and the very real possibility of denying Himself and His redemptive intention for all humanity ... deal with it.

I'll go back to quite-booing for a while.

Philetus

 

[Philetus]

AMR, buddy, old pal.

When I read about Molinism, I sense it is a convoluted attempt to explain something, but it ends up being confusing and contrived because it is not true.

When I read about compatibilism, it is strained and convoluted, an attempt to prop up a deductive conclusion about free will and sovereignty as defined by Calvinism.

You are making a simple concept complicated in an attempt to water down self-evident free will. A simple understanding and face value reading of Scripture and daily reality does not fit your philosophical props and musings.

If you would recognize free will for what it is and not have a wrong view of sovereignty, you could jettison your long, philosphical meanderings and accept straightforward revelation.

You deride Sanders and Boyd, yet their ideas are clear as a bell and biblical compared to your pontifications. You misrepresent OT and cling to Calvinism with a dogmatism that is not warranted.

I normally do not like those who are simplistic or anti-intellectual, but sometimes the other ivory tower extreme is just as blind to the obvious. I believe OT can have rigorous detailed proofs as you claim for your view. Since I do not have the time or expertise do reinvent what is already in much credible literature, I will continue to assert what seems obvious to me from life and Scripture: free will is not illusory or compatibilisitic, determinism is not compatible with free will and responsibility, sovereignty does not have to mean meticulous control; by creating free agents, God voluntarily limited the nature of His omniscience to include some unsettled issues, etc. etc.

Like it or lump it.:baby: :bang:

I like it!
:thumb:

 

[Yorzhik]

If you will to have your palms the opposite of whatever God says, even if God knows that, then even God could not say, correctly, how your palms will be. It's so simple even a grammar school student could understand.

Apparently it's not that simple. God could not tell you how your palms would be in this scenario because it would result in the opposite happening.

Right. That's the point. "God could not tell you how your palms would be"

God knows, but He cannot say!

Get it? It's a logical contradiction. You have a few choices:
1. Don't get rid of the logical contradiction, just say "God can do the logically contradictory.
2. Say that mankind does not have a will.
3. Say that God does not know the future exhaustively.

That's it. You can create a 4th choice, but all choices after these 3 are "I'm illogical and nothing I say matters".

What's your choice RobE? Or are you going to retract "God could not tell you how your palms would be"?

 

[themuzicman]

OVTs: Can we say that God has exhaustive, contingent foreknowledge?

(Explanation: God knows all possible courses of the future.)

Muz

 

[RobE]

Right. That's the point. "God could not tell you how your palms would be"

God knows, but He cannot say!

So what? God can't tell you how they will be in this scenario because it will cause a rebellion within you changing the outcome. Again, so what? It doesn't mean that God doesn't know where you palms would be.

Get it? It's a logical contradiction. You have a few choices:
1. Don't get rid of the logical contradiction, just say "God can do the logically contradictory.
2. Say that mankind does not have a will.
3. Say that God does not know the future exhaustively.

That's it. You can create a 4th choice, but all choices after these 3 are "I'm illogical and nothing I say matters".

What's your choice RobE? Or are you going to retract "God could not tell you how your palms would be"?

What do options 1,2, and 3 have to do with God saying something to a rebellious individual? You're sure drawing a lot of conclusions from this. I'm interested in the thinking so why don't you explain where your conclusions come from?

Before you begin consider the following verse:

John 13:28 "What you are about to do, do quickly," Jesus told him, but no one at the meal understood why Jesus said this to him.​

Below is the post in question:

If you will to have your palms the opposite of whatever God says, even if God knows that, then even God could not say, correctly, how your palms will be. It's so simple even a grammar school student could understand.

Apparently it's not that simple. God could not tell you how your palms would be in this scenario because it would result in the opposite happening. However, God might know and tell others of the result; and, your actions would verify His knowledge.

Let's say God knows that your will is to do the opposite of what He says to do.

God decreed before creation that you would put your palms 'up'.

How might God effectively carry out His decree?

I see two possibilities:

1. God foreknows you will put your palms up so God allows you to do so(through providing you hands, a will, and the environment in which to commit the action. Also He does not intervene to stop you.).
2. God foreknows you will put your palms down so He must intervene to accomplish His decree. He intervenes by saying you should put your palms 'down' which results in you putting your palms 'up'.
Is God culpable for either action? Did God make you place your palms 'up' or 'down' in either instance or did you act freely?

Did God 'trick' you into putting them 'up' or was it your will to do the opposite of what He said to do?

"Nineveh, Nineveh, Where for art thou, Nineveh?"

 

[RobE]

:rotfl:

Why don't you ask Jeremiah or Jesus!

What a dolt!

:rotfl:

Is there anything in existence which is outside of God's domain, control, or providence?

 

[lee_merrill]

I'm still wondering how God knows a remnant will be saved from Israel--and only a remnant...

 

[themuzicman]

Repeat after me: Group dynamics.

Muz