ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 2

[themuzicman]

And here is why you are categorized on #2. If the move catches Him surprised, then He is still learning. Sure He can 'then' determine what to do, but you are suggesting that it is a move he is not aware of. #1 has him already aware of the move and knowing what to do before it ever gets there. Both 1 and 2 are dealing with simple foreknowledge. EDF would be that he knows the move the opponent is going to make of the choices possible. You are even denying simple foreknowledge in your understanding (that he would be surprised or wrong).

Again, you equivocate on "learning." God already knows all the possible moves. He isn't surprised in that He needs to change His mind about what He would do in a given situation. Yes, His expectation wasn't met. But that was an expectation about something that was previously unknowable. Does that prevent the chess master from accomplishing his goal? Of course not. Omnicompetence remains, not because the future is fixed, but because God's actions assure that His goals are accomplished, regardless of the decisions we make.

If he is #1, (or an arrived #2) he is never surprised or wrong because every move is already known and his response already known and calculated. You argue for omnicompetence, this is what it means, but you don't really believe omnicompetence if you don't realize that as a master, he cannot be surprised or he doesn't know every contingency response. Even Sanders suggests God can lose. Even Bob Enyart says God is a 'risk' taker. I really wonder sometimes if you are truly OV. I still believe you have one foot in, not both.

Let's be clear on the difference:

EDF says that there is only ONE possible chess game. All moves were determined in some way before the game began. The end is achieve by fixing the game's course. This is NOT omnicompetence. This is determinism.

OVT says that there are an infinite (or close to it) number of possible chess games, but that the chess master understands all the possible moves, and knows all the possible ways to accomplish His ends. The game is not fixed beforehand, the opponent has the free will do act within what is possible for him. But though omnicompetence through omniscience and omnipotence, the chess master will win.

I think you're an OVT in denial, because you desire to incorporate free will into your theology, and it's eroded your view of EDF to the point that it's not EDF anymore.

You even propose OVT circumstances, and try to attribute them to EDF.

Muz

 

[godrulz]

The Chessmaster analogy has been proposed previously and is helpful. It takes more ability to play a contingent game than to fix the game or needing to know ahead of time instead of respond in real time.

I am not sure why some want to say that the non-existent future somehow exists for God in His 'present'. This assumption is indefensible.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

I am not sure why some want to say that the non-existent future somehow exists for God in His 'present'. This assumption is indefensible.

Unlike yourself, Sanders, et al, God's free knowledge has been properly defended by all the church fathers. The only thing indefensible is your shiny new definition of omniscience, which holds God cannot know the future. So you are left with simply asserting the definition, as if that makes it true. If you had better training in epistemological topics you would be more credible.

 

[lee_merrill]

The Chessmaster analogy has been proposed previously and is helpful. It takes more ability to play a contingent game than to fix the game or needing to know ahead of time instead of respond in real time.

"It takes a truly wise and creative God to guarantee victory without having to control every detail of history. By contrast, to simply control others so that you always get your way is a sure sign of insecurity and weakness."

"Though she cannot be certain of how her opponent will move, for her opponent is a free agent, she is certain she can wisely out-maneuver him. ... God neither predestines nor foreknows everything as settled but is nevertheless certain of victory because of his divine wisdom. It is the only model in which God wins by virtue of his wisdom, creativity, and problem-solving intelligence. ... To simply control or possess information about the future requires no virtuous attributes." (Greg Boyd, "Divine Foreknowledge").

But then with the Ninevites, it must therefore have been God's plan to destroy them. He changed his plan when they repented, and did not destroy them, according to the Open View. But then God frustrated his own plan, by sending Jonah to warn them!

So why did God send Jonah, if his plan was to destroy the Ninevites, why didn't he just do it right away? That would have been winning, if that was his purpose. So then God's plan to destroy them failed, they repented, and thus he had to change his plan, and forgive them! So what has become of our invincible chess master? His overall plan actually failed.

According to the Open View, what it seems we have are contingencies and preferences, but not one outcome that can be guaranteed, in the example of Jonah. So does the chess master now consider losing as one possibility, and plan a response to that? How is he then invincible?

So God does "win" regardless of how anyone chooses, but only if we call "having a plan if my purpose fails" winning. How is "winning" in this way a special demonstration of God's wisdom and strength, though? I win too, in that way, I also am an invincible chessmaster.

 

[Lon]

Again, you equivocate on "learning." God already knows all the possible moves. He isn't surprised in that He needs to change His mind about what He would do in a given situation. Yes, His expectation wasn't met. But that was an expectation about something that was previously unknowable. Does that prevent the chess master from accomplishing his goal? Of course not. Omnicompetence remains, not because the future is fixed, but because God's actions assure that His goals are accomplished, regardless of the decisions we make.



Let's be clear on the difference:

EDF says that there is only ONE possible chess game. All moves were determined in some way before the game began. The end is achieve by fixing the game's course. This is NOT omnicompetence. This is determinism.

OVT says that there are an infinite (or close to it) number of possible chess games, but that the chess master understands all the possible moves, and knows all the possible ways to accomplish His ends. The game is not fixed beforehand, the opponent has the free will do act within what is possible for him. But though omnicompetence through omniscience and omnipotence, the chess master will win.

I think you're an OVT in denial, because you desire to incorporate free will into your theology, and it's eroded your view of EDF to the point that it's not EDF anymore.

You even propose OVT circumstances, and try to attribute them to EDF.

Muz

Well, I'm an emerging Calvinist, but was Arminian so of course there would have been coincidence with OV.
However, I do not hold to freewill, or at least not as you understand it. If I ever speak favorably for it, it is usually quite different than how you understand it. I don't believe an unregenerate has moral freewill, and it is the only kind I ever care to debate. Hands up or down, vanilla or chocolate aren't too important in my mind and I tend to agree with Skinner and Pavlov that we have learned responses, rather than freewill. I tend to believe we are predictable and deterministic in our preference vs our moral choice. I will wear the gray shirt today either because I am a slave to sin, or because I'm liberated in Christ. I will wear the gray shirt because I bought a gray shirt or really don't care about it at all and am just wearing what somebody bought for one of my birthdays and seems appropriate for casual dress as a teacher today.

I argue for simple foreknowledge but believe in EDF. I sometimes do this just to get the the root of the discussion. It helps to take it in steps and discuss points one at a time. My goal was to get you to understand you supporting the Arminian view more than OV here. You still have God at one time less than competent as you say He didn't know at one point but does now. So I do see your OV coming in as well, but I'm not sure the two are compatible. Again this would place your view at #2, not 1.

Arminian and Calvinist positions have God always there (#1), always fully competent, and never having made a mistake.

I suppose we could argue that a master could make mistakes and still win with "God is a risk-taker." My problem is that if freewill exists other than a happenstance 'feeling' it still isn't on par with chess moves. It is more like an ant walking across the board. I don't think our wills are up to par to play chess with God. Because of this, it isn't a good analogy for what is actually happening. Contingencies of His creation are a rather small thing compared to His ability and nature.
I see a lot of non-coinciding analogies with the chess game, but it seems one that OV is familiar with, so helps in discussion.

 

[themuzicman]

Well, I'm an emerging Calvinist, but was Arminian so of course there would have been coincidence with OV.
However, I do not hold to freewill, or at least not as you understand it. If I ever speak favorably for it, it is usually quite different than how you understand it. I don't believe an unregenerate has moral freewill, and it is the only kind I ever care to debate. Hands up or down, vanilla or chocolate aren't too important in my mind and I tend to agree with Skinner and Pavlov that we have learned responses, rather than freewill. I tend to believe we are predictable and deterministic in our preference vs our moral choice. I will wear the gray shirt today either because I am a slave to sin, or because I'm liberated in Christ. I will wear the gray shirt because I bought a gray shirt or really don't care about it at all and am just wearing what somebody bought for one of my birthdays and seems appropriate for casual dress as a teacher today.

Just so you know, the reason we choose vanilla or chocolate as the free will choices is to unload religious entanglement from the choosing process. Regardless of whether it is choosing ice cream or choosing to sin or not, the choosing process is the same.

I think you'd agree that dogs don't have the moral culpability that we do in Scripture, and yet you reduce our decisions to being dog-like.

I argue for simple foreknowledge but believe in EDF. I sometimes do this just to get the the root of the discussion. It helps to take it in steps and discuss points one at a time. My goal was to get you to understand you supporting the Arminian view more than OV here. You still have God at one time less than competent as you say He didn't know at one point but does now. So I do see your OV coming in as well, but I'm not sure the two are compatible. Again this would place your view at #2, not 1.

Then you don't understand OVT, nor do you understand EDF. #1 isn't EDF.

Arminian and Calvinist positions have God always there (#1), always fully competent, and never having made a mistake.

You haven't given the Calvinst/Arminian position. That would be more like God playing both sides of the board.

I suppose we could argue that a master could make mistakes and still win with "God is a risk-taker." My problem is that if freewill exists other than a happenstance 'feeling' it still isn't on par with chess moves. It is more like an ant walking across the board. I don't think our wills are up to par to play chess with God. Because of this, it isn't a good analogy for what is actually happening. Contingencies of His creation are a rather small thing compared to His ability and nature.

There's no question there. The analogy is there to show that EDF isn't necessary for God to accomplish His purposes, nor is it necessary for everything God expects others to do to happen in order for God to attain His goals.

I see a lot of non-coinciding analogies with the chess game, but it seems one that OV is familiar with, so helps in discussion.

Except that you're not grasping what #1 means. #1 would be Molinist natural knowledge without middle knowledge.

Muz

 

[godrulz]

Unlike yourself, Sanders, et al, God's free knowledge has been properly defended by all the church fathers. The only thing indefensible is your shiny new definition of omniscience, which holds God cannot know the future. So you are left with simply asserting the definition, as if that makes it true. If you had better training in epistemological topics you would be more credible.

Academic snobbery. Send money and I will retract the statement.

 

[Lon]

You really miss the argument sometimes. Lee, btw brought up another excellent point I hope he harps to death. If God changed His mind, why send a prophet in the first place? Couldn't He just have said after the fact: "You sinnned, now you are here."? I'm ashamed I didn't see it as clearly. OV is back to scrambling.

Me. I said that I argue for the general first. It is a way of trying to get you to acquiesce a point. I'm no longer Arminian, but I do argue purposefully from that perspective. If you think I'm not seeing the difference, this isn't the case.

I already told you I was arguing simple foreknowledge. I am leaving EDF out of the discussion because it clouds the waters and OV has strong aversion to the points I'd like to make. So sometimes I attack it from the Arminian angle because I can reason from there and get you to look at OV from their perspective a little easier with some of this discussion.

Just so you know, the reason we choose vanilla or chocolate as the free will choices is to unload religious entanglement from the choosing process. Regardless of whether it is choosing ice cream or choosing to sin or not, the choosing process is the same.

I think you'd agree that dogs don't have the moral culpability that we do in Scripture, and yet you reduce our decisions to being dog-like.

I'm morally culpable for choosing vanilla over chocolate? I reduce our trivial decisions to about this level, yes. I see a difference between ice cream and Loving God and man decisions. While I agree they are ultimately part of the servant and free discussion, it isn't any easy discussion with one not ready to compare and contrast, so I emphasize the contrast but agree with your point here.

Then you don't understand OVT, nor do you understand EDF. #1 isn't EDF.

I already said it wasn't.

You haven't given the Calvinst/Arminian position. That would be more like God playing both sides of the board.

For the Calvinist. The Arminian sees God as more guiding, helping and tutoring. Sure, He is then playing Himself, but that isn't the Arminian emphasis.

There's no question there. The analogy is there to show that EDF isn't necessary for God to accomplish His purposes, nor is it necessary for everything God expects others to do to happen in order for God to attain His goals.

I believe this has us agreeing on the impotence of man to twart God.
But your argument here doesn't deny EDF. It just says it isn't a necessity.
As to that point, I see it in scripture, necessary or not (I believe every part of His character is necessary however, and I believe scripture to reveal that God has EDF.

Except that you're not grasping what #1 means. #1 would be Molinist natural knowledge without middle knowledge.

Muz

I already addressed this.

 

[Yorzhik]

"God has decreed your palms will be up because He foreknew your will would determine to turn them up."

You state God's decree is based upon your will.

No, I didn't state that. "God has decreed your palms..." is originally your quote, not mine. I merely quoted your quote.

You then ask that if your will were different then would it remain the same. Please look closely.....

A: God's decree = your will
B: God's decree <> your will

Question from A and B: "are you saying that man cannot will to NOT do what God says?". What God decreed was based upon your will and not His so the answer is: 'yes' a man cannot will to do other than his own will. It would be logically contradictory.

Since "A" is not something I said, it cannot be compared as something I said with something else I said.

What I have said, was that, according to the Settled View, God has decreed all events from eternity past. Or, that God has known all events in exhaustive detail from eternity past.

You're implying that God wills you to turn them up or down.

Your question implies that God's will is for your will to do other than it wills; which is impossible according to its definition of being your will. In other words your implying that God has a specific will in regards to you turning your hands up or down; and not merely that God has a will to allow you to act. Your question: 'man cannot will to NOT do what God says'. The result of 'do what God says' implies that God has an independent will in the hand turning which He does not according to the first part of your statement.

This, again, is based on your error just above of attributing something you said to me.

So, in your understanding of the Settled View, can a man will to do other than what God says?

Does God know, exhaustively, every event that He allows?

in order to allow the event, it must be known.

Thanks for a straight answer.

I'm saying directly that man can will to NOT do what God says. Do you agree, Rob, that man can will to NOT do what God says?

No. I don't agree since God's decree(per your earlier statement) is based upon your will. How is your will to be other than what it is?

The earlier statement is not mine; I was quoting you.

That being said, what you are saying is that when God said "do not eat of the tree" that it was not God's will that Adam and Eve not eat of the tree?

It's the contradiction which is obscuring the argument and thinking.

What's the contradiction again?

Has God decreed every event from before the foundation of the world?

Yes. God has decreed every event from before the foundation of the world. He has decreed to enact those events through His own power; OR, He has decreed to allow those events by not interfering with them. In both instances it was His decree.

If God has not decreed every event before the foundation of the world, does God know, exhaustively, every event before the foundation of the world?

Yes. God knew of every event before the foundation of the world. He decided to create the world for the sake of those who would be His despite those who would reject Him.

Does God know, exhaustively, every event that He allows?

Of course. How else could He decide to allow them? Does God know evil will occur on the earth tommorrow unless He intervenes? If so, is He responsible for the evil which occurs tommorrow while He has the power and authority to prevent it? How is this any different than making the decision before the creative act?

That's clear.

So let's try the same question again, without the error from above where you attribute a quote to me that was actually your quote:

God could communicate how one would have their palms 5 seconds into the future. And remembering that the quote you are attributing to me above is not mine; can a person will to have their palms other than what God says?

Lon, what RobE has written here is complete nonsense. Do you agree with it?

What nonsense? Be specific. Perhaps the intent is different than what you are receiving.

You said "The joke per se is that creation is an action of God, so if God has no idea as to the outcomes of His own actions then........."

It's an incomplete sentence at best. It makes no sense. I asked Lon about it, because I don't think Lon could sort it out.

 

[RobE]

No, I didn't state that. "God has decreed your palms..." is originally your quote, not mine. I merely quoted your quote.

Completely true. I'm sorry I didn't notice the reference to my quote. Source

What I have said, was that, according to the Settled View, God has decreed all events from eternity past. Or, that God has known all events in exhaustive detail from eternity past.

Which is a correct analysis other than in both cases God's act of creating(what was known) is a decree itself.

So, in your understanding of the Settled View, can a man will to do other than what God says?

Yes. Men are capable of doing otherwise despite what God knows the men will do.

The question you are asking is, "Will a man do other than what God knows?". To this I answer "No.", men are unwilling to do other than what God knows they will do.

in order to allow the event, it must be known.

Thanks for a straight answer.

Do you agree that in order to allow an event the event must be known?

God could communicate how one would have their palms 5 seconds into the future. And remembering that the quote you are attributing to me above is not mine; can a person will to have their palms other than what God says?

Yes, but they are unwilling to do so just as God foreknows.

You said "The joke per se is that creation is an action of God, so if God has no idea as to the outcomes of His own actions then........."

It's an incomplete sentence at best. It makes no sense. I asked Lon about it, because I don't think Lon could sort it out.

Is God able to foreknow the outcomes of His own personal actions?

 

[RobE]

No, I didn't state that. "God has decreed your palms..." is originally your quote, not mine. I merely quoted your quote.

This is true. However the term 'decreed' doesn't affect my objection at all.

So when you ask:

Yorzhik(A): God could communicate how one would have their palms 5 seconds into the future. ......;.....

Yorzhik(B).....can a person will to have their palms other than what God says?​

Analysis of the question:

The term 'would(A)' above speaks to a man's will.
The term 'will(B)' above speaks to a man's will.​

You ask if what God says can be unequal to what you would(B) do if we accept the fact that what God says equates to what you would(A) do. The contradiction appears.

Again, whether the term 'decree' exists within the thinking or not.....

A. God says = your will
B. God says <> your will

Rob

p.s. One way to issue a decree is through speaking it.

 

[RobE]

The Chessmaster analogy has been proposed previously and is helpful. It takes more ability to play a contingent game than to fix the game or needing to know ahead of time instead of respond in real time.

Do you play chess? The game isn't contingent at all. If I was to play a grandmaster the end would be determined before I made my first move --- E4! Chess is not a game in the sense you are speaking of.

I, on the other hand, was a candidate master in the USCF a long time ago. I am able to tell you that if the game is played perfectly the worst outcome would be a draw. The reason games are won or lost is through mistaken beliefs about what the opponent wants to do. God is able to exhaustively and definitely know what the opponent wants to do through the examination of hearts and minds. There is no room for error with this perfect present knowledge.

I am not sure why some want to say that the non-existent future somehow exists for God in His 'present'. This assumption is indefensible.

Even if we assume your ideas are correct and God is temporal, then knowledge of the non-existent future might exist; whether the future itself exists or not.

We know of the non-existent future in our daily lives and rely on that knowledge to get things accomplished.

For example we know:

Whether we're going to work later.
When we turn the key in the car it will start.
When we eat lunch our stomach will be satisfied.
Our socks are in the drawer.​

What happens when we don't go to work, the car doesn't start, our stomach is still growling, or the socks aren't in the sock drawer?

We find out that we didn't know anything at all, we merely believed those things would occur. Our beliefs were mistaken because we didn't have exhaustive knowledge of outside factors which would change our beliefs.

God could know through perfect present knowledge if our socks were clean, our stomach was ill, and our car would start; all of which, would allow us to go to work. God's perfect present knowledge assures Him of knowing(not believing in) the future non-existent outcomes; just as, your undefinite and inexhaustive knowledge allows you to know(in some instances) the future non-existent outcomes. What you do in a limited fashion, God does in a limitless fashion.

 

[RobE]

I think you'd agree that dogs don't have the moral culpability that we do in Scripture, and yet you reduce our decisions to being dog-like.

A dog on his chain is still free to drink from his bowl!

The chain was placed on the dog through free moral agency and the original sin. Christ strives to release us from our chain.

You state the same when you use the defense of John 6:44.

 

[themuzicman]

You really miss the argument sometimes. Lee, btw brought up another excellent point I hope he harps to death. If God changed His mind, why send a prophet in the first place? Couldn't He just have said after the fact: "You sinnned, now you are here."? I'm ashamed I didn't see it as clearly. OV is back to scrambling.

IF that's the best argument you got, you'd better sit down:

The threat of destruction was the inducement and catalyst to the change of heart in Ninevah. God knew it was possible that they would repent, and the prophecy is inherently conditional.

(Gee, that wasn't even hard.)

Me. I said that I argue for the general first. It is a way of trying to get you to acquiesce a point. I'm no longer Arminian, but I do argue purposefully from that perspective. If you think I'm not seeing the difference, this isn't the case.

I'm not Arminian, either.

I already told you I was arguing simple foreknowledge. I am leaving EDF out of the discussion because it clouds the waters and OV has strong aversion to the points I'd like to make. So sometimes I attack it from the Arminian angle because I can reason from there and get you to look at OV from their perspective a little easier with some of this discussion.

Simple foreknowledge is just EDF trying to get out of cause. Even from the Arminian perspective, all that will happen is already set in stone. They just try not to attribute cause to anyone. The chess master example does not include simple foreknowledge.

I'm morally culpable for choosing vanilla over chocolate? I reduce our trivial decisions to about this level, yes. I see a difference between ice cream and Loving God and man decisions. While I agree they are ultimately part of the servant and free discussion, it isn't any easy discussion with one not ready to compare and contrast, so I emphasize the contrast but agree with your point here.

Thanks

I already said it wasn't.

It's not Arminian foreknowledge, either.

For the Calvinist. The Arminian sees God as more guiding, helping and tutoring. Sure, He is then playing Himself, but that isn't the Arminian emphasis.

The Arminian is only one step from the Calvinist in foreknowldege. The Arminian just appeals to mystery in how God knows.

I believe this has us agreeing on the impotence of man to twart God.
But your argument here doesn't deny EDF. It just says it isn't a necessity.
As to that point, I see it in scripture, necessary or not (I believe every part of His character is necessary however, and I believe scripture to reveal that God has EDF.

And I disagree. I think scripture inherently reveals a God who desires true loving relationships, and a God who engages in true justice over our moral decisions, both of which are incompatible with EDF.

No, EDF isn't necessary from Scripture, but free will is. And EDF isn't compatible with free will.

Muz

 

[lee_merrill]

Do you play chess? The game isn't contingent at all. If I was to play a grandmaster the end would be determined before I made my first move --- E4!

Even if I start with D4?!

Hey, you were a candidate chess master? Neat, I did a little chess competition, and I was what they call a fish (but not because I swim good--for the non-chess people).

Blessings,
Lee <- Always did wish he could play good chess

 

[Lon]

IF that's the best argument you got, you'd better sit down:

The threat of destruction was the inducement and catalyst to the change of heart in Ninevah. God knew it was possible that they would repent, and the prophecy is inherently conditional.

(Gee, that wasn't even hard.)

Lee's argument, but with your definition, you couldn't say God changed His mind, for He had in mind all along.

I'm not Arminian, either.



Simple foreknowledge is just EDF trying to get out of cause. Even from the Arminian perspective, all that will happen is already set in stone. They just try not to attribute cause to anyone. The chess master example does not include simple foreknowledge.

I think I agree here (at least not seeing any disagreement with this point at the moment).

Thanks



It's not Arminian foreknowledge, either.
The Arminian is only one step from the Calvinist in foreknowldege. The Arminian just appeals to mystery in how God knows.

I think it is, though you are probably correct here that not all would hold to that position.

And I disagree. I think scripture inherently reveals a God who desires true loving relationships, and a God who engages in true justice over our moral decisions, both of which are incompatible with EDF.

No, EDF isn't necessary from Scripture, but free will is. And EDF isn't compatible with free will.

Muz

I have argued in that EDF doesn't really effect relationship or justice that much.

But here I go again:

Knowing you wear a certain color shirt with inappropriate print, before you do and allowing you to do so, even if it was forbidden doesn't have me morally culpable about your choice.

Yes, I could have stopped you, but that is exactly why you do have free choice. I didn't stop you. I'll choose to work with it to bring you to repentance and learn something.

Please show how you didn't have a choice or how I'm morally culpable just for knowing ahead of time about your unwise choice.

 

[Yorzhik]

This is true. However the term 'decreed' doesn't affect my objection at all.

So when you ask:

Yorzhik(A): God could communicate how one would have their palms 5 seconds into the future. ......;.....

Yorzhik(B).....can a person will to have their palms other than what God says?​

Analysis of the question:

The term 'would(A)' above speaks to a man's will.
The term 'will(B)' above speaks to a man's will.​

You ask if what God says can be unequal to what you would(B) do if we accept the fact that what God says equates to what you would(A) do. The contradiction appears.

Again, whether the term 'decree' exists within the thinking or not.....

A. God says = your will
B. God says <> your will

Rob

p.s. One way to issue a decree is through speaking it.

Ok. If God were telling you what your will is, then this would be valid. But the test is to see if God can tell you how your palms will be, not what your will is. If you will to have your palms the opposite of whatever God says, even if God knows that, then even God could not say, correctly, how your palms will be. It's so simple even a grammar school student could understand.

 

[themuzicman]

Lee's argument, but with your definition, you couldn't say God changed His mind, for He had in mind all along.

Sure I can. God decided that He would destroy Ninevah, but that decision was contingent upon whether they repented. They did, so God changed His mind.

I have argued in that EDF doesn't really effect relationship or justice that much.

But here I go again:

Knowing you wear a certain color shirt with inappropriate print, before you do and allowing you to do so, even if it was forbidden doesn't have me morally culpable about your choice.

Well, this is the first problem you have. If you have foreknowledge of what shirt I will wear, and I choose what shirt to wear after you have certain foreknowledge of it, then I cannot freely choose that shirt. That proof has been presented many times.

Yes, I could have stopped you, but that is exactly why you do have free choice. I didn't stop you. I'll choose to work with it to bring you to repentance and learn something.

No, that would be YOUR choice, not mine. You, in essence, are choosing for me.

Please show how you didn't have a choice or how I'm morally culpable just for knowing ahead of time about your unwise choice.

If you have DEFINITE foreknowledge of my shirt choice, then when the moment when I choose arrives, I cannot choose not to do it. If I choose no to do it, then you do not have definite foreknowledge. Furthermore, if you have definite foreknowledge of what shirt I will choose, then YOU cannot prevent me from doing so.

Molinism tries to resolve this by saying that God knows what every possible agent would do in any given situation, and then actualizes a possible world with a given set of decisions, but that has its own problems.

Now, this, in and of itself doesn't make you morally culpable. However, it does make the person who caused me to choose a particular shirt culpable. This is the old "foreknowledge doesn't cause" argument. That much is true, but it does require someone making a free will decision before the outcome of that free will decision can be certainly known. Now whether my decisions are determined directly by God "actualizing" what I will choose, or whether my decisions are determined by the circumstances in the given moment, the "free will" moment which determined my decision preceded the knowledge of it.

Yes, I know there are all kinds of temporal models to try to explain how GOd knows before I choose, and find most of them to be very deterministic.

Muz

 

[RobE]

Ok. If God were telling you what your will is, then this would be valid. But the test is to see if God can tell you how your palms will be, not what your will is.

However if God allows you to act freely, then your will directs the placement of your palms. Your action is the outward sign of your will. Are you saying you 'willed' to put them 'down' and found them to be 'up'?

If you will to have your palms the opposite of whatever God says, even if God knows that, then even God could not say, correctly, how your palms will be. It's so simple even a grammar school student could understand.

Apparently it's not that simple. God could not tell you how your palms would be in this scenario because it would result in the opposite happening. However, God might know and tell others of the result; and, your actions would verify His knowledge.

Let's say God knows that your will is to do the opposite of what He says to do.

God decreed before creation that you would put your palms 'up'.

How might God effectively carry out His decree?

I see two possibilities:

1. God foreknows you will put your palms up so God allows you to do so(through providing you hands, a will, and the environment in which to commit the action. Also He does not intervene to stop you.).
2. God foreknows you will put your palms down so He must intervene to accomplish His decree. He intervenes by saying you should put your palms 'down' which results in you putting your palms 'up'.​

Is God culpable for either action? Did God make you place your palms 'up' or 'down' in either instance or did you act freely?

Did God 'trick' you into putting them 'up' or was it your will to do the opposite of what He said to do?

"Nineveh, Nineveh, Where for art thou, Nineveh?"

 

[RobE]

Even if I start with D4?!

Hey, you were a candidate chess master? Neat, I did a little chess competition, and I was what they call a fish (but not because I swim good--for the non-chess people).

Blessings,
Lee <- Always did wish he could play good chess

Well, we are all woodpushers in comparison to Our Lord. He's not interested in games when it comes to the life and death of those who are foreordained to be His.

I will tell you, fish:chuckle: , that the game is more challenging when we play on opposite sides of the board. Given D4, my Indian King would be offended - G6!

The open theists will have to stick with un-proverbial Yahtzee!:chuckle:

Proverbs 16:33 The lot is cast into the lap,
but its every decision is from the LORD.​