themuzicman
Well-known member
I forgot that we're snorkeling instead of skin diving here.
Intention requires an object of intent.
If foreknown A then foreknown B or foreknown C or foreknown D, etc.....
Intention isn't fulfilled if maybe A then maybe B, or maybe C, or maybe D, etc.....
'A' must at least be foreknown. Otherwise it's impossible to prove a change of mind , intention, or anything else.
Open theism is handicapped if definite foreknowledge is impossible. We can put the LFW definition to work here without foreknowledge present.
If Nineveh(free will entities) might repent; then Nineveh might be destroyed or Nineveh might not be destroyed in the future.
Without definite foreknowledge the argument is meaningless drivel.
If Nineveh definitely repents, then Nineveh definitely won't be destroyed in the future.
If Nineveh definitely doesn't repent, then Nineveh definitely will be destroyed in the future.
An open theist is unable to present this argument because Nineveh is chocked full of free will agents. Definite foreknowledge is an illusion within open theism and LFW.
By my reasoning free will exists because of the definitely foreknown outcomes described above. Without this foreknowledge --- free will is defunct.
That's true. However, you can't intend something without certain foreknowledge of your intended outcome. Especially if you're God and able to bring about that which you intend through raw unusurped power.
A man might say that I intended A, but B happened and I was helpless to stop it!
Then there were two intentions simultaneously. One for repentence and one for non-repentence.
God foreknew that if Nineveh repented they wouldn't be destroyed.Foreknowledge is the basis for intention.
God foreknew that if Nineveh didn't repent they would be destroyed.
How is open theism able to use foreknowledge of future free acts as the basis for any argument whatsoever? God didn't change His foreknown intention in the case of Nineveh. He simply chose the appropriate foreknown response.
An a foreknow response is what if not an intention?
Really? If I intend to go to work, Isn't it reasonable that I foreknow that I have a job, a way to work, the ability to work, etc..... The foreknown causes which enable me to go to work exist or I'm unable to do anything whatsoever.
If I intend A produces B; and, in reality A produces C then reason falls apart where complete present and past knowledge exists. Complete knowledge prevents any external force from changing the foreknown fact that A produces B.
If foreknown A then foreknown B. Not, if maybe A then maybe B.
Don't you get tired of exploring the same old arguments in the same old ways? I do. Let's reason together and consider a new idea.
Thanks,
Rob
Let's begin by you agreeing to a particular dictionary to use. Honestly, you're on ignore because of your slimey, slithery, inane semantics, and this is nothing more than that.
Muz