jobeth
Member
Jaltus:
Yes, both Rice and Pinnock claim that EDF = Predestination. And I agree with them on that point. How can you logically deny that absolute foreknowledge excludes the freedom to do anything other than what God knows will occur?
Ultimately, you must either revise the traditional definition of Foreknowledge or revise the meaning and implications of Freewill.
The traditional definition of Omniscience includes God knowing exhaustively not only the present and the past, but also the future. It posits that God knows and is able to predict what will happen BEFORE it happens. God foretells what is going to happen with the force of a promise, and not merely as a vision or an ideal which He is helpless to either bring about, or change or hinder.
The concept of creaturely freedom must exclude the possibility that all human actions are predictable in this way. It posits instead that future free decisions are not knowable in advance. How can God promise a thing will definitely occur in the future, if people's decisions make a genuine contribution to the way things will turn out?
If God's knowledge of what we will do is certain, then how is it possible to do other than what God knows we will do?
And if Freewill means that we alone ultimately decide and genuinely determine our own destiny, then how can God know our destiny, until we, apart from God's agency and control, have made that decision?
It does no good to suggest that God foreknows what our contribution will be and how we will determine our own destiny, because if God genuinely knew ahead of time, then the "fix" was already in place BEFORE we decided, meaning our decision was merely subsequent to God's knowledge and in no way antecendent or "causal".
Genuine effects do not preceed their ultimate cause, but are always subsequent to them. To say that God foreknows what we will decide is to say that our decisions are not the real cause.
Rice continues:"Calvinism presents a magnificient portrait of divine majesty. Its basic metaphor for God is that of an absolute (benevolent) monarch. His most impressive characteristics are power, sovereignty, and control. For Calvinism, God sits enthroned above the rough and tumble of human events, serenely (and lovingly) presiding over the course of history. He decides, he decrees, and his (good) purposes are inevitable fulfilled. Nothing can resist his (Holy) will."
I like that description and agree with the implications. From Rice's point of view, my position regarding God's sovereignty is "typical" Calvinism, rather than "extremist".
Rice even admits that "People often find comfort in the thought that God (who is Good) is in absolute control of their lives."
I think that's beautiful.
The problem with this view, as Rice sees it, is that "On the logical level, God's omnicausality involves omniresponsibility. If everything happens just the way God plans it, then God is responsible for everything. This excludes creaturely freedom, and it seems to make God responsible for all the evil in the world."
To which I respond, "Yes. That is why God, himself, paid the penalty for all the sin and evil in the world, thereby reconcilling the world to Himself, not imputing their tresspasses unto them."
Do you agree with Rice on that point?
Yes, both Rice and Pinnock claim that EDF = Predestination. And I agree with them on that point. How can you logically deny that absolute foreknowledge excludes the freedom to do anything other than what God knows will occur?
Ultimately, you must either revise the traditional definition of Foreknowledge or revise the meaning and implications of Freewill.
The traditional definition of Omniscience includes God knowing exhaustively not only the present and the past, but also the future. It posits that God knows and is able to predict what will happen BEFORE it happens. God foretells what is going to happen with the force of a promise, and not merely as a vision or an ideal which He is helpless to either bring about, or change or hinder.
The concept of creaturely freedom must exclude the possibility that all human actions are predictable in this way. It posits instead that future free decisions are not knowable in advance. How can God promise a thing will definitely occur in the future, if people's decisions make a genuine contribution to the way things will turn out?
If God's knowledge of what we will do is certain, then how is it possible to do other than what God knows we will do?
And if Freewill means that we alone ultimately decide and genuinely determine our own destiny, then how can God know our destiny, until we, apart from God's agency and control, have made that decision?
It does no good to suggest that God foreknows what our contribution will be and how we will determine our own destiny, because if God genuinely knew ahead of time, then the "fix" was already in place BEFORE we decided, meaning our decision was merely subsequent to God's knowledge and in no way antecendent or "causal".
Genuine effects do not preceed their ultimate cause, but are always subsequent to them. To say that God foreknows what we will decide is to say that our decisions are not the real cause.
Rice continues:"Calvinism presents a magnificient portrait of divine majesty. Its basic metaphor for God is that of an absolute (benevolent) monarch. His most impressive characteristics are power, sovereignty, and control. For Calvinism, God sits enthroned above the rough and tumble of human events, serenely (and lovingly) presiding over the course of history. He decides, he decrees, and his (good) purposes are inevitable fulfilled. Nothing can resist his (Holy) will."
I like that description and agree with the implications. From Rice's point of view, my position regarding God's sovereignty is "typical" Calvinism, rather than "extremist".
Rice even admits that "People often find comfort in the thought that God (who is Good) is in absolute control of their lives."
I think that's beautiful.
The problem with this view, as Rice sees it, is that "On the logical level, God's omnicausality involves omniresponsibility. If everything happens just the way God plans it, then God is responsible for everything. This excludes creaturely freedom, and it seems to make God responsible for all the evil in the world."
To which I respond, "Yes. That is why God, himself, paid the penalty for all the sin and evil in the world, thereby reconcilling the world to Himself, not imputing their tresspasses unto them."
Do you agree with Rice on that point?