Commercial speech.
Commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection than does noncommercial speech.
43 Although commercial speech normally involves the sale of goods and services, the Supreme Court has on one occasion defined it more broadly as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”
44 Since panhandling relates solely to a proposed transfer of money from the listener to the speaker, it would seem to fit this definition. The argument to the contrary is based on a series of cases holding that charitable solicitation is not commer- cial where it is “intertwined” with advocacy.
45 Whether panhan- dling is commercial speech is at present an unresolved question.
Commercial speech which is unlawful or misleading can be banned outright.
46 There is no First Amendment problem with criminalizing
false or misleading representations by panhandlers. Indeed, such conduct constitutes the well-established crime of theft by false pretenses.
47
Other commercial speech may be limited so long as the government has a
substantial interest which is directly advanced by the regulation, and the regulation is no broader than necessary. This test differs from the time, place, or manner and expressive conduct tests in that the regulation may go directly to the content of the speech.
43. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978).
44. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 561 (1980).
45. Schaumburg, note 24; Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947 (1984); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781 (1988).
46. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771-772 (1976); San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U. S. 522, 535, n. 12 (1987).
47. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.7, at 382-383 (1986).