Interaction with perfect foreknowledge?

[godrulz]

No it doesnt refute itself. All other choices are still possible, its just they wont be chosen. for any decisions (X or ~X) there are two possibilities, but only one will be actual. It doesnt follow from X being chosen that ~X was therefore not a possible choice. The same works by looking at it as future.

It doesnt follow from the fact that ~X will be chosen, that X is therefore not a possible choice.

I cant put this distinction any more clearly.

peace,
jd

The possible is not actual. The future is not actual/knowable. If certain, it is not contingent. It still seems to me that you are negating contingency/possibilities and have a thinly veiled determinism or a position not much different than simple foreknowledge (which is hard to explain).

 

[godrulz]

Exhaustive foreknowldge is no different than exhastive past knowledge.

CASE IN POINT:
Three years ago I chose to eat chocolate ice cream instead of vanilla.

I have exhaustive knowledge that is the choice I made.

Is it possible (today) that I didn't actually choose chocolate three years ago but instead chose vanilla?

The past is fixed and can be known exhaustively.

The present is an object of knowledge as can be known as actual/certain.

I do not understand the other views that make the open/unsettled future actual/certain/knowable before it comes into existence (Molinism included...sounds too complex to be probable vs OT).

 

[docrob57]

Thanks, check the edit I did an that message and see what you think.

Greg

I would have to disagree. The admittedly oversimplified but nonetheless basically realistic model that I proposed describes a free will choice. This gets back to the question of whether free will choices are caused, and the answer must be yes. To deny that, I think, necessarily implies a failure to understand the alternative.

 

[insolafide]

Can you illustrate this in a simple, self-evident way, such as when I refer to God not knowing the outcome of a Superbowl trillions of years before it is played (common sense)?

I dont know what you are asking for. These things are not self-evident, they are philosophically complex.

When you say that God does not know the outcome of the Superbowl before it is played, you are making a statement that lacks support. WHY is that case that God does not know it? (BTW it is NOT common sense...) I could simply turn it around and say...

God knows the outcome of a Superbowl trillions of years before it is played. (assuming that there were trillions of years "before", which seems patently false, even by old-earth standards...).

But I'm sure you will not find such a statement convincing, just as I dont find your statements convincing. why? because they are just statements, no proof.

I have tried to assert it as simply as possible. But the modality in question and the possible-worlds analysis that are ususally added are far from simple, and far from uncontroversial.

What is the real quesiton you are asking? Why is the future unalterable?

Ill try to answer.
peace,
jd

 

[novice]

The past is fixed and can be known exhaustively.

That's my point.

Therefore, if the future can also be known exhaustively then we could no more say un-chosen choices are actually possible in the future then they would be possible in the past.

If the future is exhaustively known it is no different than the past.

 

[insolafide]

Seems to smack of Deism or determinism...

Clete might want to tweak his statements about God being wrong. In "Divine Foreknowledge: 4 views" that he has referred to, Boyd does not suggest that God is wrong. Rather, He knows reality as it is distinguishing possible/probable/actual/necessary/contingent/conditional, etc.

its not either Deism or determinism - how about some explanation instead of mere statements? Why do you think it is deistic (ROFL!) or deterministic?

peace,
jd

 

[docrob57]

Can you illustrate this in a simple, self-evident way, such as when I refer to God not knowing the outcome of a Superbowl trillions of years before it is played (common sense)?

See my post number 95. It is a solid and logical example.

 

[novice]

We exhaustively know the past and the choices we made and we can imagine other choices that we COULD have made but we know that we didn't make those choices so therefore those unchosen choices aren't actual possibilities any longer.

An exhaustively known future has this very same dilemma.

 

[insolafide]

Supercomprehension sounds similar to perfect past and present knowledge. It still does not make contingent things certain/actual/knowable, nor does it negate possibilities/uncertainties/openness.

It was given to give a possible model for a specific problem (God having middle-knowledge of His own actions). i am not endorsing it as a theory in general.

I do not think 'middle knowledge' is self-evident. Could it be a philosophical construct to attempt to retain exhaustive foreknowledge/free will?

it isnt self-evident!!!! sheesh. nothing in theology usually is self-evident. It is philosophical, and it does attempt a model a the the compatibility between foreknowledge and free will. But none of those things make it wrong, or not possible. Believe it or not but Open Theism is FAR from self-evident.

Sorry for trying to understand and yapping without full comprehension. :baby:

its fine, i dont mind explaining - but just be careful with the blanket, catch-all statements when you arent really sure if they are true... Measure twice, Cut once.

peace,
jd

 

[logos_x]

We exhaustively know the past and the choices we made and we can imagine other choices that we COULD have made but we know that we didn't make those choices so therefore those unchosen choices aren't actual possibilities any longer.

An exhaustively known future has this very same dilemma.

Yep!

Very well said! Concise and obviously demonstrates the absurdity of the "closed view".

The future is malleable, having not yet occured. The past is not, barring any possibility of time travel...in effect making the past malleable again by making it the present again. If it was a closed future, even relativity and the possibility of time travel would not change anything...because all change would be impossible.

 

[insolafide]

Exhaustive foreknowldge is no different than exhastive past knowledge.

CASE IN POINT:
Three years ago I chose to eat chocolate ice cream instead of vanilla.

I have exhaustive knowledge that is the choice I made.

Is it possible (today) that I didn't actually choose chocolate three years ago but instead chose vanilla?

thats a difference in kind of possibility, something Freddosso calls "accidental necessity". That is, it is possible that you could have chosen vanilla instead of chocolate, but then the proposition "Three years ago I chose to eat chocolate ice cream instead of vanilla" would have been false.

But notice, even though this accidental necessity is now true, that does not meant that you werent FREE three years ago to choose vanilla. you were. The same pertains to the future. Just because you will choose Chocolate in three years, does not mean that you are not free to choose vanilla instead.

peace,
jd

 

[novice]

Very well said! Concise and obviously demonstrates the absurdity of the "closed view".

Thank you.

Excellent post from you as well.

 

[godrulz]

I would have to disagree. The admittedly oversimplified but nonetheless basically realistic model that I proposed describes a free will choice. This gets back to the question of whether free will choices are caused, and the answer must be yes. To deny that, I think, necessarily implies a failure to understand the alternative.

Free will and causation/determinism are mutually exclusive. 'Free will' is caused by our will/mind and not something back of it. This is why we are culpable for our own choices.

 

[docrob57]

Free will and causation/determinism are mutually exclusive. 'Free will' is caused by our will/mind and not something back of it. This is why we are culpable for our own choices.

With all due respect, all you folks do is make assertions, at least provide a logical argument for your position.

 

[novice]

thats a difference in kind of possibility, something Freddosso calls "accidental necessity". That is, it is possible that you could have chosen vanilla instead of chocolate, but then the proposition "Three years ago I chose to eat chocolate ice cream instead of vanilla" would have been false.

But notice, even though this accidental necessity is now true, that does not meant that you werent FREE three years ago to choose vanilla. you were. The same pertains to the future. Just because you will choose Chocolate in three years, does not mean that you are not free to choose vanilla instead.

peace,
jd

LOL.

The past is exhaustively known.

I CHOSE CHOCOLATE! In this debate its irrelevant whether or not I was free three years ago because we are talking about my past choice right now (in the present).

The possibility that I chose vanilla is now closed (not possible) because of the exhaustive nature of our knowledge of the past.

 

[insolafide]

The possible is not actual.

right, i never claimed it was.

The future is not actual/knowable.

false.

If certain, it is not contingent.

false. We can be certain of things that are contingent. I could be certain that "I will sleep in tomorrow". Now maybe you are confused by the fact that it is possible that we are wrong about what we know. That is not a problem with either the certainty we have or the contingency of the proposition. Thats a problem with fallibility. Just because God is more accurate than us, does not mean that His certainty somehow affects the contingency of what He knows.

It still seems to me that you are negating contingency/possibilities and have a thinly veiled determinism or a position not much different than simple foreknowledge (which is hard to explain).

Umm no. I have told you many times. I am an Indeterminist (i affirm libertarian free will, and my theology allows me to do so) and I am a Molinist and affirm middle-knowledge (which by definition is not simple-foreknowledge).

peace,
jd

 

[docrob57]

LOL.

The past is exhaustively known.

I CHOSE CHOCOLATE! In this debate its irrelevant whether or not I was free three years ago because we are talking about my choice right now (in the present).

The possibility that I chose vanilla is now closed (not possible) because of the exhaustive nature of our knowledge of the past.

So, lets assume you forgot what you chose 3 years ago, does that mean that you didn't choose it?

 

[insolafide]

That's my point.

Therefore, if the future can also be known exhaustively then we could no more say un-chosen choices are actually possible in the future then they would be possible in the past.

If the future is exhaustively known it is no different than the past.

I think you are confused.

From the Present we are looking at the past, and askign the question, "were we free?". Even though we know that one choice was made, we still affirm that YES we were.

From the Present we are looking at the future and asking the question "will we be free?" Even though we know that one choice will be made we still affir that YES we will be free.

You are trying to say that I need to have causal power over the past from the present in order for past actions to be free. Thats a ridiculous requirement, and smells fishy of bad metaphysics.

peace,
jd

 

[insolafide]

LOL.

The past is exhaustively known.

and your point is? For God, on my view, the future is also exhaustively known. Just like we were free in the past, we will be free in the future (when it becomes present).

I CHOSE CHOCOLATE! In this debate its irrelevant whether or not I was free three years ago because we are talking about my past choice right now (in the present).

no kidding. but we are also talking about it as past. We are not suggesting that we are NOW free in the past. But neither am I suggesting that we are NOW free in the future. Obviously we have to wait for the future to be present before we can act, and act freely.

we were free in the past. we will be free in the future. If thats not direct parallelism, i dont know what is!

The possibility that I chose vanilla is now closed (not possible) because of the exhaustive nature of our knowledge of the past.

Thats right. But the possibility that you could have chosen vanilla in the past (when it was present) is not ruled out. Thats exactly the issue with the future - if God knows that you will choose vanilla in the future, it doesnt rule out your freedom to choose some other flavor (or no ice cream at all). In both cases (past and future) the actualities are known, and we are still free.

so whats the problem?

peace,
jd

 

[novice]

So, lets assume you forgot what you chose 3 years ago, does that mean that you didn't choose it?

doc, you are a proponent of exhaustive foreknowledge correct?

And you don't believe that God forgets His own foreknowledge do you? Of course not! Therefore why bother asking such a question? It will only serve to waste at least four posts.