As long as you hold to that view, you will fail to accurately describe the world as science has revealed it in the past few hundred years. Aristotelian forms aren't real. Even fundamental particles break down to a quantum description of their states. Macroscopic items like horses are similar for genetic reasons, but there is no idealize "horseness" that they aspire to.
Did you read my "long" answer to Selaphiel? Post number 118?
I'm wondering whether you are, perhaps, working on a mistaken view of what an "Aristotelian form" is?
What I am saying is pretty common sense. To say something similar: In any description: "F is doing y," a description of F necessarily precedes any description of the y that F is doing, and the description of F must be open to the doing of y. For example, fire isn't the sort of thing to cause things to freeze.
Just for the sake of argument, how do you know that a person who has a male body IS in fact male? What if they are a female form person trapped in a male body? How can you rule that you even in Aristotelian terms?
Aristotle's account of soul (see especially De Anima I and II) was tailor-made to rule out the "x soul trapped in a y body" account, as he understood people like Pythagoras and Plato to be espousing it. He expressedly attacks the view that any kind of soul can go into any kind of body. If it be granted that the soul directly informs the body, and a body is a
living body of such and such a kind because of the soul that it has, then the aforementioned view necessarily is ruled out. Whatever formal actuality the body has is received from its substantial form, which is the soul.
In another words, males have male bodies because they're male. Females have female bodies because they're female.
It's really that simple.