Now that is an interesting thought. I wonder how it works in the case of an altruistic deed. One would choose survival yet might sacrifice oneself for another.
Whatever the choice, when it was made it was what one was most inclined to do at that exact moment of the choosing.
Do you think there could be a neutral position for the will?
No. No inclination of the will means no movement. Stasis. To say, I simply chose randomly, and picked choice A over B thusly, is self-delusion. When you "picked" you were so inclined else you would never have "picked" in the first place.
Persons believing in libertarian free will think original sin did not affect them and they tend to believe they have more moral powers than they actually possess, ignoring the fact that our hearts are filled with evil desires (Matt 5:19; Mark 7:21; Romans 1:24; 1 Pet 2:11).
Indeed, libertarian free will (the liberty of indifference) implies we could acceptably choose to receive Christ without having a desire to receive Him, despite the clear teachings of the Scriptures to the contrary.
Therefore, the Reformed view of free will, choosing according to our most desired inclination, accurately reflects what the process of choosing is all about. It is also biblical, for the un-regenerated sinner chooses only to sin more or sin less, while the regenerated elect can choose to glorify God, which the lost (un-regenerated) can never do.
Rather, mankind’s freedom stems from our natures, connected to our instincts and our emotions, and is determined by our intellectual considerations and character. Man’s freedom is a
liberty of spontaneity, or a self-determined freedom—for we choose to do what we are most inclined to do at the moment we so choose. Unlike the notions of unsettled theism,
freedom is not arbitrariness. In all rational acts underlies a ‘why’—a reason which decides the act. To be otherwise, to embrace the liberty of indifference, is to be the uncertain, incalculable, and unreliable imaginary man of unsettled theism—which is where claims to the liberty of indifference must ultimately lead—a human will that is autonomous even unto itself.
The mind’s desire always precedes the mind’s choosing. This is precisely why libertarian free-will is impossible. It alleges a choice that is bereft of desire or want. Apparently, people just choose because they can, rather than because they want. But if that were the case, either no choice would ever be made (no desire would win the contest) or the decision would be completely random, arbitrary and thus have no moral consequence. Even American jurisprudence assumes a motive in a given crime. It is only common sense. Yet if libertarian free-will is true, determining motive is a fool's erands. Why? Because desire is not linked in any way to choice. (Of course, those with common sense know better.)
Quite simply,
the liberty of indifference position is, given an identical state of affairs at the moment of so choosing, the choice can be other than what it ends up being.
Thus, it necessarily follows that since the state of affairs that precedes the choice would include the strongest inclination that triggered the choice in reality, then for the choice to be other than what it ends up being would require that it be possible for a morally relevant choice to be contrary to what is intended!
Thus we see that
libertarian free will,
the liberty of indifference,
does not preserve moral responsibility, it would actually destroy it! For we would have persons intending to do
X and yet they would end up doing
not-X instead.
AMR