Originally posted by LightSon
I suppose you could only remember me reading it, if I actually responded to it in some fashion.
I just have no memory of it.
My memory is getting rusty or somethin' :down: If you could provide a link or repost, that would be appreciated.
i recall you asking me how sure i was that it was valid and i said about 8 out of 10. i showed it to my philosophy professor who said that it was in fact a valid argument so if the premises are correct, then it should be sound and i find no reason to think that it's not.
here is the 1st version of my argument, the one i think i showed to you.
Argument for a partially open future
1. I can freely choose either “a” or “b”
2. “a” is not “b” and “b” is not “a”
3. I cannot choose both “a” and “b”
4. I must choose only “a” or only “b”
5. Being able to freely choose between two options is known as free will.
6. Based on statement 1, I have free will.
7. For any decision I make to be free, it must be contingent.
8. If it is contingent then it may or may not happen and is not certain.
9. Assume God knows I will choose “a” before I make my decision
10. What God knows is certain and must happen
11. God is infallible and cannot make mistakes
12. If God knows I will choose “a” then it is certain I will choose “a”
(Contradicts: 6, 7)
13. If “a” is certain, then there is no possibility of choosing “b”. (Contradicts: 1,6)
14. If there is no possibility of choosing “b” then it is not actually a choice. (Contradicts: 1,6)
15. If “b” is not actually a choice then there really is no choice at all.
(Contradicts: 1, 6)
16. If there is no choice at all then when I “choose” “a” then I am really doing the only thing I can do. (Contradicts: 1,6)
17. Since God knows with certainty that “a” will be chosen, the original choice is not contingent. (Contradicts: 1,6,7,8)
18. Because the original choice is not contingent it is not free. (Contradicts: 1,6)
19. Since it is not free, there is no free will. (Contradicts: 1,6)
The conclusion that we have no free will clearly contradicts our first premise. Because the conclusion contradicts the premise, the assumption is false. Therefore God does not know the free will decisions of a person before the person makes them.
here is the 2nd version of it which i like better and my friends find easier to understand.
Argument for a partially open future-attempt 2
1. I have free will.
2. Free will is defined by having the ability to freely choose between two or more options when making a choice.
3. For any decision I make to be a free decision, it must be contingent.
4. If a decision is contingent then both choices exist as possible.
5. If I have only two choices and one of them cannot be chosen, then the decision, in this case, would not be contingent because only one choice can be made.
6. Let us assume that God foreknows our every choice in regards to the future. This is also known as exhaustive foreknowledge.
7. What God knows is certain because God is omniscient and does not make mistakes.
8. If what God knew was not certain, then he would not know it for sure and could be wrong. If God could be wrong then he would be fallible.
9. Since everything God knows is certain, then the future is also certain.
10. If the future is certain then it cannot be changed.
11. If God knows in a given situation that I will choose “a” over “b” then because his foreknowledge is certain and the future cannot be changed, I must choose “a”.
12. If, in a decision, I must choose option “a” over option “b” (based on the foreknowledge of God) then the decision is not contingent.
13. Based on statement 3, because this decision is not contingent, the decision is not free.
14. Therefore, for this decision, I am not free.
15. Since God’s foreknowledge is complete (exhaustive) it includes all of the future.
16. If God foreknows the results of every decision I will ever make, and every decision that God knows is not contingent and thus not free, then I do not have free will.
17. But we already established in statement 1 that I do have free will. Thus we have a contradiction. (Statement 1 and 16)
18. Nothing contradictory can follow from true statements.
19. Since the assumption we made in statement 6 about God’s foreknowledge gave us a contradiction, then it is incompatible with free will.
20. Therefore, since we have free will, God does not foreknow the choices we will make.
and here is the 3rd version i wrote which you might find easier.
Argument for a partially open future-attempt 3
1. I have free will
2. We define free will as the ability to choose equally between two or more options when presented with a choice.
3. For any decision I make to be free, each choice must be contingent.
4. A contingent choice is one where each choice has an equal possibility of being chosen.
5. Let us assume now that we have a choice before us and that God has absolute foreknowledge of what choice I will pick before I pick it.
6. Since his knowledge is absolute, there is no way he can be mistaken about it. In other words, what he knows is absolutely certain.
7. Whatever is absolutely certain cannot be changed. If it could be, it wouldn’t be absolutely certain.
8. Thus, the choice God knows I will make, because it’s absolutely certain, cannot be changed. Whatever choice God knows I will make cannot be changed.
9. Now let us say that I have a decision before me between choice “a” and choice “b”.
10. Let us also say that God has absolute foreknowledge that I will choose choice “a”
11. Thus, from number 6 it follows that my choosing of choice “a” is absolutely certain.
12. It also follows then from number 7 that my decision of choice “a” cannot be changed.
13. It follows that if God knows I will choose “a” then he also knows I will not choose “b”.
14. This knowledge is also absolutely certain and cannot be changed per numbers 6 and 7.
15. Thus, since God is certain that choice “b” will not be chosen by me then choice “b” is not an option I can choose. If I could choose it then God’s knowledge would not be absolutely certain.
16. Since “b” is no longer a choice I can choose then there is not an equal possibility of both “a” or “b” being chosen and the decision is no longer contingent.
17. Since any decision that is not contingent is also not free, per number 3, then this decision is not a free one.
18. Thus, for this decision I do not have a true free will because there is only one choice I can make and that is the one God has absolute foreknowledge of.
19. If God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future then every decision we make follows the exact same pattern as described here-not contingent and thus not free.
20. Thus, if God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future, then we do not have free will.