ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 3

[Lon]

Again, there is a difference between his decretive and prescriptive will.

You forgot your end-quote thingy

This is another silly point for a system that claims that God is meticulously sovereign. If everything God wants to happen happens because He is the cause of all things, and everything that happens is His will, how can there be a division in His will?

Think about it. God on one hand says, "murder is wrong" and on other other hand says, "It is my will that Jack the Ripper murder 40 women." It is contradictory. It's insane.
Muz

Explain your position on this dichotomy, please. We know God saw Jack the Ripper at the time of the attrocities. What was God's desire and will at the time according to the OV? Was it His will to allow? What is the difference between Hilston's position?

 

[themuzicman]

You forgot your end-quote thingy

Bad fingers! Bad! No biscuit!

Explain your position on this dichotomy, please. We know God saw Jack the Ripper at the time of the attrocities. What was God's desire and will at the time according to the OV? Was it His will to allow? What is the difference between Hilston's position?

There are two elements to this:

According to OVT, God declares that men will have free will, and that men have dominion over the earth. Thus, violating free will or dominion would mean that God violates His Own Word. He doesn't do that.

Thus, God may take actions to influence the free will of men, but does not take actions that would violate free will or man's dominion.

In Jack the Ripper's case, preventing him from acting would violate free will, and continually erecting barriers to his doing so would violate dominion.


Second, mankind, as a whole, is guilty of sin in Adam. We can see this in Romans 5. Thus, in a corporate sense, when men commit sins against men, it is a just result of mankind's sin. To prevent every instance where the result of mankind's sin is visited upon men would prevent justice from occurring.

(No, I don't mean that each individual deserves what they get. Clearly this judgment appears acutely on specific individuals, and frequently ones we would not choose for it to come upon. However, in the end, the "fault" for this judgment falling isn't the individual, but mankind corporately, including you and me.)


Thus, when Jack the ripper acts, he does so apart from God's causing him to do so, and in alignment with God's declaration that men have free will and dominion over the earth, and his actions, which are sinful, are also a natural judgment upon mankind for our sins.

(by natural judgment, I mean judgment in the same way that an alcoholic ruins his own liver. It's not God's direct judgment of man, but the judgment of natural consequences. This is one reason why the crucifixion of Christ was so heinous: He never sinned.)

Make sense?

Muz

 

[Lon]

Bad fingers! Bad! No biscuit!

There are two elements to this:

According to OVT, God declares that men will have free will, and that men have dominion over the earth. Thus, violating free will or dominion would mean that God violates His Own Word. He doesn't do that.

This seems to support the view across board to me though. It seems to not be particular to any one theological position in assessment. I hope you see what I mean: He has a desire to not see violence and another to allow men to live with their choices. Perhaps an example again: I do not desire my child to touch an electric wire on the farm. As he persists, I may allow him to do it so that it won't happen again. There are two considerations for my will in this scenario, both what I desire and what I allow. Perhaps you can speak more to this to elucidate your position for me.

Thus, God may take actions to influence the free will of men, but does not take actions that would violate free will or man's dominion.

In Jack the Ripper's case, preventing him from acting would violate free will, and continually erecting barriers to his doing so would violate dominion.


Second, mankind, as a whole, is guilty of sin in Adam. We can see this in Romans 5. Thus, in a corporate sense, when men commit sins against men, it is a just result of mankind's sin. To prevent every instance where the result of mankind's sin is visited upon men would prevent justice from occurring.

(No, I don't mean that each individual deserves what they get. Clearly this judgment appears acutely on specific individuals, and frequently ones we would not choose for it to come upon. However, in the end, the "fault" for this judgment falling isn't the individual, but mankind corporately, including you and me.)


Thus, when Jack the ripper acts, he does so apart from God's causing him to do so, and in alignment with God's declaration that men have free will and dominion over the earth, and his actions, which are sinful, are also a natural judgment upon mankind for our sins.

(by natural judgment, I mean judgment in the same way that an alcoholic ruins his own liver. It's not God's direct judgment of man, but the judgment of natural consequences. This is one reason why the crucifixion of Christ was so heinous: He never sinned.)

Make sense?

Muz

I think the freewill discussion may not be necessary at this particular point (adding extra elements to our consideration of God's will). It can be introduced in ensuing posts I think, but at the moment I'm just trying to get dialogue specifically about what God desires and allows, what He wills and how it relates to His actions and interactions with us. So I appreciate the move toward freewill as it relates to us, but want to hone in on this particular distinction between what God desires and wills. At this point, I've no agenda but to clarify and understand any similarities and differences upon God's will without necessarily working through man's perspective or ramifications upon it (again referring to the electric fence analogy). It is hard to distinguish between my will and my desire for my child in this analogy and I think it reflects what I'm trying to get at with God's desire/will as well. If my son's freewill comes into play or not doesn't seem to address my dilemma as a father for what I'm attempting to dialogue.

 

[themuzicman]

This seems to support the view across board to me though. It seems to not be particular to any one theological position in assessment. I hope you see what I mean: He has a desire to not see violence and another to allow men to live with their choices. Perhaps an example again: I do not desire my child to touch an electric wire on the farm. As he persists, I may allow him to do it so that it won't happen again. There are two considerations for my will in this scenario, both what I desire and what I allow. Perhaps you can speak more to this to elucidate your position for me.

Free will is necessary to remove God from being the cause of Jack the Ripper's actions. Without free will, God cannot simply allow men to live with their choices, because they aren't their choices. They're God's.

In your example, if you took your child's hand and repeatedly made him touch the wire, he may learn not to touch the wire, but would be unable to refrain from doing it again, because you are the one causing him to do it.

I think the freewill discussion may not be necessary at this particular point (adding extra elements to our consideration of God's will). It can be introduced in ensuing posts I think, but at the moment I'm just trying to get dialogue specifically about what God desires and allows, what He wills and how it relates to His actions and interactions with us. So I appreciate the move toward freewill as it relates to us, but want to hone in on this particular distinction between what God desires and wills. At this point, I've no agenda but to clarify and understand any similarities and differences upon God's will without necessarily working through man's perspective or ramifications upon it (again referring to the electric fence analogy). It is hard to distinguish between my will and my desire for my child in this analogy and I think it reflects what I'm trying to get at with God's desire/will as well. If my son's freewill comes into play or not doesn't seem to address my dilemma as a father for what I'm attempting to dialogue.

The difference is who causes him to touch the fence. If you are taking his arm and making him touch the fence, then you have culpability, even if he is the only one who actually touches the fence.

If you have declared that you will not prevent your son from using his free will and learning from experience, and you keep your word, then you would be unable to prevent it without breaking your word.

And, if we believe that God never breaks His word, then He is unwilling (unable seems too strong, unwilling too weak) to prevent it because of His Word, as well.

Muz

 

[Lon]

Free will is necessary to remove God from being the cause of Jack the Ripper's actions. Without free will, God cannot simply allow men to live with their choices, because they aren't their choices. They're God's.

In your example, if you took your child's hand and repeatedly made him touch the wire, he may learn not to touch the wire, but would be unable to refrain from doing it again, because you are the one causing him to do it.

The difference is who causes him to touch the fence. If you are taking his arm and making him touch the fence, then you have culpability, even if he is the only one who actually touches the fence.

If you have declared that you will not prevent your son from using his free will and learning from experience, and you keep your word, then you would be unable to prevent it without breaking your word.

And, if we believe that God never breaks His word, then He is unwilling (unable seems too strong, unwilling too weak) to prevent it because of His Word, as well.

Muz

I agree with this and it isn't outside of Calvinism doctrine as I understand it.

Since we have seen that the domination of sin, from the time of its subjugation of the first man, not only extends over the whole race, but also exclusively possesses every soul; it now remains to be more closely investigated, whether we are despoiled of all freedom, and, if any particle of it yet remain, how far its power extends. . . .

Now when I assert that the will, being deprived of its liberty, is necessarily drawn or led into evil, I should wonder if anyone considered it as a harsh expression, since it has nothing in it absurd, nor is it unsanctioned by the custom of good men. It offends those who know not how to distinguish between necessity and compulsion. But if anyone should ask them whether God is not necessarily good, and whether the devil is not necessarily evil, what answer will they make? For there is such a close connection between the goodness of God and His divinity that His deity is not more necessary than His goodness. But the devil is by his fall so alienated from communion with all that is good that he can do nothing but what is evil. But if anyone should sacrilegiously object that little praise is due to God for His goodness, which He is constrained (1) to preserve, shall we not readily reply that His inability to do evil arises from His infinite goodness and not from the impulse of violence? Therefore if a necessity of doing well impairs not the liberty of the divine will in doing well if the devil, who cannot but do evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily; who then will assert that man sins less voluntarily, because he is under a necessity of sinning? This necessity Augustine everywhere maintains, and even when he was pressed . . . he confidently expressed himself in these terms: "By means of liberty it came to pass that man fell into sin; but now the penal depravity consequent on it, instead of liberty, has introduced necessity." And whenever the mention of this subject occurs, he hesitates not to speak in this manner of the necessary servitude of sin. We must therefore observe this grand point of distinction, that man, having been corrupted by his fall, sins voluntarily, not with reluctance or constraint; with the strongest propensity of disposition, not with violent coercion; with the bias of his own passions, and not with external compulsion: yet such is the pravity (2) of his nature that he cannot be excited and biased to anything but what is evil. . . .
When the will of a natural man is said to be subject to the power of the devil, so as to be directed by it, the meaning is, not that it resists and is compelled to a reluctant submission, as masters compel slaves to an unwilling performance of their commands; but that, being fascinated by the fallacies of Satan, it necessarily submits itself to all his directions. For those whom the Lord does not favor with the government of His Spirit, He abandons in righteous judgment to the influence of Satan. . . . When we attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that all things have ever been, and perpetually remain, before His eyes, so that to His knowledge nothing is future or past, but all things are present: and present in such a manner that He does not merely conceive of them from ideas formed in His mind, as things remembered by us appear present to our minds, but really beholds and sees them as if actually placed before Him. And this foreknowledge extends to the whole world and to all the creatures. Predestination we call the eternal decree of God, by which He hath determined in Himself what He would have to become of every individual of mankind. For they are not all created with a similar destiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation for others.
-John Calvin, Institutes, Reading About the World, Volume 2

 

[penofareadywriter]

You forgot your end-quote thingy

Explain your position on this dichotomy, please. We know God saw Jack the Ripper at the time of the attrocities. What was God's desire and will at the time according to the OV? Was it His will to allow? What is the difference between Hilston's position?

I agree with this and it isn't outside of Calvinism doctrine as I understand it.

The power to influence is irrevocable (though it be finite).God engages in a prolonged struggle with creatures when they rebel, not because a greater good comes of it or because he hopes for their salvation(though this is true of people who are not irrevocably hardened in their rebellion), but rather because the alternative of immediately revoking their power to influence would undo the morally responsible freedom that is necessary for love.
Suppose I give my teenage daughter 200$ for her b-day. If I genuinely give her the money I cannot dictate how she spends it. if i truly give it to her, she owns it, which means that she has the power to spend it as she sees fit. if I threaten to take the money back every time she wants to spend it in ways other than how I would spend it, I actually still own the money. I am just choosing to spend it through her.
if God were to retract our freedom every time we were about to chose something against His will, then it cannot be said that He REALLY gave us freedom.
When free agents choose to harm others, to some extent God must tolerate this misfortune.

 

[Hilston]

The fact that Hilston, a dispensationalist, advocates this invention of "decretive/prescriptive wills of God" is enough reason to reject the teaching.

I love the logic here. I wonder how far Nang-and-Jim would take this logic. For example, Hilston also advocates the existence of God.

Notice that there is no attempt by Nang-and-Jim to refute anything Lon believes about Hilston's essay. They merely and authoritarianly declare: "We advise you not to go there." Of course, they ostensibly say this with the full authority of the Reformed fathers, interestingly accompanied by the typical neo-liberal strategem of attacking the man and dismissing the message.

This is the difference between the conservative and the neo-liberal approach to debate. There are those who actually want to engage in thoughtful and respectful discussion, and there are those who prefer to make bald pronouncements based on the supposed authority of others and to demonize the views of others to pre-empt any actual discussion. How in the world could one hope to have a substantive dialogue, let alone advancing any mutual understanding, when pejoratives such as "invention" are tossed around, soaked in such vitriol and obviously prejudiced disrespect?

In fact, the very first time we ever heard this theory of "two wills" taught, was in a sermon preached in an Arminian, hyperdispensational church . . .which husby and I heard prior to our "Reformed" awakenings.

Here's that same logic again. If an Arminian/hyper-dispy said it, it can't possibly be true. I wonder what Nang-and-Jim think about the Arminian/hyper-dispy belief in the virgin birth?

. . and which we immediately rejected as untrue . . . even before being exposed to Calvinism, on the Scriptural basis that there is only one Gospel, and one faith.

There is one gospel and one faith today, according to Paul's epistles. But when Paul penned wrote his letters, he was declaring "one gospel" and "one faith" in contrast to the multiple Kingdom gospels and Kingdom faiths that preceded the Body of Christ. See the details here: The Seven Ones.

God is singular in will, purposes, and intents.

In terms of God's decrees, this is certainly true. But God's prescriptions do not speak to God's purposes or intentions. God decrees the murder of innocent people, but He does not command it. And just because God commands against unjustified killing, one cannot assume that it is God's purpose or intention for the United States to be murder-free.

It is only those who attempt to compromise or make the sovereign will of God compatible with the (free) actions of men, that speak of a supposed two wills of God.

This is merely a specious attempt to dismiss a patently biblical concept, understood and expressed by the writers of scripture from Genesis to Revelation. I've yet to meet anyone who can give a cogent refutation against the link that Lon provided above. If there is such rebuttal, I'm most interested in reading it.

Such is not to be found in the teachings of the Reformed fathers who adhere to absolute Godly sovereignty.

Oh look. Here's the reverse of the logic demonstrated above. If Hilston or an Arminian/hyper-dispy says something, it can't possibly be true. But if a Reformed father said it, it can't possibly be untrue.

We would advise you not go there . . .

See what I mean? Good grief. Why not go there? Maybe someone (me or Lon) will learn something for a change, rather than all this ego-saturated bluster, bicep flexing and schoolyard bully tactics. The illogic and inane behavior of Nang-and-Jim's post proves at least one thing to me: The effect of the disease of Open Theism on the minds of those who frequent this forum is not limited to Open Theists.

Contains no animal products,
Hilston

 

[Nang]

I love the logic here. I wonder how far Nang-and-Jim would take this logic. For example, Hilston also advocates the existence of God.

Oh please . . .the point was made to demonstrate that teaching two wills of God is not historically Reformed.

Notice that there is no attempt by Nang-and-Jim to refute anything Lon believes about Hilston's essay.

That would be off-topic from the OP. If you would like our critique of your essay, start a thread with it, and we will accomodate.

This is the difference between the conservative and the neo-liberal approach to debate.

No debate occurring, Hilston. At least, not between myself and Lon, who I was addressing. If you want a debate, start a new thread and I will accommodate.

Here's that same logic again. If an Arminian/hyper-dispy said it, it can't possibly be true.

That's about right . . .

In terms of God's decrees, this is certainly true. But God's prescriptions do not speak to God's purposes or intentions.

God's precepts certainly reveal His purposes and intentions.

This is merely a specious attempt to dismiss a patently biblical concept, understood and expressed by the writers of scripture from Genesis to Revelation. I've yet to meet anyone who can give a cogent refutation against the link that Lon provided above. If there is such rebuttal, I'm most interested in reading it.

If you want a rebuttal, start a thread and I will accommodate.

If Hilston or an Arminian/hyper-dispy says something, it can't possibly be true. But if a Reformed father said it, it can't possibly be untrue.

That's about right . . .



Nang

 

[Hilston]

Oh please . . .the point was made to demonstrate that teaching two wills of God is not historically Reformed.

We're curious: Do you make a distinction between what God commands (e.g., Ex 20:13, Thou shalt not murder) and what God decrees? (e.g., Acts 2: 23 Him [Jesus Christ], being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.) If so, what do you call them?

That would be off-topic from the OP. If you would like our critique of your essay, start a thread with it, and we will accomodate.

We've posted a link to the thread below:
"God's prescriptive will and His decretive will"

No debate occurring, Hilston. At least, not between myself and Lon, who I was addressing.

Lon said: "Again, there is a difference between his decretive and prescriptive will." You then responded by doing the following:

1. You chide him for even considering the teaching of a dispensationalist.
2. You call his belief an "invention."
3. You advise him to "reject the teaching."
4. You ridicule his view as something found in "Arminian, hyperdispensational" churches.
5. You imply some deficit in Lon's mental acuity, describing his view as something so obviously wrong that "husby and [you] … immediately rejected [it] as untrue … prior to [y]our 'Reformed' awakenings … even before being exposed to Calvinism."
6. Without argument or elaboration, you claim, "God is singular in will, purposes, and intents," as if that addresses the question.
7. You presume upon our and Lon's intentions by assuming the impetus behind the teaching is to "compromise or make the sovereign will of God compatible with the (free) actions of men." (it's not mine, by the way).
8. You advise Lon "not go there," as in, challenging "the teachings of the Reformed fathers who adhere to absolute Godly sovereignty."

And that's not a debate occurring? Then what was it, a bedtime story? Lon, how do you feel about Nang's "non-debate" comments about your post?

Hilston previously wrote: In terms of God's decrees, this is certainly true. But God's prescriptions do not speak to God's purposes or intentions.

God's precepts certainly reveal His purposes and intentions.

Let's see if we understand your logic. God's precepts reveal His purpose and intentions. Ok. If we understand that correctly, then knowing a precept of God should reveal God's purpose and intentions. For example, knowing that God's precept is "Thou shalt not commit adultery" (Exodus 20:14), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to raise up adversity against David from his own house, to take David's wives before his eyes and give them to his neighbor, who would lie with David's wives in the sight of the sun. Knowing that the precept of God is the blessing of his people by other nations (Genesis 12:3), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to "[turn] their heart to hate his people" (Psalm 105:25). Knowing that God commanded Pharaoh to let His people go (Exodus 5:1, 8:1), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to harden Pharaoh's heart (Exodus 4:21). Knowing that God commanded David to not take a military census of the people (2 Samuel 24:10), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to be angry with David and to move him to do just that (2 Samuel 24:1). Knowing that God's precept is "Thou shalt not murder" (Exodus 20:13), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention for His only Son to be murdered, "being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" (Ac 2:23), "to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose determined before to be done" (Acts 4:28).

Do we understand your claim correctly?

Planning a heist,
Hilston

 

[Nang]

We're curious: Do you make a distinction between what God commands (e.g., Ex 20:13, Thou shalt not murder) and what God decrees? (e.g., Acts 2: 23 Him [Jesus Christ], being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.) If so, what do you call them?

Sure do, but both God's legal commands and God's decrees reveal God's will.

You do not agree?

Let's see if we understand your logic. God's precepts reveal His purpose and intentions. Ok. If we understand that correctly, then knowing a precept of God should reveal God's purpose and intentions.

Correct.

For example, knowing that God's precept is "Thou shalt not commit adultery" (Exodus 20:14), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to raise up adversity against David from his own house, to take David's wives before his eyes and give them to his neighbor, who would lie with David's wives in the sight of the sun. Knowing that the precept of God is the blessing of his people by other nations (Genesis 12:3), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to "[turn] their heart to hate his people" (Psalm 105:25). Knowing that God commanded Pharaoh to let His people go (Exodus 5:1, 8:1), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to harden Pharaoh's heart (Exodus 4:21). Knowing that God commanded David to not take a military census of the people (2 Samuel 24:10), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to be angry with David and to move him to do just that (2 Samuel 24:1). Knowing that God's precept is "Thou shalt not murder" (Exodus 20:13), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention for His only Son to be murdered, "being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" (Ac 2:23), "to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose determined before to be done" (Acts 4:28).

Do we understand your claim correctly?

No. You are omitting the factor that God decreed to establish a secondary moral agency within men created in His image, that would also work cause and effect amongst His creation.

Nang

 

[Lon]

The power to influence is irrevocable (though it be finite).God engages in a prolonged struggle with creatures when they rebel, not because a greater good comes of it or because he hopes for their salvation(though this is true of people who are not irrevocably hardened in their rebellion), but rather because the alternative of immediately revoking their power to influence would undo the morally responsible freedom that is necessary for love.

I do not disagree with this speculation but have a few problems with the presuppositions that drive the tenor. If you read Hilston's piece, I think it describes this meaningfully. We have God's decrees and His Will involved.
Mat 13:24 He presented them with another parable:
"The kingdom of heaven is like a person who sowed good seed in his field.
Mat 13:25 But while everyone was sleeping, an enemy came and sowed weeds among the wheat and went away.
Mat 13:26 When the plants sprouted and bore grain, then the weeds also appeared.
Mat 13:27 So the slaves of the owner came and said to him, 'Sir, didn't you sow good seed in your field? Then where did the weeds come from?'
Mat 13:28 He said, 'An enemy has done this.'so the slaves replied, 'Do you want us to go and gather them?'
Mat 13:29 But he said, 'No, since in gathering the weeds you may uproot the wheat with them.
Mat 13:30 Let both grow together until the harvest. At harvest time I will tell the reapers, "First collect the weeds and tie them in bundles to be burned, but then gather the wheat into my barn." ' "

As we follow the parable, we can observe several things about the will of the owner of the field. First, that he desired a field of good seed.
We also have a problem: weeds. The owner did not desire weeds in his field. An enemy came in. At this point, we should dileneate our respective theological positions. As verse one says, this is analogous to God and us. Our dilineation is over God's foreknowledge particularly and somewhat as well upon our respective premise of His sovereignty.
The story continues to give us God's choice in the matter of weeding or allowing the wheat and tares to grow side by side. What we have is a change in options for the owner, or an option that was already foreknown. The parable suggest 'while they were sleeping' yet God does not rest nor does He slumber. The parable, even in the OV is not parallel to our presuppositions respectively and will reveal our different take upon God's prescriptive and decretive decisions. As Nang says, we may just call it 'will' here without distinguishing any of the nuances. That is, from her perception, God knew His field was being weed-seeded and because He didn't stop it there, allowed or desired weeds. As a moderate Calvinist, I must mediate that position and wade through the difference in God's desire, allowance and intent. I believe the text provides for that dilineation. There are several points in the story that steer our minds in this direction:
1) "while they were asleep" While God does not slumber, I believe this element purposeful by God to show it is not His decree that weeds should be so, but rather an acquiescence. Pen, you stated that you believed it is to preserve freewill and tied it as necessarily connected to love. I would qualify this differently upon different presuppositions from other texts. I uphold choice and culpability but define it differently than the OV perception of LFW and I am wholly skeptical of freewill being a factor at all concerning love. I don't believe choice (specifically 'to do otherwise')necessary for love to exist. I do to an extent, but it needs a lot of discussion and I'll merely mention the difference between our suppostions here.
2) "an enemy has done this" In this statement, I must disagree with the double-pred Calvinist view. The implication of this verse is that it is the work of the enemy and not of the direct will or desire of the owner that weeds are present in the garden. Pen, I agree with this particular part of your assessment.
3)"No, since in gathering the weeds you may uproot the wheat with them"
We see further parameters in this particular about the Will of God. His value upon each individual seed is such that not one is He willing to surrender. In this, I believe Hilston's address particularly helpful in discussing aspects of God's will in a fallen world and it helps me to wade through God's intentions, that I believe we most are understanding of.

Suppose I give my teenage daughter 200$ for her b-day. If I genuinely give her the money I cannot dictate how she spends it. if i truly give it to her, she owns it, which means that she has the power to spend it as she sees fit. if I threaten to take the money back every time she wants to spend it in ways other than how I would spend it, I actually still own the money. I am just choosing to spend it through her.
if God were to retract our freedom every time we were about to chose something against His will, then it cannot be said that He REALLY gave us freedom.
When free agents choose to harm others, to some extent God must tolerate this misfortune.

Again, there are many truths here that coincide and resonate strongly with the parable. We can see, I believe, our points of mutual interest and divergence in this analogy. I see it as a good analogy for our discussion.

 

[Lon]

Lon, how do you feel about Nang's "non-debate" comments about your post?

Certainly I 'felt challenged.' I've been Calvinist for about 2 years now and so have been very upfront that my Arminian roots may not be entirely severed. I do believe a moderate Calvinist stance is hard to distinguish from forms of Sovereign Arminianism (much overlapping and mutuality).
As such, I'm fairly open to critique and correction, but have found that moderate Calvinism isn't opposed/is in sync to the Decretive/Prescriptive discussion.

John Hendryx - The Will of God - Hyper-Calvinism Versus Historic Calvinism
(very nearly resembles Jim's)

Brian Anderson -Does God Desire The Salvation Of All Men?
(again, using similar language and quoting Spurgeon)

God's Will for the Salvation of All Men
(A site that argues for classic and moderate Calvinism)

 

[penofareadywriter]

I don't believe choice (specifically 'to do otherwise')necessary for love to exist. I do to an extent, but it needs a lot of discussion and I'll merely mention the difference between our suppostions here.

Here are some thoughts on the issue.
If God's goal is to have people and angels participate in His triune love, these agents must possess the capacity to refuse His love. Why? Is it possible to force people to love? Powerful people may be able to force others to do just about anything. Through psychological torture, they may be successful in getting people to betray loved ones or even deny their faith. They may even succeed in forcing others to act and say loving things to them. But NO ONE can force another person to actually love them.
Another thing to point out is what I would call the principal of proportion. EVERYTHING in creation has a capability( with free moral agents in the picture of course) to have a positive and a negative impact on its environment. The sun can give life or take life. Water can give life or take life. If man was truly created as a individual, he must by definition have the capability of BOTH good and evil.
To quote the great C.S. Lewis on this subject " Free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then. did God give [creatures] free will? Because Free will, though it makes evil possible. is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having."

3)"No, since in gathering the weeds you may uproot the wheat with them"
We see further parameters in this particular about the Will of God. His value upon each individual seed is such that not one is He willing to surrender. In this, I believe Hilston's address particularly helpful in discussing aspects of God's will in a fallen world and it helps me to wade through God's intentions, that I believe we most are understanding of.

This an interesting variable that I have not considered yet.

 

[Lon]

Here are some thoughts on the issue.
If God's goal is to have people and angels participate in His triune love, these agents must possess the capacity to refuse His love. Why? Is it possible to force people to love? Powerful people may be able to force others to do just about anything. Through psychological torture, they may be successful in getting people to betray loved ones or even deny their faith. They may even succeed in forcing others to act and say loving things to them. But NO ONE can force another person to actually love them.
Another thing to point out is what I would call the principal of proportion. EVERYTHING in creation has a capability( with free moral agents in the picture of course) to have a positive and a negative impact on its environment. The sun can give life or take life. Water can give life or take life. If man was truly created as a individual, he must by definition have the capability of BOTH good and evil.
To quote the great C.S. Lewis on this subject " Free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then. did God give [creatures] free will? Because Free will, though it makes evil possible. is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having."
This an interesting variable that I have not considered yet.

How could I argue with Lewis? I'll need to go back a piece (bear with me, I tend to lose people along the way if I don't do this):

I don't believe choice (specifically 'to do otherwise')necessary for love to exist. I do to an extent, but it needs a lot of discussion and I'll merely mention the difference between our suppostions here.

In past posts here, I've supported that there is no need for LWF whatsoever in defining love, but your specific address here speaks to a need of clarification and even a bit of compatibility issues we share between us in this discussion.


LFW is a difficult concept to define comprehensively because it carries many many subjective ideas for it's definition(s).

• 1. Libertarian/Liberty maintains or emphasizes free. In this sense, it is redundant but necessary opposed to some form of 'constrained' freewill. The problem here is that all freedoms are described or attributed also to some form of restraint or parameter. In order to be 'free' from sin, I have to be free to follow God and so the subjective factor here is much like a glass half-full or a glass half-empty. Is the glass half free of water or half free of air? Is it free of contaminates in air or water? Libertarian suggest both free and choice to accentuate the freedom as truly free, but such a notion is also subjective and difficult to pin down.
  2. Free - 'unrestrained' with 49 other definitions! I would particularly point to the need for parameters (restrictions of some sort) in defining both libertarian and free such that is it very difficult to discuss objectively in theology discussion.
  3. Will - (self) deliberated

It is interesting that there is so much redundancy in these three. They almost out-do each other in vying for position. Liberated freedom (removing at least some semblance of restraint) and de-liberating liberty or cancelling another volition by volition.
I'm being somewhat purposeful in this obtusion, but I wanted the subjective problems to stand out a bit. It is not intended to mischaracterize or malign any one's particular.

Gen 1:31 God saw all that he had made — and it was very good!

Gen 2:15 The LORD God took the man and placed him in the orchard in Eden to care for it and to maintain it.
Gen 2:16 Then the LORD God commanded the man, "You may freely eat fruit50 from every tree of the orchard,
Gen 2:17 but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will surely die."

Man is created very good. In this capacity, I philosophize he has a capacity to love God even before an instruction is given 'to do otherwise.'
Choice, is not part of Adam's makeup. It is an external reference after his creation. Again, this is speculative for certainly God must have had in mind exactly what He intended in man, but the forbidden tree is an external motivation "don't eat from it." We must ask this question: Was Adam free to love God at this point in our story? Is he merely mechanical without the capacity to do otherwise? Is the tree necessary in this story to define a loving relationship between creation and Creator? It is important that we start here because it is the beginning of our consideration of freedom. In my estimation, freedom is relative to what we are desirous of. If Satan had created us (if that were even possible) we'd be made 'free to sin' but restricted from loving God. I bring this example to merely support the idea that freedom is a relative term that needs a significant ammount of discussion before it carries any meaning.
I would be so bold as to say even with an encyclopedic set of 3 at 500 pages each, we'd still have much left to consider in coverage of the topic. LWF is no easy subject because of the virtual relativity of meaningful and need for mutual definition (there are almost 1000 websites linked to Google on the subject).

This article is insightful toward pertinent points between the issues we are faced with respectively.

Here is a monergistic/moderate Calvinist rebuttal to LWF as a theological doctrine. Though the OV position will certainly disagree, I think it gives logical arguments that can be understood, acquiesced, and intelligently dialogued.

The Stanford article (also linked above) is fair in representing most philosophical thought and divergence upon LFW.

 

[Hilston]

Hilston previously wrote:

We're curious: Do you make a distinction between what God commands (e.g., Ex 20:13, Thou shalt not murder) and what God decrees? (e.g., Acts 2: 23 Him [Jesus Christ], being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.) If so, what do you call them?

Sure do, but both God's legal commands and God's decrees reveal God's will.

You do not agree?

Not at all. Or perhaps we need to define what you mean by "God's will." God's legal commands (His prescriptive will) reveal and reflect God's nature and character. God's decrees (His decretive will) reveal God's purposes and intentions. The former can be disobeyed and thwarted. The latter cannot. Do you agree with this?

Hilston previously wrote:

Let's see if we understand your logic. God's precepts reveal His purpose and intentions. Ok. If we understand that correctly, then knowing a precept of God should reveal God's purpose and intentions.

Correct.

Can you provide an example from Scripture? I'd also be interested in any statements by the Reformed fathers that you are inclined to offer.

Hilston previously wrote:

For example, knowing that God's precept is "Thou shalt not commit adultery" (Exodus 20:14), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to raise up adversity against David from his own house, to take David's wives before his eyes and give them to his neighbor, who would lie with David's wives in the sight of the sun. Knowing that the precept of God is the blessing of his people by other nations (Genesis 12:3), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to "[turn] their heart to hate his people" (Psalm 105:25). Knowing that God commanded Pharaoh to let His people go (Exodus 5:1, 8:1), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to harden Pharaoh's heart (Exodus 4:21). Knowing that God commanded David to not take a military census of the people (2 Samuel 24:10), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention to be angry with David and to move him to do just that (2 Samuel 24:1). Knowing that God's precept is "Thou shalt not murder" (Exodus 20:13), then it must not have been God's purpose or intention for His only Son to be murdered, "being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" (Ac 2:23), "to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose determined before to be done" (Acts 4:28).

Do we understand your claim correctly?

No. You are omitting the factor that God decreed to establish a secondary moral agency within men created in His image, that would also work cause and effect amongst His creation.

Show me. Where did I omit the moral agency of men in my examples?

Have you had a look at our other thread on the two different wills of God?

Strengthens teeth,
Hilston et al

 

[Nang]

Hilston previously wrote:
Not at all. Or perhaps we need to define what you mean by "God's will." God's legal commands (His prescriptive will) reveal and reflect God's nature and character.

The law of nature reveals the attributes of God. (Romans 1:20)

The formal Law specifically reveals the duties, responsibilities, and accountability of humanity. e.g. Genesis 1:28, 2:16-17, Exodus 20:1-17, Deuteronomy 5:6-22

The purposes and eternal intents of God are sovereignly decreed, and all that occurs in created time is determined, ordained, and controlled by God.

God's decrees (His decretive will) reveal God's purposes and intentions. The former can be disobeyed and thwarted. The latter cannot. Do you agree with this?

I disagree with the former.

The laws of God (precepts) cannot be thwarted, suppressed, or disobeyed successfully or inconsequentially. Suppression of natural laws, or rebellion against formal commands, cannot and do not change the decrees of God, which are established upon His attributes, purposes, and good pleasure.

Decrees cannot be “disobeyed” for they are established by God upon Covenant and promises. Spiritual principle: Genesis 50:20; Romans 8:28

God's will be done, no matter the effects caused by the corrupted wills of mankind.

Can you provide an example from Scripture?

Sure. Look at the basic commands (formal Law) revealed to Adam in the garden.

“Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth . . .” Genesis 1:28a

“. . .Subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the face of the earth.” Genesis 1:28b

“. . Of every tree fo the garden you may freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat; for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die.” Genesis 2:16-17

These verses reveal God’s purpose for man. These commands put obligation upon man to perform (Covenant of Works). Man, created with moral agency, under these formal commands (as well as being placed in the garden with God and having full knowledge of the powerful and sovereign attributes of God), was held fully responsible to obey God’s will according to His precepts.

The fact that Adam failed his duties and obligations under both natural laws and formal Law, did not change, thwart, or suppress the attributes of God or His revealed purposes, at all.

Mankind is still reproducing, exercising dominion over creation, and fulfilling God's precept of death as being the wages of sin.

God's purposes have not been changed or thwarted, for He had already decreed to overrule Adam’s failure by providing another “Adam,” who was promised to Eve immediately following the fall. Genesis 3:15

Where did I omit the moral agency of men in my examples?

You consistently attribute God accountable for the failures of His creatures to abide by His precepts. Man was created morally responsible and obligated to live righteously under the Law.

God is not morally responsible to His own Law; only man is given such legal parameters.

And God, according to His purposes, decreed the demonstration of humanity’s inherent inability to morally fulfill all His Law.

Why? In order to reveal perfect humanity in Jesus Christ, who fulfilled all human accountability under the Law (the Covenant of Works); according to divine attribution and every legal precept; on behalf of His people according to promises of grace decreed before the foundation of the world.

“But when the fullness of the time had come, God send forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the Law, to redeem those who were under the law that we might receive the adoption as sons.” Galatians 4:4-5

This sums up revelation of the single purpose and will of God.

“And in truth if Christ were not crucified by the will of God, where is our redemption? Still however, the will of God is not at variance with itself. It undergoes no change. He makes no pretence of not willing what He wills, but while in himself the will is one and undivided, to us it appears manifold, because from the feebleness of our intellect, we cannot comprehend how, though after a different manner, he wills and wills not the very same thing." (Calvin's Institutes, Book 1, Chapter 18, Paragraph 3).

In my opinion, the teaching of duplicity of wills in God, is man-centered, wishful thinking, that is motivated by unnecessary desire to make excuses for God, rather than Christ-centered theology founded on faith in God to do all things well.

Nang

 

[penofareadywriter]

Man is created very good. In this capacity, I philosophize he has a capacity to love God even before an instruction is given 'to do otherwise.'

I would agree with that.

Choice, is not part of Adam's makeup. It is an external reference after his creation. Again, this is speculative for certainly God must have had in mind exactly what He intended in man, but the forbidden tree is an external motivation "don't eat from it." We must ask this question: Was Adam free to love God at this point in our story? Is he merely mechanical without the capacity to do otherwise? Is the tree necessary in this story to define a loving relationship between creation and Creator? It is important that we start here because it is the beginning of our consideration of freedom. In my estimation, freedom is relative to what we are desirous of. If Satan had created us (if that were even possible) we'd be made 'free to sin' but restricted from loving God..

I definitely have some questions here. After reading I still don't quite know where you stand on all this but I going to take some stabs and just let me know if I'm stabbing in the right direction.
So are you suggesting the Adam was not initially created with the freedom to rebel or " do other wise"? If so, was this freedom introduced at the time when God placed the tree in front of Him and commanded "Do not eat"? To me, the fact that God told Adam not to eat from the tree is the very evidence that God created him WITH the ability to disobey or "do other wise" than to love God.
Here is the the big one for me...why did God put the tree in the garden or ANYWHERE for that matter? If love needs not to be chosen freely, as I and others (Boyd) reject, why do we find God Him self placing in Adams front yard full access to the knowledge of good and evil? To make matters worse, He made the tree its self VERY attractive and appealing to the human eye! This whole scenario seems to strongly suggest that Greg Boyd's 6 theses of his "Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy" are correct when He suggests that (theses #1) Love must be freely chosen.
Now moving on to LFW. I see where you are coming from and I believe that there are cohesive answers ans solutions to the objections and difficulty's attached with LFW. # 1, this could be a issue of semantics. I don't know if you will agree or not but I believe the term "self determination" might help if properly understood. Self determination would be defined as the ability of an agent to determine his or her own actions. The agent renders INDEFINITE possibilities ("maybe this" and "maybe that") into DEFINITE realities ("certainly this or "certainly that"). Antecedent and external factors INFLUENCE the agent(genetics, culture, demons, ect..) but cannot DETERMINE the agent insofar as the agent is self-determining. I would love to here your thoughts!

 

[Hilston]

The law of nature reveals the attributes of God. (Romans 1:20)

I agree, but you made the claim "but both God's legal commands and God's decrees reveal God's will." Do natural laws reveal His purpose and intents?

The formal Law specifically reveals the duties, responsibilities, and accountability of humanity. e.g. Genesis 1:28, 2:16-17, Exodus 20:1-17, Deuteronomy 5:6-22

Again, I agree. But you made the claim "but both God's legal commands and God's decrees reveal God's will." Do God's prescriptions to man reveal His purposes and intents?

The purposes and eternal intents of God are sovereignly decreed, and all that occurs in created time is determined, ordained, and controlled by God.

Yet again, I agree. But you're not addressing the original claim. You made the claim "but both God's legal commands and God's decrees reveal God's will." Based on your claim, shouldn't you have included God's purposes and intents for God's formal Law, above, as well?
Hilston previously wrote:

… perhaps we need to define what you mean by "God's will." God's legal commands (His prescriptive will) reveal and reflect God's nature and character. God's decrees (His decretive will) reveal God's purposes and intentions. The former can be disobeyed and thwarted. The latter cannot. Do you agree with this?

I disagree with the former. The laws of God (precepts) cannot be thwarted, suppressed, or disobeyed successfully or inconsequentially.

Who said anthing about "successfully or inconsequentially"? They can be disobeyed. Period. People murder. People lie. This is indisputable.

Suppression of natural laws, or rebellion against formal commands, cannot and do not change the decrees of God, which are established upon His attributes, purposes, and good pleasure.

Whoever said otherwise? God's decrees are immutable.Who are you talking to, Nang-and-Jim? Why are you having such difficulty following this basic line of thought?

Decrees cannot be “disobeyed” for they are established by God upon Covenant and promises. Spiritual principle: Genesis 50:20; Romans 8:28 … God's will be done, no matter the effects caused by the corrupted wills of mankind.

I agree. Which is precisely why God's decretive will (His sovereignly decreed purposes and intents) is distinct from God's prescriptive will (His formal Law that specifically reveals the duties, responsibilities, and accountability of humanity).

Hilston previously wrote:

Let's see if we understand your logic. God's precepts reveal His purpose and intentions. Ok. If we understand that correctly, then knowing a precept of God should reveal God's purpose and intentions.

Nang-and-Jim replied:

Correct.

Hilston then asked Nang-and-Jim to provide an example from Scripture. They rejoined:

Sure. Look at the basic commands (formal Law) revealed to Adam in the garden.

“Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth . . .” Genesis 1:28a

“. . .Subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the face of the earth.” Genesis 1:28b

“. . Of every tree fo the garden you may freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat; for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die.” Genesis 2:16-17

These verses reveal God’s purpose for man.

Why did you leave out "intents"? There is a subtle equivocation going on. Was it God's purpose and intent for Adam to abstain from eating of the tree?

These commands put obligation upon man to perform (Covenant of Works). Man, created with moral agency, under these formal commands (as well as being placed in the garden with God and having full knowledge of the powerful and sovereign attributes of God), was held fully responsible to obey God’s will according to His precepts.

Yes, but these commands do not reveal God's purposes and intents. They only reveal His nature and character. Adam could not deduce from God's commands what God's purposes or intentions were.

The fact that Adam failed his duties and obligations under both natural laws and formal Law, did not change, thwart, or suppress the attributes of God or His revealed purposes, at all.

You're making my point for me. You are making a distinction between the formal laws God gave to Adam (and Adam's ability to disobey them) and God's purposes (which no man can alter or thwart, as you admit below). The former comprise God's prescriptive will; the latter His decretive will.

God's purposes have not been changed or thwarted …

Hilston asked: Where did I omit the moral agency of men in my examples?

You consistently attribute God accountable for the failures of His creatures to abide by His precepts.

Show me. Don't just assert. Where did I do that?

Man was created morally responsible and obligated to live righteously under the Law.

I agree; where have I said otherwise?

This sums up revelation of the single purpose and will of God.

“And in truth if Christ were not crucified by the will of God, where is our redemption? Still however, the will of God is not at variance with itself. It undergoes no change. He makes no pretence of not willing what He wills, but while in himself the will is one and undivided, to us it appears manifold, because from the feebleness of our intellect, we cannot comprehend how, though after a different manner, he wills and wills not the very same thing." (Calvin's Institutes, Book 1, Chapter 18, Paragraph 3).

I agree with this. Calvin recognizes the difference, concerning "the very same thing," between God's prescriptive will ("He wills") and God's decretive will ("He wills not"). God's prescriptive will is that men heed Jesus of Nazareth ("He wills") and God's decretive will is that men NOT heed Jesus of Nazareth ("He wills not") so that they'll execute Him.

In my opinion, the teaching of duplicity of wills in God, is man-centered, wishful thinking, that is motivated by unnecessary desire to make excuses for God, rather than Christ-centered theology founded on faith in God to do all things well.

Calvin is saying nothing contrary to what I've written. He doesn't have a terminology to discuss what God "wills" and "wills not" about the very same thing, but Calvin makes the distinction nonetheless.

Loose at the zoo,
Hilston

 

[Nang]

\ Calvin recognizes the difference, concerning "the very same thing," between God's prescriptive will ("He wills") and God's decretive will ("He wills not").

Eh? Calvin speaks of God's singular will, not any kind of "difference" between "same things!"

God's prescriptive will is that men heed Jesus of Nazareth ("He wills")

God's preceptive will is revealed via Law.

and God's decretive will is that men NOT heed Jesus of Nazareth ("He wills not") so that they'll execute Him.

Absurdities . . .

God's decretive will is that Jesus Christ, motivated by mercy and grace, would humanly and perfectly fulfill God's preceptive will (Law)as Mediator and Federal Head of the sons of God; establishing grounds for His righteousness under the Law, to be imputed to their account before God.

Loose at the zoo,
Hilston

Very "Loose" and very toothless, too.

Nang

 

[Hilston]

Hilston wrote previously: Calvin recognizes the difference, concerning "the very same thing," between God's prescriptive will ("He wills") and God's decretive will ("He wills not").

Eh? Calvin speaks of God's singular will, not any kind of "difference" between "same things!"

God's decretive will is singular. Calvin is clear on that. But he recognizes the struggle that we humans have with God's decrees that are contrary to His formal law, attributing this human struggle to "the feebleness of our intellect." He says we have difficulty comprehending how, "though after a different manner," he wills and wills not the very same thing." It couldn't be more clear. Why does Calvin even raise the question? Because of this very issue. How can God prohibit murder, but at the same time decree the murder of His own Son? The answer lies in the fact that God wills and wills not after a different manner: one is prescriptive, and one is decretive. This is why Calvin says that God "makes no pretense of not willing what He wills." God is not hung up on the distinction, nor does He pretend that it's not there. "In Himself," Calvin say, "the will is one and undivided," but to us, it appears to be divided. Why? Because we see a difference between decretive and prescriptive, and it's a difficult concept (proven abundantly in this thread).

Hilston wrote: God's prescriptive will is that men heed Jesus of Nazareth ("He wills")

God's preceptive will is revealed via Law.

Yes, and in the every command that God utters as well, one of which was to heed the Son in His earthly ministry. But men disobeyed according to God's decrees. So there's a conflict (albeit not unresolvable, hence the need for distinguishing terminology). On the one hand, God tells men to obey the Son (prescriptive). On the other (decretive) hand, God has decreed that men will NOT obey the Son.

Hilston wrote: ... and God's decretive will is that men NOT heed Jesus of Nazareth ("He wills not") so that they'll execute Him.

Absurdities . . .

Do you not agree that God decreed the execution of His Son? Calvin certainly believed this. Here are Calvin's own words in which he not only states that God wanted the execution of Christ to happen, but decreed it. And in so describing, Calvin acknowledges the difference between God's decretive and prescriptive wills:

But Peter teaches us that what befell Jesus was not only foreseen by God, but also decreed by him. From this we learn a general truth about God’s providence, one that appears in the government of the world as a whole, no less than in the death of Jesus: it belongs to God, not only to know the future, but also to ordain by his will whatever he wants to be done. Peter made this second point when he said that Jesus was delivered by the sure and determinate counsel of God. Wherefore, the foreknowledge of God is other than the will of God by which he rules and regulates all things. ~ Calvin's Commentaries, Vol. XXIII, p. 183. (emphases added by Hilston)

Notice the last bolded line. The foreknowledge (i.e., decreed will of God) is other than the will of God by which he rule and regulates all things (i.e., the prescriptive will of God). Calvin understands and acknowledges the difference. Will you?

Missing Pontiac,
Hilston