ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 2

[themuzicman]

You are not answering the question, according to your own logic, you are just denying my theology.

I was just using that as an example.

This should logically work in either case.

Assuming EDF.

Muz

 

[lee_merrill]

And this is where modal logic falls apart. It wants to look at both as being the same.

I'm not sure why "modal logic can't describe this" means my point is invalid, though. And I did even (I believe) show how modal logic can describe temporal propositions, but my argument here does not depend on this.

Depends on when the fact of the decision was known.

After the fact, it's known now, and let's say we first heard about it right this moment.

And Nang, I don't mind if you discuss in my discussion, I am discussing in RobE's discussion, you know...

Blessings,
Lee

 

[themuzicman]

I'm not sure why "modal logic can't describe this" means my point is invalid, though. And I did even (I believe) show how modal logic can describe temporal propositions, but my argument here does not depend on this.

You did simple logic and added some (as you said) meaningless modal elements.

After the fact, it's known now, and let's say we first heard about it right this moment.

Well, this is where modal logic gets a little weird. The past cannot be anything else other than what happened. Thus, we have the principle of the necessity of the past. Does that mean that it couldn't have been different before it happened? Not if it wasn't definitely foreknown. Thus, without EDF, it may have been contingent before that moment happened.

Does that make it necessary? Who knows. Personally, I don't really care. I've had too many modal discussions change time frames to suit the person I was having a discussion with to have any desire to discuss it from that perspective.

And, of course, your next step is to say that the future is like the past, which, as I've already pointed out, is the failure of modal logic. You want to make the past and the future the same, when they are not.

Muz

 

[lee_merrill]

And, of course, your next step is to say that the future is like the past, which, as I've already pointed out, is the failure of modal logic.

But I'm not using modal logic, modal logic is a way of expressing certain types of statements, now you could refute my statements by writing them in some logic equation, and then deducing a contradiction within that system. But I'm not using modal logic, why not address the statements directly? Modal logic seems to be more obscuring the issues here, rather than clarifying them...

So my view here is that we are looking with definite knowledge at a past free decision, and a future free decision, and I would argue that this demonstrates that definite knowledge of a decision does not mean there must be only one possibility associated with that decision.

Blessings,
Lee

 

[Clete]

You guys need to read this so that everyone is on the same page...

Modal Logic

and

Modal logic

Modal logic is not refuted in any different sort of way than any other sort of logic. The term modal only has to do with the subject matter not some different set of rules (at least usually not anyway). Whether someone is using Modal Logic or not, the same fallacies falsify its conclusions. That is to say that whether you use modal logic or not, if you are being self-contradictory, you are wrong. It is therefore not valid to say that because you are using modal logic, your argument fails. That would be about like saying that because that tool is red it isn't a hammer. It just doesn't follow.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[lee_merrill]

That is to say that whether you use modal logic or not, if you are being self-contradictory, you are wrong. It is therefore not valid to say that because you are using modal logic, your argument fails.

Certainly, I would agree...

 

[RobE]

Certainly, I would agree...

As would I. The problem is not the use of modal logic. It's the incorrect use of it.

Here's the argumentNorman Swartz)

1) If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
2) Paul has one daughter and two sons.

therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.​

Or if you prefer....

1) If it's possible to foreknow the future, then God has to know that I will eat cheese.
2) It's possible to foreknow the future.

therefore, I must eat cheese.​

The problem is that although Paul does have a son (he in fact has two sons), he does not have to have any. His having any children at all, as well as the exact number, are contingent matters, not matters of logical necessity.

Or the problem is that although you will eat cheese, you don't have to.

Premise 4: Thus, X can only do A at time Z, (2,3).

You eating cheese "is not logically necessary." Just as X doing A "is not logically necessary" which is imposed upon it with the term "only".

Lee's use of 'it is necessary' was correct in that He applied it to the whole statement, not just the contingency. It is necessary then becomes superfluous and you see that the necessity disappears when you do the math. This btw, defeats the proof as well.

Here's the link to Swartz entire line of reasoning.....The Modal Fallacy

 

[RobE]

You want to make the past and the future the same, when they are not.

Why aren't they especially if we're speaking of an entity which resides 'outside of time'?

A child and a man are different, but they are the same in many ways. Time is time, and examination of it should produce similar results.

 

[RobE]

Depends on who you talk to. The Molinist will say no, because God could have actualized another possible world.

Muz

Hence, the reason to use modal terms when speaking of it as we all do.

Isn't the unknown outcome of the open theist because of the complexity of alternate worlds?

Whereas, Molina,(I think rightly) believed that God was intelligent enough to understand and account for those alternate worlds.

 

[Clete]

As would I. The problem is not the use of modal logic. It's the incorrect use of it.

Here's the argumentNorman Swartz)

1) If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
2) Paul has one daughter and two sons.

therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.​

Or if you prefer....

1) If it's possible to foreknow the future, then God has to know that I will eat cheese.
2) It's possible to foreknow the future.

therefore, I must eat cheese.​

The problem is that although Paul does have a son (he in fact has two sons), he does not have to have any. His having any children at all, as well as the exact number, are contingent matters, not matters of logical necessity.

Or the problem is that although you will eat cheese, you don't have to.

Premise 4: Thus, X can only do A at time Z, (2,3).

You eating cheese "is not logically necessary." Just as X doing A "is not logically necessary" which is imposed upon it with the term "only".

Lee's use of 'it is necessary' was correct in that He applied it to the whole statement, not just the contingency. It is necessary then becomes superfluous and you see that the necessity disappears when you do the math. This btw, defeats the proof as well.

Here's the link to Swartz entire line of reasoning.....The Modal Fallacy

You caution us to use modal logic correctly and then do the exact opposite! Did you even bother to read any of the articles I linked too? I'd bet not!

You said...

1) If it's possible to foreknow the future, then God has to know that I will eat cheese.
2) It's possible to foreknow the future.

therefore, I must eat cheese.​

Notice that all the modal terms are highlighted.

Who, in your twisted little world, do you believe has made this argument and where did they make it? You're so impressed with Swartz having defeated this argument. There is no way you've represented it accurately! My daughters could falsify this nonsense! The possible doesn't necessitate anything! That's why it only possible and not necessary! :freak::duh:

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[RobE]

You caution us to use modal logic correctly and then do the exact opposite! Did you even bother to read any of the articles I linked too? I'd bet not!

Who, in your twisted little world, do you believe has made this argument and where did they make it? You're so impressed with Swartz having defeated this argument. There is no way you've represented it accurately! My daughters could falsify this nonsense! The possible doesn't necessitate anything! That's why it only possible and not necessary! :freak::duh:

Resting in Him,
Clete

You're right. I put Swartz's valid example first and an invalid example second intentionally. Why would I do this?

 

[lee_merrill]

You're right. I put Swartz's valid example first and an invalid example second intentionally. Why would I do this?

Strange that Clete states the essence of your argument, and claims this then refutes you--but indeed necessity is not bound up in the claims Muz is making, however it's not about what is possible (as Clete it seems is insisting) but whether "a implies b", and then given "a", does this mean "b" is necessarily true. Not, ah... necessarily! Neat link about the fallacy, that helped me clarify this in my mind...
CleverDan

Blessings,
Lee

 

[themuzicman]

So my view here is that we are looking with definite knowledge at a past free decision, and a future free decision, and I would argue that this demonstrates that definite knowledge of a decision does not mean there must be only one possibility associated with that decision.

But the opposite is demonstrated. A past decision cannot be anything else, now. Of course, whether it was free at all is what we're discussing.

Why don't you do the test:

in your next post, assume that it is definitely foreknown that you will use the word "superfluous." You say that you have the ability to do otherwise, so maintain the truth of what is definitely foreknown, and do otherwise.

Muz

 

[themuzicman]

Why aren't they especially if we're speaking of an entity which resides 'outside of time'?

We aren't speaking of a being that doesn't experience a temporal existence.

A child and a man are different, but they are the same in many ways. Time is time, and examination of it should produce similar results.

But not the same results.

Muz

 

[themuzicman]

As would I. The problem is not the use of modal logic. It's the incorrect use of it.

Here's the argumentNorman Swartz)

1) If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
2) Paul has one daughter and two sons.

therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.​

And that's true.

Or if you prefer....

1) If it's possible to foreknow the future, then God has to know that I will eat cheese.
2) It's possible to foreknow the future.

therefore, I must eat cheese.​

At some point, you must, if #1 is true. That's correct.

The problem is that although Paul does have a son (he in fact has two sons), he does not have to have any. His having any children at all, as well as the exact number, are contingent matters, not matters of logical necessity.

This is where you play games with modal logic. First you speak from the perspective of this moment, and then you speak from the perspective of the beginning of time. That's your error.

Or the problem is that although you will eat cheese, you don't have to.

If it is foreknown that you will, and that foreknowledge is definite and certain, then you must.

Premise 4: Thus, X can only do A at time Z, (2,3).

You eating cheese "is not logically necessary." Just as X doing A "is not logically necessary" which is imposed upon it with the term "only".

Ah, but it IS necessary.

Lee's use of 'it is necessary' was correct in that He applied it to the whole statement, not just the contingency. It is necessary then becomes superfluous and you see that the necessity disappears when you do the math. This btw, defeats the proof as well.

Not when we eliminate your error

Muz

 

[lee_merrill]

A past decision cannot be anything else, now.

And similarly with a known future decision, yet both may be free.

... in your next post, assume that it is definitely foreknown that you will use the word "superfluous." You say that you have the ability to do otherwise, so maintain the truth of what is definitely foreknown, and do otherwise.

But this is not real foreknowledge, let me mention the cross, which was foreknown, and sure, and yet Jesus' decision to lay down his life, he said, was a free one, even at the last moment.

"I lay it down of my own accord" (Jn. 10:18)

Blessings,
Lee

 

[themuzicman]

And similarly with a known future decision, yet both may be free.

Then why don't you demonstrate how that works.

But this is not real foreknowledge, let me mention the cross, which was foreknown, and sure, and yet Jesus' decision to lay down his life, he said, was a free one, even at the last moment.

"I lay it down of my own accord" (Jn. 10:18)

Here we need to make a distinction between something that will happen in general, say Christ's death as propitiation, and a specific event, where Jesus dies on a cross in 33AD on whatever date it happened.

That Jesus would die was necessary. How and when Jesus would die was His choice.

Muz

 

[SaulToPaul 2]

Then why don't you demonstrate how that works.



Here we need to make a distinction between something that will happen in general, say Christ's death as propitiation, and a specific event, where Jesus dies on a cross in 33AD on whatever date it happened.

That Jesus would die was necessary. How and when Jesus would die was His choice.

Muz

Was it important that Christ die at the time of the Passover?

 

[RobE]

And that's true.

No it isn't. That's the whole point.

At some point, you must, if #1 is true. That's correct.

No. If you don't believe Lee or me, the perhaps you are able to believe Clete.....

My daughters could falsify this nonsense! The possible doesn't necessitate anything! That's why it only possible and not necessary!

This is where you play games with modal logic. First you speak from the perspective of this moment, and then you speak from the perspective of the beginning of time. That's your error.

Isn't it just as wrong to speak from the perspective of the eternal and then speak from the perspective of the moment.

If it is foreknown that you will, and that foreknowledge is definite and certain, then you must.

Premise 4: Thus, X can only do A at time Z, (2,3).

You eating cheese "is not logically necessary." Just as X doing A "is not logically necessary" which is imposed upon it with the term "only".

Ah, but it IS necessary.

#4 isn't modally necessary, Sorry, but that's not a modally necessary statement, You're trying to argue from modal logic, and I've not asserted necessity. Get out of your pigeon hole and pay attention, Inability without necessity, Again, we're not talking necessity, In fact, I did not. I didn't speak of necessity at all, but ability, Please point to where I said "must.".

Not when we eliminate your error

Muz

 

[themuzicman]

No it isn't. That's the whole point.

Given the assumption, it is. That's where you miss it. You want to say that the assumption could be otherwise, therefore things change. You can't have your cake and eat it, too.

No. If you don't believe Lee or me, the perhaps you are able to believe Clete.....

Why would I?

The problem is that you're trying to assume the conclusion that your view is reality, and then appealing to reality as the basis for saying that it's true. That's circular.

If we live exclusively in the hypothetical world you've created, it is true. The fact that it isn't true in the real world invalidates your assumptions.

Isn't it just as wrong to speak from the perspective of the eternal and then speak from the perspective of the moment.

IT doesn't matter which way you do it, it wrong.

Muz