Basically, I'm showing how the English language causes a Modal Fallacy based upon it's use.
When premises are set up they use the language to convey necessity or actuality or possibility.
- Actual Tenses
- Past - "I did A."
- Present - "I do A (now)." "I am doing A (now)."
- Future - "I will do A (in the future)."
- Necessary Tenses
- Past - ""I had to do A."
- Present - "I have to do A (now)." "I must do A (now)." "I cannot do otherwise than A."
- Future - "I will have to do A (in the future)."
"I must do A (in the future)."
"I will not be able to do otherwise than A (in the future)."
- Possible Tenses
- Past - "I could have done A." "It was possible for me to have done A."
- Present - "I could do A (now)." "I might do A (now)." "It is possible for me to do A (now)."
- Future - "I might do A (in the future)." "I can do A (in the future)." "It will be possible for me to do A."
Now let's take some premises for analysis:
Premise 1a: Free will is defined as having the ability to do or do otherwise purely by an act of that will.
Premise 1a speaks in the possible present tense.
Premise 2a: If a future action is known by whatever means then there is no ability to do other than what is known (or else) it could not be said to have been known.
Premise 2a: Speaks in the necessary present tense.
Conclusion A: If the future is known, by whatever means, then I do not have free will.
The conclusion A speaks in the actual present tense.
The Modal Fallacy occurs in premise 2a where it assigns undue necessity.
Premise 2a basically states that "
It must be that if a future action is known by whatever means then it could not be said to have been known."
Possible present tense.
I removed the "
there is no ability to do other than what is known" and replaced it with an equivalent antecedent "It must be" because that gives us the ability to actually see what is being said here by putting premise 2a in the proper tense since necessity hasn't been proven anywhere in a prior premise, but is just simply put forward as being true.
One more example:
"If Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has to have at least two children."
The antecedent of this sentence expresses a true proposition. (Paul is my brother and he does have two sons and a daughter.) Thus according to the valid inference rule (known as "Modus Ponens") which allows us to infer the consequent of any true conditional statement whose antecedent is true, we should be able to infer: "Paul has to have at least two children."
Something is clearly amiss. While it is true that Paul does (in fact) have at least two children (he has three), it is false that he has to have three. He doesn't have to have any. He doesn't have to have one. He doesn't have to have two. He doesn't have to have three. He doesn't have to have four. Etc., etc. Put another way: There is no necessity in Paul's having any children, let alone having three. There is no necessity for Paul (just as there is no necessity for anyone else) to have at least two children.
"If Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he
has at least two children."
Replacing the
has to have(necessity assigned and deceptive) with
has(no necessity and truthful) makes the statement valid.
Assigning necessity is tricky when speaking of two items such as foreknowledge and freewill which have logical connections which aren't obviously seen when people make statements.
I hope this clears it up,
Rob
