A Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma.

[Bob Enyart]

Parts is Parts

Parts is Parts

In other words, this "god" is it's own standard because all three parts of it agree on what is "good?" Sorry, but this doesn't solve Euthiphro's dillema at all: in fact, it just makes the dillema circular ("god" is "good" because all the part's of its own nature say that it's "good").

P’84, the difference between persons and parts answers your objection. A person has a will. And a will is not the only, but one of the most, distinguishing characteristics of a person. In Gethsemane the Son said to the Father, “Not my will, but yours be done,” asserting that He willingly went to the cross, and was crucified after submitting His own will to the Father.

Christianity asserts that there are three Persons in the Godhead. Euthyphro’s Dilemma succeeds only against a unitarian deity or a morally contradictory Plurality. As I argued in the OP, if theologians had invented the Trinity to answer Socrates, the temptation would be strong to dismiss the claim as a convenient secondary assumption like the inflationary period of the Big Bang. But the plurality of the Godhead is well attested from Genesis 1:1 as described above.

Thus P’84: “The testimony of three eternal witnesses [not parts, but People, with independent wills], that not one of them has ever been threatened by another is not arbitrary [nor circular]. And for them to therefore assert that they are good to each other and not evil, by the testimony of each toward the other, is not arbitrary [nor circular]. And for them therefore to recognize as ‘good’ traits which are consistent with their nature is not arbitrary [nor circular].”

Thanks for trying,

-Bob Enyart
KGOV.com & Denver Bible Church

 

[Jefferson]

I've posted below Greg Koukl's answer to Euthyphro's Dilemma as found on his STR.org site and transcribed from his Stand To Reason radio program. To contrast the two answers:

Koukl argues, like Enyart, that righteousness flows from God's nature. However Koukl fails to indicate that it is the triune nature of God and His three-fold eternal witness that enables God to declare objectively what goodness is. Enyart answers that it is only this triune nature of the Christian God that can answer Socrates' accusation against an arbitrary divine standard of righteousness.

Enyart, like Koukl, also indicates that Allah, the deity of Islam, cannot answer this dilemma for he is even theoretically unable to defend his own righteousness. Koukl provides only a reference [Scott Rae, Moral Choices--An Introduction to Ethics] to back up this claim against Allah but his is a transcript of a radio segment and so is less comprehensive than Bob's answer. Thus Koukl makes the valid claim, but does not explain why Islam cannot answer this dilemma.

Enyart explains why Allah, if he existed, could not even theoretically know that he were good, because as a proposed unitarian deity, if he testifies of himself, his testimony is not credible. And this point that the Lord makes also demonstrates that Koukl's answer falls short. It is the triune nature of the testimony of the Trinity that enables God Himself to objectively know righteousness. Hopefully, this answer to Euthyphro on TOL will encourage Christians everywhere to realize another aspect of the glory of the Trinity!

-Jeff

And here is Stand To Reason's answer to:

Euthyphro's Dilemma

Gregory Koukl

Plato's challenge concerning the nature of goodness is still being heard today: Is an act right because God says it's so, or does God say it's so because it's right?

Plato's famous dilemma concerning the nature of goodness is still being raised today as a serious challenge to Christianity. Is an act right because God says it's so, or does God say it's so because it's right? The question first surfaces in Plato's dialog Euthyphro.[1]

The Challenge

In Plato's dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro[2], Socrates is attempting to understand the essence of piety and holiness:

Socrates: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro? Is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro: No, that is the reason.

Socrates: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

The dilemma Euthyphro faced is this: Is a thing good simply because the gods say it is? Or do the gods say a thing is good because of some other quality it has? If so, what is that quality? The problem stumped Euthyphro.

In more recent times, Plato's approach has been used as an assault on the coherence of Christianity. 20th century British philosopher and atheist, Bertrand Russell, formulated the problem this way in his polemic against the faith, Why I Am Not a Christian:

If you are quite sure there is a difference between right and wrong, you are then in this situation: Is that difference due to God's fiat or is it not? If it is due to God's fiat, then for God Himself there is no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant statement to say that God is good. If you are going to say, as theologians do, that God is good, you must then say that right and wrong have some meaning which is independent of God's fiat, because God's fiats are good and not good independently of the mere fact that he made them. If you are going to say that, you will then have to say that it is not only through God that right and wrong came into being, but that they are in their essence logically anterior to God.[3]​

The Problem

Russell's version is an attempt to show an internal flaw in the Christian's notion of God and goodness. Is a thing right simply because God declares it so, or does God say it is good because He recognizes a moral code superior even to Him?

This problem presents a dilemma because one is forced to choose between two options, both ultimately hostile to Christian theism. The believer is caught between a rock and a hard place.

On the one hand, God reigns and His Law is supreme. As the ultimate Sovereign, He establishes the moral rules of the universe. His commands are absolute. We must obey.

Ethicist Scott Rae describes the view: "A divine command theory of ethics is one in which the ultimate foundation for morality is the revealed will of God, or the commands of God found in Scripture."[4] This view is known as ethical voluntarism.

At first blush this seems correct, until we realize the liabilities. The content of morality would be arbitrary, dependent on God's whim. Though God has declared murder, theft, and debauchery wrong, it could have been otherwise had God willed it so. Any "immoral" act could suddenly become "moral" by simple fiat.

Further, it reduces God's goodness to His power. To say that God is good simply means that He is capable of enforcing His commands. As Russell put it, "For God Himself there is no difference between right and wrong."

This is the position of Islam,[5] but it is unacceptable to the Christian. Morality is not arbitrary. God is not free to call what is wrong right, and what is right wrong. The text is clear: "It is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18). God cannot sin.

But the alternative seems no better. If the Christian asserts that morality is not arbitrary, he is caught on the second horn of the dilemma. If the standard itself is absolute such that not even God can violate it, doesn't this make the Almighty Himself beholden to a higher law? The Sovereign becomes the subordinate.

In each case, Christianity loses. Either God is not good, or He's not sovereign. That's the dilemma.

Grounding

Plato's challenge forces us to consider an important detail in any discussion on the nature of morality: grounding.

The word "ground" originally meant "the lowest part, base, or bottom of anything."[6]

In philosophy it refers to the foundation or logical basis of a claim. Euthyphro's task was to identify the logical grounding of piety or virtue. What base does morality "stand on"?

Frank Beckwith and I chose a title for our book on relativism that paints a word picture: Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air. Our point: Relativists who make any claim to knowledge have no basis for their assertion. They are standing not on solid ground, but on thin air.

A law is only as legitimate as the authority upon which it rests. The U.S. government can't pass laws governing Canadians. Our federal laws apply only to the people of this country. Individuals can't make up laws that apply to their neighbors. They don't have that authority.

The founders of our country argued that even governments are subject to a higher law. Certain truths are transcendent, they argued, grounded not in human institutions but in God Himself. This appeal to higher Law was their rational justification for the morality of the American Revolution.

The problem of grounding morality is a difficult one for atheists who claim one can have ethics without God. Certainly, an atheist can act in a manner some people consider "moral," but it's hard to know what the term ultimately refers to. It generally means to comply with an objective standard of good, a Law given by legitimate authority. However, without a transcendent Lawmaker (God), there can be no transcendent Law, and no corresponding obligation to be good.

Trappist monk Thomas Merton put the challenge this way:

In the name of whom or what do you ask me to behave? Why should I go to the inconvenience of denying myself the satisfactions I desire in the name of some standard that exists only in your imagination? Why should I worship the fictions that you have imposed on me in the name of nothing?[7]​

As I wrote in Relativism, "a 'moral' atheist is like a man sitting down to dinner who doesn't believe in farmers, ranchers, fishermen, or cooks. He believes the food just appears, with no explanation and no sufficient cause."[8] The atheist's morality has no grounding.

Does the Christian fare any better, though? That is the challenge of Euthyphro's dilemma.

The Solution

The general strategy used to defeat a dilemma is to show that it's a false one. There are not two options, but three.

The Christian rejects the first option, that morality is an arbitrary function of God's power. And he rejects the second option, that God is responsible to a higher law. There is no Law over God.

The third option is that an objective standard exists (this avoids the first horn of the dilemma). However, the standard is not external to God, but internal (avoiding the second horn). Morality is grounded in the immutable character of God, who is perfectly good. His commands are not whims, but rooted in His holiness.

Could God simply decree that torturing babies was moral? "No," the Christian answers, "God would never do that." It's not a matter of command. It's a matter of character.

So the Christian answer avoids the dilemma entirely. Morality is not anterior to God--logically prior to Him--as Bertrand Russell suggests, but rooted in His nature. As Scott Rae puts it, "Morality is not grounded ultimately in God's commands, but in His character, which then expresses itself in His commands."[9] In other words, whatever a good God commands will always be good.

A Second Problem

The Christian's job is not done, though, because Bertrand Russell's observation suggests a second problem. Socrates' challenge to Euthyphro has not been met. What is "good"? It doesn't help to say that God is good unless we know what the term refers to.

If the word "good" means "in accord with the nature and character of God," we have a problem. When the Bible says "God is good," it simply means "God has the nature and character that God has." If God and goodness are the very same thing, then the statement "God is good" means nothing more than "God is God," a useless tautology.

The answer to this problem hinges on the philosophical notion of identity, expressed symbolically as A = A. When one thing is identical to another (in the way I'm using the term), there are not two things, but one.[10] For example, the president of Stand to Reason (Gregory Koukl) is identical to the author of this article. Everything that's true of the one is true of the other.[11] The author and the president are the same. They are not two, but one.

According to Christian teaching, God is not good in the same way that a bachelor is an unmarried male. When we say God is good, we are giving additional information, namely that God has a certain quality. God is not the very same thing as goodness (identical to it). It's an essential characteristic of God, so there is no tautology.[12]

Knowing Goodness

A proper understanding of Christian teaching on God removes one problem, yet we still face another: What is "good"? How can we know goodness if we don't define it first?

The way Abraham responded when he first learned of God's intention to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah gives us a clue to the answer:

Far be it from Thee to do such a thing, to slay the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous and the wicked are treated alike. Far be it from Thee! Shall not the Judge of all the earth deal justly? (Genesis 18:25)

Here's the question. How did Abraham know justice required that God not treat the wicked and the righteous alike? As of yet, no commandments had been handed down.

Abraham knew goodness not by prior definition or by some decree of God, but through moral intuition. He didn't need God to define justice (divine command). He knew it directly. His moral knowledge was built in.[13]

Even the atheist understands what moral terms mean. He doesn't need God in order to recognize morality. He needs God to make sense of what he recognizes.

This is precisely why the moral argument for God's existence is such a good one. The awareness of morality leads to God much as the awareness of falling apples leads to gravity. Our moral intuitions recognize the effect, but what is the adequate cause? If God does not exist, then moral terms are actually incoherent and our moral intuitions are nonsense.

Christians need not fear Plato on this score. When Euthyphro's dilemma is applied to Christianity, it mischaracterizes the Biblical view of God. Goodness is neither above God nor merely willed by Him. Instead, ethics are grounded in His holy character. Moral notions are not arbitrary and given to caprice. They are fixed and absolute, grounded in God's immutable nature.

Further, no outside definition of piety is necessary because morality is known directly through the faculty of moral intuition. God's laws express His character and--if our moral intuitions are intact--we immediately recognize those Laws as good.

This doesn't mean Christianity is true, only that it's is not handicapped by Plato's challenge to Euthyphro.

Footnotes

[1] There is some debate whether this word should be pronounced "u-THY-froh" or "U-thuh-froh."

[2] Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, translated by J. Harward, Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed., vol. 7 of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 195.

[3] Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, 1957), 12.

[4] Scott Rae, Moral Choices--An Introduction to Ethics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995), 31.

[5] Rae, 32.

[6] Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition.

[7] Quoted in Phillip Yancy, "The Other Great Commission," Christianity Today, October 7, 1996, 136.

[8] Frank Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism--Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 169.

[9] Rae, 32.

[10] The term "identical twins" is, strictly speaking, a misnomer. Twins aren't identical to each other. Each twin is identical to herself and only similar to the other.

[11] Philosophers know this as Leibnitz' law of the indiscernability of identicals.

[12] This distinguishes between the "is" of essential predication and the "is" of identity mentioned earlier. The word "is" can mean a couple of things.

[13] Something like this has to be the case. Regardless of how one grounds the concept of goodness, another could always ask, "But what makes that notion good?" To avoid a vicious regress, one must eventually appeal to some irreducible, primitive concept known by intuition.

This is a transcript of a commentary from the radio show "Stand to Reason," with Gregory Koukl. It is made available to you at no charge through the faithful giving of those who support Stand to Reason. Reproduction permitted for non-commercial use only. © 2002 Gregory Koukl

For more information, contact Stand to Reason at 1438 East 33rd St., Signal Hill, CA 90755
(800) 2-REASON (562) 595-7333

 

[Ecumenicist]

1) Is something good because God recognizes it as good? Or,
2) Is something good because God commands that it is good

Yes and yes. God commanded creation, and saw that it was good.

Bob makes a good point in suggesting that from a Christian perspective, God is consistant,
over and against the Greek Pantheon.

But, the question isn't really whether God is Good. The question really is, is human interpretation of God's Word good?

[Dave, I moved your full post to the Euthyphro Companion Thread because it went off topic from this point. - Jefferson]

 

[Bob Enyart]

PB: yes, skeptics are uncomfortable...

PB: yes, skeptics are uncomfortable...

PlastikBuddha, I continue to invite you and others to attempt to find fault with this TOL answer to Euthyphro’s Dilemma. This initial inability by our skeptic community to demonstrate that we have not answered this challenge will draw more attention to the truth that we have. You wrote:

“For the record I think the best theist answer stems from this:”

and if Socrates did not leave out other plausible solutions

PB, we theists claim that morality flows from God. Socrates was attempting to philosophically undermine that concept. So he argued that such a standard would either be defined by God or externally from Him. And while the force of his argument went mostly unstated, he hoped to show that either God was not the source of morality, or if He were, then morality must be arbitrary. TOL has rebutted this.

I understand that a non-Christian will be uncomfortable acknowledging that, of all the world’s major religions, only the Christian God answers Socrates’ challenge. But to hope that the solution resides elsewhere, PB, you do nothing to demonstrate that we have not succeeded, and we have by merely thinking outside of the unitarian box and applying the specific claims of Christ. As Jesus stated (John 5:31-32, 36-37): "If I bear witness of Myself, My witness is not true [credible]. There is another who bears witness of Me, and I know that the witness which He witnesses of Me is true [and] the works which the Father has given Me to finish—the very works that I do—bear witness of Me, that the Father has sent Me. And the Father Himself, who sent Me, has testified of Me."

-Pastor Bob Enyart
KGOV.com & Denver Bible Church
(Free Mt. Moriah DVD on the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ for unbelievers who snail mail a request addressed to: Bob Enyart 80001-0583)

 

[MontgomeryScott]

Committed to Righteousness

Committed to Righteousness

If you listen to Bob's archives, several times he states that God cannot sin because He is committed to righteousness. Hmmm? This makes the standard of right and wrong external to Him.

He would be consistent if he said that God can't sin because He is righteousness and cannot NOT be Himself.

So which is it? Is God righteousness personified or is God committed to righteousness?

 

[skeptic griggsy]

:wave: This answer[ Aquinas's] to the Euthyphro begs the question as we don't have evidence that that is indeed a part of God's nature and like the ontological argument another definition without substance. Indeed , we ignostics argue that that is another guess among others of His nature and attributes. And it just puts the dilemma at another point anyway.:sheep:

 

[Bob Enyart]

Suggestion for DM: Use traits instead of things or actions

Suggestion for DM: Use traits instead of things or actions

1) Is something good because God recognizes it as good? Or,
2) Is something good because God commands that it is good

Yes and yes. God commanded creation, and saw that it was good.

Dave, I’m sorry, but you misunderstand the issue. The question is not whether God can command something that is good, but: What is it that makes something good? It will be easier for you to follow the discussion if for illustrations you use traits instead of things or actions, traits like honesty, kindness, patience, humility. Did God command that these things would be good? Could He have commanded that these would be evil? Or did He merely recognize them as good? And if the latter, how can He do so without His determination being arbitrary? The OP answers this last question with the eternally corroborating three-fold testimony of the Persons of the Trinity in that they have no accusations against one another.

Bob makes a good point in suggesting that from a Christian perspective, God is consistent, over and against the Greek Pantheon.

Thanks.

But, the question isn't really whether God is Good. The question really is, is human interpretation of God's Word good? God's Word has been used to justify so much injustice and cruelty. …

Dave, we’ve moved the remainder of your post to the Euthyphro Companion Thread. Our goal is to keep this thread germane to Socrates’ dilemma. You went on to change the topic, which you are welcome to do elsewhere. Folks “can bring up a hundred other questions that deserve a hundred other answers.” But not in this thread.

-Bob Enyart
KGOV.com & Denver Bible Church

 

[Bob Enyart]

God's faithfulness is an ability, not an inability...

God's faithfulness is an ability, not an inability...

If you listen to Bob's archives, several times he states that God cannot sin because He is committed to righteousness. Hmmm? This makes the standard of right and wrong external to Him.

He would be consistent if he said that God can't sin because He is righteousness and cannot NOT be Himself.

Montgomery, thanks for commenting. I would be interested to know from you in a future post if you agree that the Trinity answers Euthyphro’s Dilemma. From your current post clearly we do disagree over this fundamental issue that you’ve addressed, basically, Can God sin?, and you have the vast majority of Christian teaching on your side.

First, let me correct something. I do not say (and I hope I never spoke so loosely as to have said) that “God cannot sin because” but rather, at Denver Bible Church and many of us here on TOL, we teach that “God will not sin because…” Montgomery, you and a thousand theologians disagree with this. I pray and hope, however, that Christians everywhere will re-evaluate this fundamental matter on the nature of God. But in this thread, this subject, although broached in the OP, is not directly on topic. Tico has already replied to you and so I will also, but to keep this thread sharply focused on the Dilemma itself, I'll limit my response here to this post only, and if you'd like to post a follow-up please do so in the Euthyphro Companion Thread or elsewhere. Thanks!

The five paramount attributes of the eternal God are that He is living, personal, relational, good and loving. The Bible 30 times refers to Him as the “Living God.” Because He is living, He can be Personal, and we read that He is a personal Being from Genesis chapter one throughout Scripture and especially emphasized in the Gospels. Being a person means among other things to possess a will, which is the ability to decide, and therefore the ability to decide otherwise. Being Relational brings with it multiple perspectives, which are required for a person to know whether or not he is righteous. If I testify concerning Myself, My testimony is not credible. Thus the triune God knows and declares that He is Good, and His commitment to the good of others demonstrates His Love.

Montgomery, your argument is that God cannot sin, which I assert is not praiseworthy, whereas that He has not sinned for all of eternity past because He will not sin is utterly praiseworthy. And it is God’s faithfulness that is at the heart of the Bible’s description of Him:

God’s Faithfulness
“For He is the Living God, and steadfast forever,” Daniel 6:26
“…the LORD your God, He is God, the faithful God…” Deuteronomy 7:9
“Great is Your faithfulness” Lamentations 3:23
O Lord… Your counsels of old are faithfulness and truth” Isaiah 25:1
“Trust in the LORD… and feed on His faithfulness” Psalm 37:3
“I have declared Your faithfulness… Your truth…” Psalm 40:10
“…Your faithfulness, O my God!” Psalm 71:22,
“Your faithfulness You shall establish in the very heavens” Psalm 89:2
“Your faithfulness also surrounds You” Psalm 89:8
“I will not… allow My faithfulness to fail” Psalm 89:33
“To declare… Your faithfulness every night” Psalm 92:2
“All Your commandments are faithful” Psalm 119:86
“Your faithfulness endures to all generations” Psalm 119:90
“Your testimonies, which You have commanded, Are righteous and very faithful” Psalm 119:138
“Righteousness shall be… His… and faithfulness” Isaiah 11:5
“the LORD who is faithful” Isaiah 49:7
“Let the Lord be a true and faithful witness…” Jeremiah 42:5
“For what if some did not believe? Will their unbelief make the faithfulness of God without effect?” Romans 3:3
“God is faithful” 1 Corinthians 1:9; 10:13; 2 Corinthians 1:18
“the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness” Galatians 5:22
“He who calls you is faithful” 1 Thessalonians 5:24
“the Lord is faithful” 2 Thessalonians 3:3
“He remains faithful” 2 Timothy 2:13
“He who promised is faithful” Hebrews 10:23
“…Sarah… judged Him faithful…” Hebrews 11:11
“a faithful Creator” 1 Peter 4:19
“He is faithful and just” 1 John 1:9
“Jesus Christ, the faithful witness” Revelation 1:5
“the Faithful and True Witness” Revelation 3:14
“He… was called Faithful and True, and in righteousness He judges” Revelation 19:11

Faithfulness is an ability, not an inability. To God we sing, “Great is Your faithfulness,” not "Your inability to be unfaithful." This ability is wrapped up in what it means for God to be personal and loving, which require volition. The following excerpt from the Opening Post defends this concept, and also, the italicized comments especially challenge your claim that this “makes the standard of right and wrong external to Him.” I submit also that the following is defensible biblically and that you are incorrect when you claim the foundation of the issue is that God “is righteousness and cannot NOT be Himself.”

…unless Christ's life on earth was a mere show, His fulfilling the law, refusing temptation, and suffering for us are praiseworthy, not because He had no choice, but because He did. The description of God's nature is a definition of righteousness. If God did anything contrary to that description, such an act would be deemed correctly as unrighteous. God is good, not because He cannot do evil, but because He will not do evil. God is free, and love must be freely given; thus the Son loves the Father willingly, not because He has no choice. Christians... should explain that they trust that God will remain steadfastly good because of the fierce determination of His will (counsel, Hebrews 6:17-18) to the truth. "A faithful witness does not lie, but a false witness will utter lies [inconsistencies]" (Proverbs 14:5). Christians trust that God is faithful and will only act consistent with the description of His nature. If He willed to embrace evil, as described currently by His nature, then He would no longer be the righteous God.​

And "Moral inconsistency is an absolute determinant for wrong." It was with courage, and great majesty, that God created, and then accomplished the Incarnation. And so I maintain that not only is this next comment from the OP plausible, but indeed it is the foundation of God’s glory:

If Jesus Christ gave into temptation by submitting to evil and worshipping Satan, then He would not have remained holy, but rather, the Rebellion would have entered the Godhead, and God would have come undone. It is false that God cannot do anything contrary to the description of His nature. It is true that God cannot do anything contrary to the description of His nature and remain righteous.​

The Bible emphasizes God being faithful (an ability) as central to its teaching on why we can trust Him. Our English word faith is related to fidelity, loyalty, commitment. The faithfulness of the Living God is His fierce commitment to truth and forever remaining consistent with His nature. God’s faithfulness, like faith itself, does not describe an inability but means that He has a commitment, trust, allegiance, conviction.

Of course, we haven't dealt with relevant passages like:
* Titus 1:2 -the Greek doesn't say that God cannot lie, but uses an adjective, the unlying God.
* James 1:13 -which on the surface is a strong proof text for your position, which I believe is hyperbole, i.e., God is so fiercely committed to faithfulness, Heb. 6:17-18, that for ALL practical purposes, He will not be lead down the path of sin, and if He ever sinned, God forbid, He would no longer be the Holy One of Israel
* Hebrews 2:18 & 4:15 -that Christ was tempted "yet without sin," which generally brings up a discussion of Christ's divine versus human natures, which I believe do not answer the question and miss the point.

But this discussion gets too far off center from Euthyphro's Dilemma, so per moderator Jefferson's rules for this conversation, let's keep this thread to the question of how, without contradiction, can morality flow from God.

-Pastor Bob Enyart
KGOV.com & Denver Bible Church

 

[Ecumenicist]

The question is not whether God can command something that is good, but: What is it that makes something good?

At least in the case of LOVE, this is a direct declaration of who God IS. Does God command that love is good? No, because God IS Love. Love is not a trait of God, it is the very substance of God. Does God recognize Love is good? Well, yes, but not in an external sense. God recognizes God's Self, God's Presence, manifested in Love, within God's Creatures.

Now the question comes up, what does it mean for God (in Christ) to command that we love one another...

[POST TRUNCATED by Bob Enyart. Dave, your complete post was copied to the Euthyphro Companion Thread. That question comes up, yes, but goes beyond discussing this Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma. -BE]

 

[Bob Enyart]

Skeptic Griggsy's two errors...

Skeptic Griggsy's two errors...

Skeptic Griggsy characterizes the above trinitarian Christian answer to Euthyprho as the same answer as given eight centuries ago by Thomas Aquinas. That is not true. Aquinas’ “simplicity of God” philosophy would make it difficult for Him to present the triune testimony of God as the source of God’s objective confidence in His own goodness.

Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) is sometimes represented as answering the Euthyphro Dilemma by claiming that God recognizes, rather than commands, what kinds of traits will be good. More accurately, though, Aquinas represents the dilemma as a false dichotomy, and argues that God simply defines goodness by His nature. That answer ignores the arbitrariness objection of both Socrates and of Christ in John 5, which exposes the inability of a unitarian testimony to credibly define what is good. Aquinas’s extreme commitment to Greek philosophy had him looking for an answer from the perspective of Aristotle and Plotinus more so than from the Bible.

This answer [Aquinas's] to the Euthyphro begs the question...

The first draft of my Opening Post mentioned Aquinas but I deleted that section before publishing because Aquinas sought to merge pagan Greek philosophy with Christian theology. (TOL documents the extensive history of Christian leaders merging Christian theology with pagan Greek ideas.) I did not want to give readers the false notion that Aquinas had answered Euthyphro because he did not recognize relationship as a fundamental attribute of God and therefore could not answer Socrates' challenge.

In his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas took up the question: “Whether God is the supreme good?” and wrote:

I [Thomas Aquinas] answer that, God is the supreme good simply… The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: … Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good…​

Thus Encyclopedia Britannica correctly summarizes: “it is not too far from the truth to say that the chief aim of Aquinas's work was to reconcile Aristotle's views with Christian doctrine.” In one fleeting moment in Summa Theologica, Aquinas accidentally gets a glimpse of the answer, but his commitment to philosophy turns him aside. For the closest he came was in quoting Augustine: “On the contrary, Augustine says that, the Trinity of the divine persons is ‘the supreme good, discerned by purified minds.’” But then he makes absolutely nothing of this glance toward the answer, and continues wandering in his wildly complex doctrine of simplicity, which was based heavily in his commitment to Greek philosophy and its methods, rather than on Scripture. Aquinas, who wrote twelve commentaries on Aristotle, in his discussion of goodness makes incidental reference to threes (mode, species and order) and turns aside to give a philosophical, rather than a personal and relational (trinitarian), defense of goodness.

And so Aquinas wrote on “Whether God is good?”

I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him…​

And to the question, “Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?” Aquinas wrote:

Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially…”​

And to the question, “Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?” Aquinas wrote:

I answer that… Plato held the existence of separate ideas of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation. …as Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God...​

Thus S. Griggsy, the opening post answer to Euthyphro’s Dilemma is only Aquinas’ answer to the extent that he never defended Euthyphro's second option, the divine command theory of righteousness. Aquinas was later opposed in this by theologian John Duns Scotus (1266-1308): “God commands an action not, as Aquinas asserts, because he sees it to be good; he makes it good by commanding it.” But Griggsy, TOL’s trinitarian answer to Euthyprho’s Dilemma is not Aquinas answer. If it were, it would have ignited centuries of philosophical and atheistic attacks on Aquinas use of the Trinity to answer Euthyphro. No such attacks exist.

And Griggsy, as to your second error:

[1st error:] This answer [Aquinas's] to the Euthyphro [2nd error:] begs the question as we don't have evidence that that is indeed a part of God's nature… Indeed , we agnostics argue that that is another guess among others of His nature and attributes. And it just puts the dilemma at another point anyway.

Griggsy, you misunderstand Socrates, Plato, and Russell. Their argument is that, logically, no system of absolute morality can flow from God, for either He is adhering to an external standard of righteousness, or He is arbitrarily declaring righteousness. TOL’s Christian Answer to Euthyphro’s Dilemma answers that philosophical challenge.

Thanks for challenging us though!

Pastor Bob Enyart
Denver Bible Church & KGOV.com

 

[Bob Enyart]

larryniven questions about the trinitarian answer to Euthyphro...

larryniven questions about the trinitarian answer to Euthyphro...

The side issue from the OP that MontgomeryScott focused on, of why God does not sin, spawned a discussion between Tico and larryniven which we’ve moved to the Euthyphro Companion Thread. The following excerpts from larryniven are copied here because they ask questions about our trinitarian answer:

…we can now apply the dilemma to both the father and the son. Does the father's righteousness have to refer to outside facts, or is it arbitrary? Likewise, is the son's commitment based simply on the fact that it's the father's nature (thus making it arbitrary), or is there some other evaluation going on?

And Larry continued:

…who in the trinity has the moral nature originally and who is doing the agreeing. Otherwise, you're just waving your hands and telling us rather than showing us that this argument escapes the dilemma. In other words, it won't do to tell us "Between the trinity, there are some entities which have what I will call moral nature and some (other?) entities that agree with this nature, but I cannot tell you which entities these are, how the agreement happens, or what it means for their natures to be moral." I feel as though you are capable of a more detailed response, although I have not seen one yet from you. Thanks.

Larry, you’ve made distinctions in the roles of the Persons of the Trinity that do not appear, and have nothing to do with the OP argument, as though we’ve claimed that the morality of one Person preceded another. We make no such claim, and our argument infers no such claim. Christianity asserts that all three Persons in the one God of the Trinity are good, eternally (not that one or more are good, and others agree). Euthyphro’s Dilemma questioned whether the definition of goodness can flow objectively from God. The eternal testimony within the Trinity that they have no accusations against each other can objectively corroborate to themselves the truth of their own claim to righteousness. And then love, a commitment to the good of someone, flows from that righteousness. This is what “God is good” means.

The truth that "God is good" has more to it than most theologians seem willing to bear. The goodness of the persons of the Trinity is inherent in the fierce determination of their wills, thus they are good, and their eternally corroborating testimony objectively informs them of the truth of their claim. At the risk of being rude raising a side issue that we’ll only allow responses to in the Companion Thread or elsewhere: it is almost universally discussed among Christians that the eternal future is exhaustively foreknown (sorry for the redundancy), but the consequence that God could never therefore actually create a new idea if that were true is universally overlooked. Likewise, it is widely taught that mankind does not have a libertarian free will (sorry for the re-redundancy), but it’s almost completely overlooked that a lot of Christian teaching has left God without much of a will either. By saying God has no choice in the matter of goodness, theologians think they are magnifying Him, but in reality, if God cannot exercise His will in matters of goodness, that eliminates God's will from operating in billions of situations (countless actually) where this philosophical theory of His "goodness" is like a harness that forces God to go in one direction rather than another, although such teachers would be quick to respond that while they claim God has no choice, He really doesn't want a choice, and is pleased to comply with the harness. In truth, even at the moment of the greatest demonstration of God's Goodness, in the Garden of Gethsemane, God the Son had a choice, to fulfill the promise He made in the Garden of Eden, or not. The Lord was NOT compelled to go to the cross, but God made sure to reveal to us that fundamental and most glorious truth, that in every sense, Jesus went willingly.

-Pastor Bob Enyart
Denver Bible Church & KGOV.com

 

[Bob Enyart]

American Buddhist confuses corroboration with a definition

American Buddhist confuses corroboration with a definition

American Buddhist, we moved your post to the Companion Thread because your Hindu claims and novel description of a Hindu creation myth were not sufficiently germane to keep this thread focused on this Christian Answer to Euthyphro. Your relevant comments:

This seems like a rather weak argument, Bob. But don't feel bad. Greater minds than you and I have been wrestling with this for millennia.

AB: Feelings aside AB, if it’s a weak argument, you should be able to demonstrate how it fails. But in your attempt, you confuse the OP “evidence” that confirms God’s definition of goodness with that definition itself…

I don't understand how the three of them - the Trinity - in their agreement about justness and goodness amongst one another, can then 'define' goodness as a whole. Are you saying that the definition of goodness arises from the conduct, toward one another, of the Trinity?

No. Their eternal non-confrontational conduct is the evidence that objectively validates the Trinity’s definition of goodness.

Your next question repeats that assumption, and builds upon it…

If so, is this because they decide that their behavior constitutes goodness [BE: No.] both for themselves and for the universe, or because they recognize (as in, see the innate nature of goodness beyond themselves) that their actions are good?

I'm afraid I've led myself right back to the dilemma we started with.

AB, yes, you have led yourself in circles. That’s because you’ve not followed the OP argument.

First you confused the testimony of the triune witness with a definition of goodness, rather than realize we offer that testimony as God’s own corroborating evidence of His goodness.

Secondly, you confuse the OP use of the word “recognize” with the concept of Divine Command Theory, obfuscating the whole distinction between Euthyphro’s two options.

This little bit confused me as well [quoting BE]: “Is something good because God recognizes it as good? Yes.”

I think the problem is the word 'recognize'… your use of recognize, I think, is more like the officiant recognizing the union of husband and wife at a wedding. In this case the recognition is in fact a performative act or utterance. His words bring into existence that which did not exist before.”

AB, off with your head . If you’ve read either Euthyphro’s Dilemma itself or the OP, you know that the entire distinction between the two options is whether God recognizes (sees) what traits are righteous, or commands (decides, brings into existence) what traits will be considered righteous. Such obfuscation does not disprove our Christian answer to Euthyphro.

I take it that this is what you wish to say about the Trinity and goodness. And their basis for creating goodness has been their own harmony amongst one another.

AB, I invite you to try again, but first please re-read the OP because you’ll have to understand our argument to have any chance at refuting it. God’s harmony doesn’t create the definition of goodness. His harmony corroborates the validity of His definition of goodness, which definition is a description of His nature.

 

[Bob Enyart]

Dave Miller, please consider using the Companion Thread

Dave Miller, please consider using the Companion Thread

At least in the case of LOVE, this is a direct declaration of who God IS. Does God command that love is good? No, because God IS Love. Love is not a trait of God, it is the very substance of God. Does God recognize Love is good? Well, yes, but not in an external sense. God recognizes God's Self, God's Presence, manifested in Love, within God's Creatures.

If by “Love is the very substance of God,” you mean that God cannot will to do otherwise, then Dave you overstate the case.

By saying God has no choice in the matter of goodness, theologians think they are magnifying Him, but in reality, if God cannot exercise His will in matters of goodness, that eliminates God's will from operating in billions of situations (countless actually) where this philosophical theory of His "goodness" is like a harness that forces God to go in one direction rather than another, although such teachers would be quick to respond that while they claim God has no choice, He really doesn't want a choice, and is pleased to comply with the harness. In truth, even at the moment of the greatest demonstration of God's Goodness, in the Garden of Gethsemane, God the Son had a choice, to fulfill the promise He made in the Garden of Eden, or not. The Lord was NOT compelled to go to the cross, but God made sure to reveal to us that fundamental and most glorious truth, that in every sense, Jesus went willingly.

Dave, yes, Love is fundamental to who God is, and only a handful of attributes are more fundamental to who God is, than Love. In order of preeminence, the only and eternal God is Living, Personal, Relational, Good and Loving. He could not love perfectly, unless He were Good. He could not know that He was Good, unless He were relational. He could not be relational, unless He were personal. And He could not be personal, unless He were living. Thus the Bible says 30 times, “the Living God.” These are the qualitative attributes of God the Bible speaks of throughout, that take precedence even over the more commonly discussed Greek and Latin philosophical quantitative attributes of God that have to do with how much of a certain attribute does God have or not, that is, the OMNIs and IMs of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, impassibility and immutability. Remember JONAH:
Jehovah’s
Obvious
Nativity
Attributes
Hermeneutic

The Babe in Bethlehem showed us who God truly is, for wise men came to the stable, to “worship Him” (Mat. 2:2). Yet that Infant was God the Son, who had just undergone extraordinary change, in order to become our Savior. When trying to identify which of God’s attributes are the most fundamental, use the JONAH hermeneutic…

Jehovah’s Obvious Nativity Attributes Hermeneutic

Holding her cooing newborn, any mom can tell you her baby’s attributes, of being living, personal, relational, and loving. But the sin inherited by the baby through the father will eventually express itself, and lead to death. And Mary would recognize an additional attribute in her Baby, because she did not conceive by a sinful man but of God as a virgin, therefore she could insert another into those four attributes: absolute goodness! For the angel promised her: “The Holy Spirit will… overshadow you; therefore, also, that Holy One who is to be born will be called the Son of God!” Thus the Infant retained the indispensable and most fundamental attributes of God,

Love is far more fundamental to who God is than many of His other biblical descriptions such as God being light, bread, a rock, and a door. But still, His expression of love is a function of God’s will, and it is because God is personal that He has a will, for possessing a will is a significant part of what it means to be personal. And God the son could divest Himself of some quantity of knowledge, as Jesus Himself explicitly disavowed, as “the Son,” omniscience (Mark 13:32), yet even though He humbled Himself through the Incarnation, He retained every bit of His qualitative attributes, which cannot be minimized or diluted without destroying them, namely, being Living, Personal, Relational, Good, and Loving, for the tiniest sin (if there be such), would utterly have destroyed Christ’s goodness, whereas laying down some amount of His quantitative attributes: knowledge, power, presence, passion, and changablity, this does not destroy His divinity because the quantitative OMNIs and IMs are secondary to the qualitative attributes. Thus God's power (His throne, authority) is built upon His righteousness (Ps. 89:14).

OF COURSE I HAVE GONE OFF THE EUTHYPHRO TOPIC. I apologize, and again, it appears rude of me to follow a rabbit trail and not allow response in this thread. But nonetheless, any response to this tangent should be posted in the Euthyphro Companion Thread, in any of the Battle Royale X Grandstand threads, or elsewhere. And finally Dave…

Now the question comes up, what does it mean for God (in Christ) to command that we love one another...

Sorry Dave, that question can come up in another thread. Not here. In this thread we’re TRYING to stay focused (I know I’m the worst offender, but… it’s my thread ) on the question we’re answering. If the definition of goodness flows from God Himself and is not an external standard, then wouldn’t righteousness have to be arbitrary, as though God were simply deciding what righteousness will be, since then He would be determining what traits are righteous (like love) and which are evil (like envy). Thus, is He claiming to be righteous without any way of being able to objectively confirm that opinion of Himself (as would be true with a unitarian God like Allah)? These are the questions we want to stay focused on, and on the assertion that the Opening Post has successfully answered Euthyphro’s Dilemma.

Thanks,

-Pastor Bob Enyart
Denver Bible Church & KGOV.com

 

[Bob Enyart]

Precedence of Attributes: Living, Personal, Relational, Good, and Loving

Precedence of Attributes: Living, Personal, Relational, Good, and Loving

Dave Miller’s post was moved to the companion thread. I imagine our edit decisions may seem unfair. For those unsure if your post will be moved, it would be helpful if you just posted in the Companion Thread to start with. Then, if a moderator judges your post sufficiently relevant to Opening Post arguments, forceful and/or insightful, and not repetitious with previous posts, “the moderator can move your post into this main thread” (Wildly Living Bible, Luke 14:10 ).

Dave, the only part of your post I’ll address here is:

I wouldn't dispute that God has these attributes [Living, Personal, Relational, Good, and Loving], but I would dispute the "preeminence" you assign to them. …you seem to be inferring that by accepting what Scripture says, i.e. God is Love, this somehow conflicts with the attributes you describe as pre-eminent.

Dave, from that quote, you can see that you’re violating Jefferson’s special rules for this thread:

…refer to the Opening Post arguments that the definition of Goodness is not external from God, and not arbitrary.

Yes, I’ve engaged on the tangents you reference, and yes, I’ve been rude urging others to not reply to such tangents in this thread. And I’m going to do it again… here :

Love is not antecedent to, it does not precede, the will. A person’s will is exercised before love can operate. Jesus loved us by going to the cross. He did not have to go. He went willingly. Christ's love follows the exercise of His will. Love is commitment to the good of someone, and that commitment must be active (faithfulness is an ability, not an inability).

The preeminent attributes of the only and eternal God proceed from their prerequisites.

1st: God is Living. [He is not a celestial battery or power; nor is He matter.]
2nd: He is Personal. [He is not plant, or a bacterium; He has a will.]
3rd: He is Relational. [He is not unitarian, like the Hindu Purusha or Allah.]
4th: He is Good. [Requires a will; He could not know that He were good unless He was relational; see O.P.]
5th: He is Loving. [He extends His goodness toward persons.]

A living being can love. Anything non-living cannot love.
A loving being, like an angel, can fall, and continue living, but stop loving.
Thus life is antecedent to love.

A living and personal being can do evil. Anything non-personal cannot do evil.
Thus life and personality are antecedent to morality.

Love is a commitment to the good of someone. Anything unable to make a commitment (anything lacking a will, which means it is not a person), or anyone who does not know what Good is (like the non-existent unitarian Allah), cannot love.
Thus Personhood (includes a will) and Goodness (requires relationship) are antecedent to love.

Dave, you’ve already indicated you disagree with all this. If you want to pursue those arguments or others in your post (which do not answer the arbitrariness accusation of Socrates; see O.P.), please put them in the Euthyphro Companion Thread. Thanks!

-Pastor Bob Enyart
Denver Bible Church

 

[skeptech]

That an argument is logically consistent, or valid, isn't at all sufficient to assert its conclusions as truth. If the premises aren't true, then the argument isn't sound, and the conclusions might be false.

In this case, the argument hinges on the properties of the Trinity, which Bob acknowledges as a mystery. So the premises are "mysterious" assertions that one must simply accept in order to agree with the argument.

This is no better than simply asserting that it's a mystery how a single god can affirm his own moral authority, but that it is nevertheless so.

That it's possible to perform this rationalization while maintaining "consistency" with the Bible is hardly surprising. Valid logic is applied to the Bible to justify all kinds of contrary positions.

 

[Bob Enyart]

Skeptech: given Christianity’s triune premise, the flaw in the O.P. is...

Skeptech: given Christianity’s triune premise, the flaw in the O.P. is...

TOL moderators copied Skeptech’s above post from the Euthyprho Companion Thread to this thread.

That an argument is logically consistent, or valid, isn't at all sufficient to assert its conclusions as truth. If the premises aren't true, then the argument isn't sound, and the conclusions might be false.

Since cars can fly backward through time, and since cars exist, therefore time travel is possible.

Skeptech, you are correct of course!

But then... oops, you wrote:

In this [Christian Answer to Euthyphro] case, the argument hinges on the properties of the Trinity, which Bob acknowledges as a mystery. So the premises are "mysterious" assertions that one must simply accept in order to agree with the argument.

False. The only Euthyphro question here is whether Socrates’ logical argument falsifies the premises of Christianity. Whether they can be falsified some other way (1 Cor. 15:14) is not at issue.

Let me repeat the correct part of your post, and give you a reciprocal truth that you’re forgetting:

That an argument is logically consistent, or valid, isn't at all sufficient to assert its conclusions as truth.

Then remember Skeptech: if an argument against a given premise is falsified, that argument should be rejected, regardless of the validity of the premise.

Intellectual honesty demands discarding falsified arguments. Otherwise you’ll knowingly defend illogical and even fictitious arguments against disagreeable claims.

Skeptech, I believe the following are your only intellectually honest responses:
1. Given the premise of Christianity’s triune God, the flaw in the O.P. argument is __________.
2. I can’t find a flaw in the O.P logic, but I hope that someone else can, so I’ll suspend using Euthyphro.
3. Christianity answers Euthyphro showing that the Trinity can non-arbitrarily define goodness.

Here on TOL, we are testing and answering the logical claims of Euthyphro. Socrates’ argument disproved the popular claims about the Greek pantheon. I don't know if the philosopher ever traveled to Mount Olympus (we did, in 2006, on our Bible Tour of Greece), or climbed to its summit looking for the daughters of Zeus. Such was not the nature of Socrates' investigation; he made a logical argument. The O.P. demonstrates that the Euthyphro Dilemma fails with regards to Christianity, where the eternally corroborating threefold testimony negates the need for an external standard to avoid defining goodness by fiat. The O.P. doesn’t assume that an atheist reader would believe in the Trinity (of course not), nor even that atheists who acknowledge that we’ve answered Euthyphro would therefore confess belief in God.

Skeptech, I have only looked at this single post of yours, so I don’t know what else you may have written about this. But if you are able to, please test our argument by attempting to demonstrate how the Trinity doesn’t answer Euthyphro, logically.

-Pastor Bob Enyart
Denver Bible Church & KGOV.com

 

[laughsoutloud]

I think you have to go with the Command theory.

The fact that we have a conscious does not mean we have an infallible moral compass. Even within the Bible, the same actions are viewed as moral or immoral over time.

The idea that the trinity provides some sort of external standard fails because Christianity does not recognize 3 gods, but one. If God is one then no external standard exists. Only if there were 3 Gods, and one of them were independent of this creation, and the other two subservient to that supreme God, would there be any independent basis for morality - though this would only kick the problem up a level (is something good because the supreme god willed it, or because the supreme god recognizes an independent authority).

This is like saying that the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branch has legitimacy based some authority they themselves agreed to. They don't, of course, as they all 3 derive their authority from the Constitution, and ultimately from the people.

In this case, since there is no "Constitution" for morals, only the the Divine Command approach will work for Christian theology. If that leaves goodness open to the charge of arbitrariness, then that is how it is - and there is biblical support for the idea.

 

[s_m_f]

I disagree with you beration of the Muslim tadition. It shows you are completely intoloerant of any other traditions other than your own. To make your argument a little less right winged white christian, I think you should include that the followers of Christianity do not always reflect their God. To make a strong argument against something, you must attack the strongest point, spouting right winged beliefs does not show you to be promoting the goodness of the Judeo-Christian religion but ratherm shows you as ill-informed and misleading

 

[skeptech]

Skeptech, I believe the following are your only intellectually honest responses:
1. Given the premise of Christianity’s triune God, the flaw in the O.P. argument is __________.
2. I can’t find a flaw in the O.P logic, but I hope that someone else can, so I’ll suspend using Euthyphro.
3. Christianity answers Euthyphro showing that the Trinity can non-arbitrarily define goodness.

Bob, I have a fourth alternative: I accept the logic of the OP, but point out that it's based on the premise of a Trinity that has attributes noted to be "mysterious;" and that it's facile to assemble a valid proof of virtually any conclusion desired when based on such a premise.

The conclusion that God can know what is right via the Trinity is vacuous because you have asserted that the Trinity has this power, the basis for which is that it's a mystery!

The only Euthyphro question here is whether Socrates’ logical argument falsifies the premises of Christianity.

For those who accept your interpretation of this mysterious power, your explanation can be fulfilling. But being a mystery, multiple consistent explanations are possible; and for the rest of us, it's all a bit lacking.

 

[chatmaggot]

I disagree with you beration of the Muslim tadition. It shows you are completely intoloerant of any other traditions other than your own. To make your argument a little less right winged white christian, I think you should include that the followers of Christianity do not always reflect their God. To make a strong argument against something, you must attack the strongest point, spouting right winged beliefs does not show you to be promoting the goodness of the Judeo-Christian religion but ratherm shows you as ill-informed and misleading

Is it wrong to be intolerant?